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Diplomatie. Guinée — Etats-Unis d'Amérique

John H. Morrow
First American Ambassador to Guinea.

New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1968. 291 p.

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XII
American Shortsightedness

The economic plight of Guinea resulting from its severance of ties with France, the initial emphasis of the Touré Government on the political rather than the economic, and the constant pressure of the Communist bloc countries combined to make Guinea's position on the international scene precarious. The support given by Guinea to the Soviet position at the United Nations had raised questions concerning the credibility of the professed Guinean policy of positive neutralism. Each time I raised this question with Guinean officials, they were quick to point out that the anticolonial posture of the Soviet Union at the United Nations coincided with their objective of independence for all African nations.
In spite of the discrepancies which marked the carrying out of Guinean foreign policy—and there were many—I remained convinced that the cornerstone of this policy was positive neutralism. Touré insisted repeatedly that the Guinean diplomatic doctrine was based essentially upon the interest of the Guinean people; that the Guinean people could not live in isolation from the rest of the world and overcome their economic difficulties; and that his nation was seeking the frien ship, brotherhood, and co-operation, in economic and cultural spheres, of all governments willing to respect Guinean sovereignty. Touré proclaimed:

Guinea is not the extension of any country. Its regime is not tied to any regime in the world; its experiment, inscribed in the cadre of African realities, has for its concern rehabilitating this Africa, and serving, in a dynamic and positive fashion, the cause of its independence and its unity. (Speech delivered in Conakry on May 1, 1959)

Never at any time during my stay in Guinea did I entertain the naive belief that President Touré or his colleagues could be won over to the West. I did believe that it was possible for the West to help this African leader to observe more closely the professed policy of positive neutralism, but I felt that the West had to accomplish this by deeds and not by words. It was not a question of pouring millions upon millions of aid dollars into a country that did not have the trained personnel for heavy industry. It was rather a matter of showing intent and willingness to help a developing nation meet its major problems of development at a critical moment in its history. Moscow saw to it that the whole world knew that it had offered Guinea a $35 million line of credit in August of 1959. What was not so well known was that the stringent terms of this offer caused the Guinean Government to delay its acceptance until March 1960. There existed also a convention on technical and economic aid concluded between the Republic of Guinea and the Federal Republic of Germany (March 1959) which provided a number of German experts to aid Guineans in improving methods of handling fish, raising cattle, and processing meats. The West German and Guinean Governments had under consideration a commercial treaty that involved the exchange of West German machines, motor vehicles, consumer goods, and technical equipment for Guinea's iron, bauxite, diamonds, coffee, and bananas. Negotiations were under way for a commercial treaty between the Republic of Guinea and the United Kingdom which became effective in October 1959.
The question asked within as well as outside diplomatic circles in Guinea was whether or not the United States intended to give aid to Guinea. French and Lebanese businessmen attempting to hold on in Guinea made frequent visits to the chancery with their appeals. Wherever I traveled in the country, people still engaged in small businesses besieged me with questions. For some reason these people seemed to think that I could exert some kind of magic influence in Washington that would get my country to aid the sagging Guinean economy. They felt also that I could get President Touré and his Government to lighten those regulations which were forcing foreign enterprises out of business.
I told all of these seekers that my country did have a genuine interest in preserving Guinean independence and stability, but that I had no way of knowing at that time what decisions were going to be made about aid. This was the truth, but I always felt that those asking the questions did not believe me. I said that I could not interfere in the internal affairs of Guinea in the regulation of business cnterprises, but I suggested to the French businessmen that they concentrate on getting their country to reach mutually acceptable agreements with the Guinean Government on monetary, political, and cultural matters.
Since my arrival in Guinea the major accomplishments had been the strengthening of mutual understanding and respect between the United States and Guinea, and the supplying of one English teacher. Naturally, I was perplexed by the silence in Washington on the specific, urgent requests and suggestions for an effective aid program which had been sent from our Embassy. I could not understand why apparently no action had been taken on recommendations prepared by the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) long before I had become Ambassador. I had decided finally that there might be some effort to start discussions during the state visit to the United States of President Touré scheduled for October 1959. But September fast drew to a close, and there was little that could be accomplished during an official visit to Washington unless the groundwork had been carefully laid in advance.
I had been scheduled to arrive in Washington several days ahead of the Guinean delegation to make sure that there were no loose ends to mar President Touré's official visit. In the midst of last-minute preparations for the trip, I received word from Washington that an official from the International Cooperation Administration was to arrive in Conakry the next day to begin negotiations with Guinean authorities on the standard bilateral agreement. For more than three and one-half months, despite repeated queries, we had remained in the dark concerning aid for Guinea. Now, four days before my departure date of October 18, word had come of the imminent arrival of an aid official.
I knew the Guineans well enough to realize that they were going to be extremely suspicious about any effort to negotiate an agreement so close to their visit to America. They could easily believe that I had been deliberately deceptive in not letting them know in advance that my country contemplated approaching their Government concerning an aid agreement. I was aware too that the officials with whom we had to deal were probably making their own preparations for the seven-nation tour with President Touré. I thought that the timing of the arrival of the Washington official was extremely bad.
The official arrived the next day, and we spent the morning going over the details of the agreement which I was to present to President Touré that afternoon. I stated very emphatically my objections to the timing and the purpose of his visit. After reading through the statement, which I was seeing for the first time, I warned that the Guineans were not going to be willing to sign it. The official felt that I was unduly pessimistic and said that the favorable atmosphere surrounding the Touré visit to America ensured the success of these negotiations. I replied that President Touré was going to be more interested in learning whether the United States was supplying a plane to transport the Guinean delegation to Washington than in discussing the details of an agreement at this time. I assured the official that nobody wanted to have an effective working agreement with the Guinean Government more than I did, and I pledged to do my utmost to achieve one, despite my misgivings.
The ICA official, my acting deputy, and I met with President Touré at the Présidence that afternoon. After presenting my colleagues, I thanked the President for receiving us at such short notice. I outlined the nature of the proposed bilateral agreement and succeeded in getting Touré to agree to appoint a working party to explore its details. I requested a meeting the next day (Saturday), since my departure was scheduled for Sunday. Touré indicated that the Ministers participating in the meetings would not be available until Monday. He concluded the interview in his usual fashion by saying, “D'accord en principe,” which meant simply that he had heard our proposition, and the interview had come to an end.
The ICA official seemed very elated as we left the President's office, and when we reached the chancery he wanted to send word to Washington that Touré had agreed in principle to the terms of the agreement. I told him that I could not sign such a message because it would give Washington the wrong impression. He reminded me that Touré had said “D'accord en principe.” 1 said that the Guinean President used this expression frequently in his conversations with his Ministers and with members of the diplomatic corps, and that it was merely a polite acknowledgment that the President had been listening. Touré would not state any opinion on the agreement until it had been examined carefully by his advisers. I also ventured to say that the moment Touré's advisers read the clause pertaining to certain privileges for technicians, they would reject the whole agreement.
It was fortunate that the original message which the ICA official wanted to send to his agency never left the chancery. The negotiations, started on Monday, October 19, 1959, came abruptly to a halt the following day when the Guinean officials made it clear that their Government would accept no agreement which encroached upon their national sovereignty. They declared that they had granted no special privileges to Russian, Czechoslovakian, or Polish technicians, and they had no intention of extending special privileges to American technicians. The American official was very much upset over the Guinean opposition and greatly disappointed at the failure to secure the acceptance of the standard ICA agreement by the Guinean Government.
When the word came through in Washington about the breakdown in negotiations in Conakry, I was not the least bit surprised. I was called into a hastily arranged meeting with State Department and ICA officials. An ICA man told me that I would have to return to Guinea and educate the Guineans on the ways of doing business with the United States. I asked him to suggest specifically how one educated the officials of a foreign country who charged that the insistence upon special privileges for nondiplomatic personnel encroached on their nation's sovereignty and felt that any pressure tactics constituted an insult to African dignity. The official in question, who up to this point had been quite vociferous and somewhat arrogant in tone and bearing, became silent.
I left that meeting and I left Washington with a feeling of deep frustration and bewilderment at the attitude of some of the officials in the International Co-operation Administration toward Guinea in particular and Africa in general.
Among other things I had detected an attitude that seemed to be: Guinea will either sign this agreement or else. I got the impression that these officials did not particularly care whether Guinea received aid or not. There seemed to be a complete unawareness of the ferment on the African scene, and of the fact that all Africa, as well as Asia, was scrutinizing the United States-Guinean relationship to discover whether the United States had placed a new priority on Africa and at last was formulating policies that were “responsive to African realities.”
To be perfectly frank about it, during my entire tour of duty in Guinea, I encountered only five ICA men who showed the understanding, technical expertise, and empathy absolutely essential for dealing with the ofttimes sensitive officials of developing nations. I can remember the names of four of these men, Jack Hood Vaughn, Marc Gordon, Bill Freeman, and John Canning. Unfortunately, I cannot recall the name of the fifth, but I do remember that he spoke with a foreign accent and was quite perceptive. Jack Hood Vaughn, who later left ICA—the best thing that he could have done—to go to the Peace Corps (later he became Ambassador to Panama; Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs; Director of the Peace Corps), was particularly effective during his visit to Guinea, even though the Guineans did not sign the agreement at that time. It was always my regret that ICA was unwilling to give Vaughn the rank or the authority to exercise his good judgment in the negotiations with the Guineans. With the necessary authorization from Washington—which we could not get—and with Vaughn and myself working as a team, I believe that we could have broken that particular aid impasse many months earlier.
I do not wish to convey the impression that I felt bitter toward the ICA. I was well aware that there were others within its ranks during the period in question who realized how important it was to prove to the emerging African nations the validity of the often expressed U.S. commitment to help them develop economically and politically while maintaining their sovereignty. Unfortunately, these knowledgeable individuals lacked the authority to put their ideas into action. Certainly the attempt to secure American technicians for countries like Guinea was a very ticklish and difficult matter. Those who had the desired skills and a speaking knowledge of French were usually reluctant to leave the United States to serve overseas for a twelve- or twenty-four-month period. Furthermore, the conditions under which they might have to live and work in some areas raised questions about health hazards as well as creature comforts.
I can well understand why the ICA felt obliged to seek the very best possible conditions, including diplomatic immunities, for its personnel. It is a fact, however, that other Americans not under ICA jurisdiction were recruited to work directly for the Guinean Government by the African-American Institute. The vast differences in pay and perquisites created an unfortunate atmosphere among these Americans and others living under better conditions. Those who experienced difficulty in getting promised compensation or housing, or who ran afoul of customs because of an unwillingness to pay unexpected duties were not in the best frame of mind to perform their assigned tasks.
A Guinean official at the Education Ministry summed up the situation by saying that the only people who complained constantly about their working conditions were the Americans. He contrasted their attitude with that of the Russians, Czechoslovakians, and East Germans who supposedly accepted without question the conditions in struggling Guinea. What this official ignored or did not wish to acknowledge was that Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and East German technicians had to carry out the orders that came from above. American technicians were free to stay or leave—several did leave without giving notice.
Fortunately for our standing abroad, the Peace Corps later proved conclusively that Americans could go into any country in the world without deep freezers, rugs, and other outward signs of our modern civilization and perform as effectively as people from any other country. Peace Corps members did much to remove the idea that Americans always clamor for special privileges and complain about the disgracefully low level of foreign culture and civilization. In fact, the excellent volunteer group of students known as Operation Crossroads, sponsored by the Rev. James Robinson of New York and chaperoned in Guinea in the summer of 1960 by the Rev. William Coffin, Yale University Chaplain, really paved the way for the Peace Corps in Africa.
I did wonder at times, however, what agency actually exerted the most influence on the foreign policy of the United States. It often appeared to me that the ICA, responsible for the outlay of huge sums throughout the world, was making the State Department play second fiddle in the decision-making department. This might not have been true of American dealings eleswhere in the world, but it seemed to be the case at least as long as I was in Guinea.
Whatever may be said to the contrary, the Guinean Government remained unwilling to sign the standard ICA agreement in the form originally presented in the fall of 1959. The document, finally signed by the Minister of Plan, N'Famara Keita, and myself in Conakry on September 30, 1960, was the outgrowth of prolonged and frustrating negotiations in Washington as well as in Conakry. The signing ceremony was witnessed by Guinean reporters and one French reporter and photographer. A release concerning the agreement appeared in the Agence Guinéenne de Presse, but no publicity was given it in America until an enterprising reporter of The New York Times, Dana Adams Schmidt, got wind of it a month or so later. As a result of his prodding, spokesmen for the State Department and for the ICA admitted that a bilateral agreement had been signed. I never did understand this reluctance to admit that the agreement had finally been concluded.
This bilateral agreement was considered a very significant event by members of the diplomatic corps in Guinea, who had come to believe that the United States and Guinea would never reach a meeting of minds. It was considered so significant by the Soviet Union that it called Ambassador Solod home two days later. When the Soviet Ambassador returned to Guinea, it was announced that Soviet engineers were to arrive soon to begin work on the railroad connecting Conakry and Kankan. The Soviet authorities did not know what I had reason to believe, that the agreement between Guinea and the United States would not be implemented during the remaining months of my tour of duty in Guinea. And it was not!
I had hoped that the United States was going to assist in the construction of the Konkouré Dam, not because I wanted Touré to have a prestige project, but because I felt—as had the French—that such a dam was necessary for the further development of industry in Guinea. I felt that Touré was as good a risk as Kwame Nkrumah any day, and was much more forthright. Nkrumah received American aid for his Volta Dam project. Any hope that Touré might have had concerning the possibility of American support for the construction of a dam on the Konkouré River to provide electric power for an aluminum smelter—a project already seriously considered by the French—was not realized. It was well known that Touré favored this project very much because he felt that the electric power not used by the smelter could be utilized by the towns and villages of Guinea. The Soviet Union expressed a willingness to aid in the construction of this dam, but nothing appeared to come of this offer while I was still in Guinea. It was always my feeling, however, that the Soviet Union was going to build a dam for Touré sooner or later, just as it agreed to build one for Nasser.
I was frequently asked by visitors to Guinea-official as well as unofficial—what was wrong with relations between the United States and Guinea. I could have answered this question merely by stating that it was inevitably a long-drawn-out process to establish good relations between two such different nations. This would have been dodging the issue. It was closer to the truth when I replied that Africa had not been on the U.S. priority list until fairly recently. I felt that the awareness in U.S. governmental circles of the situation developing in Africa had come as much from developments in the United Nations as from reports from African capitals—reports which were all too frequently ignored or acted upon too late. In the United Nations there had been a marked increase during 1960 and 1961 in the number of African nations that had become member states. The articulate delegates from Africa insisted that the powerful nations belonging to the United Nations support rather than thwart the role of the UN in aiding “Africa's revolution achieve success in as peaceful and just a manner as possible.” The United States was finding it increasingly difficult to secure the support of African and Asian nations for UN measures in which it was particularly interested. But nobody seemed to be connecting developments at the United Nations with United States policy in Africa.
In the 1959 report, “United States Foreign Policy,” prepared under his guidance, Dr. Melville J. Herskovits of Northwestern University pointed up the initial handicap facing the United States in Guinea: the United States did not have even a consular agent in Conakry when Guinea became independent in 1959; furthermore, the United States took more than a month to recognize the Touré Government, which had gained independence according to I egal proccdtires established by the French Government. Calling attention to the “extreme caution” exercised by the United States in granting aid to Guinea, the Herskovits report declared:

The United States has never had a positive, dynamic policy for Africa. Until very recently, we have looked to continuing control by friendly European powers as a guarantee of stability and dependable co-operation and have been reluctant to acknowledge the principle of self-government as fully applicable to its people.

The American position in Guinea between 1959 and 1961 was not helped by the uncertainty and “extreme caution” that slowed down the decision-making processes. In my estimation, the reluctance to take the necessary measures to establish an aid program in Guinea was partly the result of an unwillingness of Washington officials to endorse the concept that foreign aid is a "normal instrument of American foreign policy." This reluctance did not keep Senator Fulbright from advocating that U.S. foreign policy should move in the direction of making our aid efforts more effective. It should be recalled that Senator Fulbright himself, in his August 1964 attempt to show that reductions in the proposed foreign aid bill would undermine the program as an instrument of foreign policy, remarked:

In the context of the cold war, the objective of our aid program is not to help build stable and viable nations which will be profusely grateful to the United States, never annoy or displease us and follow us loyally on all international questions. If these were our objectives, a more effective program would be training and equipment of mass armies of occupation.
Ingratitude is disagreeable but not dangerous, and slavish compliance is a characteristic for which a free society has no use, either in itself or in its associates.

It's a small consolation to know that the Guinean situation dramatically illustrated the need which the U.S. State Department had for more people with a special knowledge of Africa, and the need for having decisions concerning Africa reached within the higher levels of the Department. Moves in this direction were started during the Eisenhower administration, and radical changes were made in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Conclusive proof that the United States had learned a lesson with Guinea was seen in the speed with which it recognized other newly emerging African nations and sent out delegations of high-level Americans to the independence celebrations of these nations. But this is only one facet of a very complicated situation.
Nowhere have I seen the basic problems and the mistakes bedeviling the United States in Africa expressed more clearly, forthrightly, and effectively than in the article, “Lost Goals in Africa” (Foreign Affairs, October 1965), by Dr. Arnold Rivkin, member of the Development Advisory Service of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Dr. Rivkin's estimate of the goals lost by the United States in Africa could well be taken as a blueprint that explains the ineffectiveness of the U.S. policy in the Republic of Guinea between 1959 and 1961. Dr. Rivkin is on firm ground when he states:

United States policy in Africa has lost much of its credibility for a large part of the African continent. We have held out hope for more than we have, in the event, been able or willing to deliver. Often the promise of brave words was extravagant and unwise, but what is noticed is that it has not been matched by congruent acts. We have seemed to say one thing and do another.

It is obviously better to make fewer promises and carry them out than to promise and fail to deliver. But I would like to point out also that the inability to make any promises at all or to anticipate favorable action on legitimate requests is just as bad as making too many promises that remain unfulfilled.
In respect to Guinea, Dr. Rivkin is correct in his appraisal of the influence exercised by the European Bureau of the State Department in shaping U.S. policies toward Guinea that caused the relationship between the United States and Guinea to be "severely limited" during a three-year period. Rivkin asserts:

… Policies toward independent African states are also shaped in the European Bureau. The sensitiveness of President de Gaulle, as judged by the European Bureau rather than an independent assessment of the U.S. national interest in Frenchspeaking countries is likely to be a decisive factor. . . . Notwithstanding the existence of the very situation which should have triggered active U.S. interest in Guinea, our respect for French primacy and De Gaulle's wishes prevented our taking action.

Dr. Rivkin reveals that Guinea and Mali, despite a combined population of eight million people, received one-half as much economic assistance as Nigeria with a population of 55.5 million, and Guinea alone received more U.S. aid than Senegal and the Ivory Coast combined. It can thus be seen that Guinean-American relations took a turn for the bettcr during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations even though Rivkin feels that

In Washington, Africa now has the lowest priority of any area. This has always been more or less State Department practice in making foreign-policy decisions; now it has become a matter of national policy.

One of the reasons my situation in Guinea was often so frustrating was that I became aware of the unwillingness on the part of Washington officials to recognize the fact that Guinea had won independence through a legal and mutually
agreed-upon procedure. These officials wanted everyone to exercise great care that nothing was done in Guinea to offend General de Gaulle. It was perfectly clear that De Gaulle hoped that the Guinean experiment would fail and that its failure would serve to deter other French African territories from taking a similar leap toward independence. It was clear also that De Gaulle was motivated in part by personal pique and anger at Sékou. Touré because the latter had chosen the occasion of the General's visit to Guinea to enunciate the desires and aspirations of the Guinean people. Nevertheless, American officials were unwilling to hecd my fervent pleas concerning the necessity of treating Guinea as an independent nation and making good on our oftrepeated assertions of interest in the self-determination of emerging nations. Instead of seizing the initiative, as urged constantly by the Embassy in Conakry, and taking obvious and logical steps to enable Guinea to develop constructively, the State Department saw fit to stick to its “notion of residual interest” in its dealings with Guinea. It was impossible to get support even for our proposal that medical teams be sent into Guinea to immunize the people—especially the children—against various diseases and undertake the dissemination of health information. Yet in 1965 this is exactly what was done in Guinea by the good ship Hope with its wonderful hospital facilities.
We had the opportunity to prove conclusively to all of Africa that our interest was not limited by our fear for what our NATO allies might think. But we let these opportunities slip by, and the Guineans and others were only too aware that our interest in their welfare seemed to increase only after the departure of the Soviet Ambassador late in 1961, and after the suppression of a second threatened coup in Guinea.
When I think of the care exercised by U.S. officials not to offend the easily ruffled feelings of President de Gaulle in regard to Guinea, and consider the shaky relationship that exists today between the De Gaulle Government and the U.S. Government, I cannot find the words to express my regrets over our missed opportunity. De Gaulle's demands for the withdrawal of American and other Allied military installations as well as of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe from the soil of his country should reveal to all concerned the futility of American efforts to appease De Gaulle between 1959 and 1961.
I am not saying that we should deliberately ignore the views of our allies. I submit, however, that if we lay claim to a foreign policy that endorses the viability, stability, and self-determination of developing nations, we cannot always be in perfect agreement with our allies. I cannot see how we can blow hot and cold in Africa and still expect our policy to have credibility there.
It is not easy to forget the shock and dismay caused by my suggestion that the United States urge France to arrive at a suitable agreement with the Guinean Government over monetary, political, and cultural problems, thus making possible a détente. Then there were the reports made by French authorities to the State Department that I was holding France at arm's length, when in reality I was attempting to establish rapport with members of the Guinean Government and gain their respect and confidence. Not to be overlooked were the attempts on the part of French diplomats to sabotage the state visit made by Sékou Touré to the United States in the fall of 1959. Had I not personally fought off these efforts in Paris (en route to the United States in October 1959), in Washington, at the Department of State, and at the White Honse there is no telling what effect the French efforts might have had upon the Touré visit. The De Gaulle Government was angry even at this ceremonial show of interest in the Touré Government and wished to diminish—if not cut off completely—the “red-carpet” treatment extended traditionally to a visiting head of state. I shall always believe that the deciding factor in warding off the negative influence the French attempted to exert on the Touré visit was the invitation extended to me prior to Touré's arrival to, brief the White House staff on the situation in Guinea. I did not pull any punches on this occasion, just as I had not in my appearance before the Secretary of State and his top advisers. At least nothing happened to mar the Touré visit.
As I have said elsewhere, Guinean Ambassador Telli Diallo, with whom I had established a firm friendship, took me to task during one of his visits to Guinea for having stopped off in Paris in 1959 to consult with the French. I vehemently denied this charge, and explained to Ambassador Diallo that my own Government had forbidden me to have any contact with French officials. I had, in fact, been confined to talking exclusively with the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, his staff, and an Episcopal minister and his wife. I don't think that I ever convinced my Guinean counterpart of this; nor could I convince Guinean officials, for that matter, that the United States did not consult the French Government before dealing with the Guinean Government.
Notwithstanding Ambassador Diallo's understandably bitter attitude toward the French Government, this very loyal and earnest Guinean, a most intelligent and astute lawyer and diplomat, always reminded me of a Frenchman in his actions, mannerisms, and ways of thinking and expressing himself. For that matter, this was true also of Ismael Touré, the Minister of Public Works, and of Fodéba Keita, the Minister of the Interior. There were no Guineans more loyal to President Touré and to the Guinean cause than these men, yet they were certainly Frenchmen under the skin. They had lived in France for many years and had absorbed French culture and civilization. The rupture with France had not eradicated this influence. So it was with a number of other Guinean officials.
At moments when they were engaged in their most heated declarations concerning the injustices and inequities of the French colonial situation, they sounded like, looked like, acted like French. At a moment, for example, when those French who still remained in Guinea were finding it impossible to repatriate their savings, the Guinean Minister of Education was in Paris trying to convince officials that they should still allow French teachers to come to Guinea. At a moment when President Touré was decrying French perfidiousness, a French Commission was en route to Guinea for discussions—fruitless though they might have been.
Coinciding with my impression of the depth of French influence on members of the Guinean Government and the people of Guinea was my belief that an unmistakable unifying factor in Guinea was the French language, which had become the official language by decision of the National Political Bureau. The mere suggestion that one of the dialects be chosen as the official language was sufficient to evoke rumblings that threatened tribal disturbances. The National Political Bureau effected a compromise as far as African languages were concerned by having them taught in the schools to enable prospective government employees to speak directly to all Guineans. English was decreed the second language of Guinea.
I have come to believe that if the French had exercised more tact, common sense, and diplomacy, and less pique, in handling the severance of relations with Guinea the situation in Guinea would have been vastly different. The skill with
which the French had spread their civilization and language was offset by their shortsighted and immature reaction to an inevitable choice made first by the Guineans. A relationship such as exists between France and the Ivory Coast, or between France and Senegal might have been possible had De Gaulle been willing to accept a fait accompli.
Until the 1965 break in diplomatic ties between France and Guinea over an alleged assassination plot aimed at President Touré, some progress had been made between these countries in settling monetary matters and improving cultural relations. For example, more teachers of French nationality could be found in Guinean classrooms than were present in Guinea between the difficult years of 1959 to 1961. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom did not appear to be any less interested in Guinea than before.

The conclusions of Dr. Rivkin cited above concerning economic assistance given by the United States to certain African nations indicate that Guinea eventually did receive greater assistance from the United States. It did not become known, however, until a near break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Guinea in November 1966 that Guinea had received almost $72 million in U.S. aid—mostly in agricultural products—since 1962.

On the surface, it appeared that Guinean-American relations had been improving slowly but surely since 1962. Then suddenly on October 30, 1966, President Touré ordered the house arrest of the newly arrived American Ambassador, Robinson McIlvaine, and one week later announced the expulsion of sixty-two Peace Corps volunteers and their dependents. These precipitous acts decreed by the highly emotional and oversuspicious Touré resulted in the summoning of Ambassador McIlvaine to the Department for consultations. A break in diplomatic ties was only narrowly averted.

This new strain on tenuous Guinean-American relations resulted from retaliative measures taken by Touré after his Foreign Minister, Louis-Lansana Béavogui, and eighteen other Guineans had been forcibly taken off a Pan American plane landed for refueling at Accra, Ghana. The Guinean Foreign Minister and three other members of the Government en route to a conference of the African Organization of Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and fifteen Guinean students en route to Lagos, Nigeria, to study English were seized by the Ghanaian police during the unscheduled refueling stop.

The Ghanaian Foreign Ministry charged the Guinean Government with holding some one hundred Ghanaians in Guinea against their will and said that the nineteen Guineans would not be released until the Ghanaians were allowed to leave Guinea. The Ghanaian Ministry charged further that Touré was broadcasting and allowing former Prime Minister Nkrumah, to whom he had given asylum in Guinea, to broadcast insulting, humiliating, and subversive propaganda. The Ministry branded the training of Ghanaian guerrillas in Guinea as “warlike actions” on the part of Guinea.
Touré, asserting that his Government would offer free transportation to any Ghanaian who wished to leave Guinea, justified his arrest of the American Ambassador by saying that he held the United States fully responsible for the seizure of Guinean citizens in transit on an American-owned plane. A Guinean Foreign Ministry official declared that American officials had given the assurance that the Pan American plane bearing the Guineans, would not stop at Accra. This had been believed because Pan American planes had been departing from Liberia and flying to Lagos, Nigeria, without stopping at Accra. Guineans had been boarding these planes in Liberia confident of arriving safely at their destination. The fact that this particular plane bearing Guineans had stopped at Accra gave rise to the belief that the Central Intelligence Agency had alerted Ghanaian officials.
A strong protest from the State Department brought about the release of Ambassador McIlvaine in less than twenty-four hours, but did not prevent an unruly mob from breaking furniture and windows at the Ambassador's residence shortly after his release. The State Department denied any responsibility for the Accra incident, but the Guinean Government insisted that the United States should take steps to secure the release of the nineteen “hostages.”
It was not until after a three-and-a-half-hour conference at Addis Ababa on November 5 that Lieutenant General Ankrah of Ghana, leader of the coup against the Nkrumah Govemment, consented to release the nineteen Guineans. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic finally prevailed upon the Ghanaian leaders to take this step, which prevented a split among the thirty-eight nations in the OAU. President William Tubman of Liberia was in on the first hour and a half of the conference with Ankrah.
The United States authorized the American Ambassador to Ethiopia, Edward M. Kerry, to circulate to OAU member states a strongly worded note criticizing Ghana's arrest of Guinean citizens as well as Guinea's arrest of Ambassador McIlvaine and G. Lambert Ronstrom, manager of Pan American World Airways.
A committee from the OAU visited Guinea and reported that no Ghanaians wished to leave Guinea. Such a report was to be expected, for none of Nkrumah's former security police wanted to risk returning to Accra. Furthermore, none of the Ghanaian students shipped to Conakry from the Soviet Union after the fall of Nkrumah felt free to speak their minds for fear of reprisals after the committee's departure.
Affairs in Guinea had seemingly returned to normal when the American Embassy was informed on November 8 that Peace Corps personnel had one week to get out of Guinea. Typically unpredictable was the “warm” but “regretful” send-off given the Peace Corps volunteers by Guinean Government officials, who hastened to assure these Americans that they were “angry” only at the United States and not at the Peace Corps.
It is a pity that Touré allowed his pride and anger to bring him to the point of expelling the one group that had so much to offer his country. It is unfortunate that he countenanced the house arrest of the American Ambassador and thus flagrantly failed to honor the fundamental concept of diplomatic immunity. For these unwise acts Touré must be held accountable. Equally deplorable is the Ghanaian Government's disregard for acceptable international behavior.
As long as Touré harbors former Ghanaian Prime Minister Nkrumah, an implacable enemy of the United States, there will continue to be misunderstandings between Guinean and American officials. Nkrumah is convinced that the CIA played a role in the overthrow of his government, and he is not going to let Touré forget this. Touré, for his part, is determined to prove to Nkrumah that he is not following the dictates of the United States or any other country.
The State Department could do nothing less than call home Ambassador McIlvaine for consultations, but I am glad that it did not opt for an outright break with Guinea. I hope that the Department can persuade Touré of the desire still prevailing in the United States to aid his country, and yet at the same time let him know in no uncertain fashion that he must honor the obligations and responsibilities of international dealings.
I am still convinced—these unfortunate incidents notwithstanding—that the nations of the West, and in particular the United States, must remain in the vanguard, realistically and sensibly aiding emerging African nations to develop economically, politically, and culturally while maintaining their sovereignty.

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