Les archives de la Revue française d’études politiques africaines contiennent de nombreux documents sur la répression du “Complot permanent” au Camp Boiro sous la dictature de Sékou Touré. Voici une sélection de trois articles :
“Les partis politiques guinéens avant l’indépendance”. Revue française d’études politiques africaines. No. 107. 9è année, novembre 1974, pp. 61-82
Philippe Decraene. “Guinée. La révolution en miettes”. Revue française d’études politiques africaines. No. 94. 9è année, octobre 1973, pp. 17-19
Pour le moment j’ai choisi de publier deux de ces trois papiers. Dans le troisième, “Les partis politiques guinéens avant l’indépendance”, l’auteur rate partiellement son sujet, en mettant l’accent sur l’activité syndicale autant que sur celle politique. Par ailleurs, Claude Rivière fait plusieurs fois référence — et sans effort critique — à Guinée : Albanie d’Afrique ou néo-colonie américaine ?, le livre d’Alpha Condé paru en 1972. Or cet ouvrage est pamphlétaire, dogmatique, peu empirique et désorganisé. Par exemple, le titre du livre n’est pas mentionné une seule fois dans le corps du texte ! Autrement dit, Alpha Condé semble poser un postulat qu’il ne lui vient pas à l’idée de développer un tant soit peu par la suite ! Etrange et illogique.
Quant à l’article d’opinion de Philippe Decraene, en voici le texte intégral.
Tierno S. Bah
“Guinée. La révolution en miettes” Revue française d’études politiques africaines. No. 94. 9è année, octobre 1973, pp. 17-19
Si, en octobre 1958, la proclamation de l’indépendance de la Guinée fut célébrée dans l’enthousiasme par tous les éléments progressistes du continent africain, la commémoration du quinzième anniversaire de cet événement, considéré comme capital à l’époque, vient de passer pratiquement inaperçue. Il est vrai qu’après le cinglant et spectaculaire “non” du turbulent leader révolutionnaire guinéen, ancien commis des postes, promu chef d’Etat après une éclatante carrière syndicale, ce que l’on appelait alors avec quelque romantisme “l’expérience guinéenne” paraissait avoir valeur exemplaire pour l’ensemble tiers-monde africain.
Depuis quinze ans, la voie suivie par M. Sékou Touré l’a mené à l’échec et il est clair que « la révolution guinéenne » reste surtout marquée par des manifestations de verbalisme dénuées de toute portée pratique. Ni économiquement, ni politiquement, la République de Guinée n’a tenu aucune des riches promesses qu’elle portait en elle en 1958.
Autrefois exportatrice de denrées agricoles tropicales, la Guinée a pratiquement cessé d’occuper une place importante dans ce domaine. Les plantations de bananes notamment sont en grande partie retournées à la brousse après le départ des exploitants européens.
Présentée au moment de son accession à l’indépendance comme le territoire de l’ancienne fédération de l’Afrique occidentale française dont les ressources potentielles étaient les plus importantes, la Guinée n’a pas été en mesure de mettre en valeur son capital agricole et minier. La plupart des capitaux étrangers, inquiets de l’évolution d’un regime qui n’a cessé de multiplier des menaces à leur égard, se sont investis soit au Sénégal, soit en Côte d’Ivoire, zones réputées plus “sûres”. Seule la présence d’immenses gisements de bauxite dans le pays a permis à celui-ci, grâce à l’implantation à Fria d’un important secteur “capitaliste” de connaître une certaine expansion et de ne pas manquer de devises étrangères. Cet apport en dollars et en francs français est d’autant plus précieux pour M. Sékou Touré que le franc guinéen est non seulement inconvertible, mais encore à peu près dépourvu de tout pouvoir d’achat réel.
Politiquement, en dépit ·d’une répression impitoyable qui a d’abord frappé le Fouta-Djalon, fief du “oui” au référendum de 1958 et, en tant que tel, considéré comme rebelle au pouvoir central, puis n’a épargné aucune couche de la population, l’opposition refuse de courber la tête. Plus d’un million de ressortissants guinéens vivent en exil en Europe, en Amérique et dans les pays limitrophes du leur. Certains d’entre eux mènent, à partir de l’étranger, une action hostile à M. Sékou Touré, mais, divisés, dépourvus de moyens financiers importants, ils restent inefficaces.
Philippe Decraene simplifie l’histoire en présentant le Fuuta-Jalon comme le “fief du Oui”. La liste des résultats du scrutin montre 56 959 bulletins “oui” contre 1 130 292 “non”. Les circonscriptions fuutaniennes enregistrèrent le plus grand nombre de votes positifs, certes. Et Labé vint de loin en tête avec 27 440 “oui” contre 40 143 “non”. Sékou Touré s’appuya sur ces chiffres pour déclarer que Labé était la “gangrène” de son parti. Mais l’anti-colonialisme et le rejet de la constitution proposée par de Gaulle n’étaient pas des fins en soi. C’étaient des moyens, des voies vers d’autres objectifs, d’autres fins, notamment la liberté, l’union et la prospérité. La Guinée sous Sékou Touré échoua sur ces trois fronts. Et l’absurde le plus cruel — eu égard aux milliers de victimes du Camp Boiro — est que le leader guinéen constata sa défaite et ravala son orgueil en invitant Jacques Foccart, son ennemi juré, à Conakry. La reddition de Sékou Touré est formulée dans cette demande qu’il adressa le 25 juin 1983 à Jacques Foccart, qui la rapporte : “Vous savez, m’a-t-il dit, que je vais sans doute devenir président de l’OUA. J’ai besoin d’un conseiller qui connaisse bien les hommes et les choses de notre continent. Personne ne répond autant que vous à ce profil. Vous êtes disponible maintenant. Accepteriez-vous, je ne dis pas de vous installer à Conakry, mais de venir me voir périodiquement pour m’aider ?”— T.S. Bah
Dans le pays où le gouvernement annonça dès 1959 la découverte de conspirations, les purges sont permanentes et frappent fonctionnaires, officiers, cadres supérieurs, simples paysans, sans épargner les plus hauts dignitaires du régime, fussent-ils les plus proches collaborateurs du chef de l’Etat. Depuis plus de dix ans celui-ci vit dans une atmosphère de complot permanent, refusant de quitter son pays et dirigeant lui-même les opérations destinées à frapper la population et à décourager, notamment par des procès publics spectaculaires, ceux qui ne sont pas entièrement d’accord avec le chef de la « révolution guinéenne ». Au demeurant, l’homme qui dénonce toujours avec la même violence « le capitalisme international » et le « néocolonialisme » fait non seulement bon ménage avec les grandes compagnies minières étrangères, pourtant peu suspectes de « socialisme », mais également avec les Etats-Unis, dont l’action discrète et efficace, apporte au budget guinéen un relatif équilibre.
La nature des rapports entre Washington et Conakry s’explique en partie par les conditions de la rupture franco-guinéenne de 1958 et par les difficultés qui ont caractérisé les relations entre Conakry et Moscou en 1962.
Mise au ban des nations africaines par la France après septembre 1958, la Guinée a été privée brutalement de toute assistance technique par l’ancienne métropole et a dû recourir à ses seules ressources nationales en experts, techniciens et capitaux.
Erratum. Après sa création, la jeune république bénéficia de l’assistance solidaire de cadres accourus d’Afrique, de France et des Caraibes pour combler le vide créé par le départ brusque des techniciens et enseignants français. — T.S. Bah
En dépit de plusieurs tentatives de réconciliation, jamais le dialogue franco-guinéen n’a pu être réellement renoué. De leur côté, les Soviétiques, d’abord accueillis avec chaleur ont été écartés, après avoir été accusés d’ingérence dans les affaires internes guinéennes.
Enfin, aucun des pays limitrophes de la Guinée, exceptée la Sierra Leone, dont M. Sékou Touré a sauvé le régime en intervenant militairement en sa faveur il y a deux ans, ne parvient à maintenir des rapports réellement cordiaux avec les dirigeants guinéens. Contraint à un réel isolement diplomatique, en partie brisé par le petit cercle des amis « progressistes » de Mauritanie et de la République populaire du Congo, d’Algérie ou du Dahomey, le président de la République guinéenne ne cesse de vitupérer contre ses voisins que pour les attaquer avec plus de véhémence après de courtes trèves.
Je continue la re-publication des dossiers de Jeune Afrique. No. 813, 8 août 1976, sur le « complot peul ». De fait, la présente livraison remonte le fil du temps en nous renvoyant à la genèse de la conspiration ourdie par Sékou Touré pour assassiner Telli Diallo et peindre le Fuuta-Jalon de son haineux et hideux pinceau. A noter que certains faits évoqués dans le document sont erronés. Je les relève et les commente de façon contextuelle. De même, j’apporte les corrections requises à quelques maladroites erreurs de noms propres. Ce dossier comporte deux volets. Il y a d’abord les informations cruciales obtenues par Jeune Afrique, qui établissent que Sékou Touré, lui-même, inventa toute la machination, qu’il fit exécuter ensuite par ses tortionnaires. Et, selon la version probable présentée ici, les membres du Bureau politique, par la voix de NFamara Keita, le mirent en garde contre le lancement d’une nouvelle purge, qui serait exploitée par les adversaires du régime. Le Responsable suprême passa outre leur avis et déclencha son complot contre les Peuls, qu’il ruminait, selon ses propres déclarations, depuis 1959. C’est un adolescent de 14 ans, Lamarana Diallo, qui fut utilisé comme agneau sacrificatoire pour obtenir la tête de Telli Diallo. Il fut accusé de tentative d’attentat sur la personne du président. Le revolver qu’il détenait lui aurait été remis par l’ancien secrétaire général de l’OUA, qui détenait alors le portefeuille de ministre de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux ! Selon certaines sources, Lamarana fut d’abord “choyé” au Camp Boiro, avant d’y être fouetté à mort par la suite. Le second volet consiste en une revue critique de Prison d’Afrique, le premier livre-témoignage sur le Camp Boiro, rédigé par Jean-Paul Alata après sa libération en 1976. Comme la plupart des observateurs à l’époque, Jeune Afrique s’étonne de la décision du gouvernement du président Giscard d’Estaing d’interdire la sortie du livre et de saisir le lot déjà en circulation. Hervé Hamon et Patrick Rotman décortiquent cette politique hypocrite du deux poids, deux mesures dans L’affaire Alata. Tierno S. Bah
Conakry, 5 juin 1976, M. Ahmed Sékou Touré, chef de l’Etat, préside un conseil des ministres. Les membres du gouvernement, convoqués inopinément, n’ont préparé aucun dossier. La séance-marathon durera plusieurs heures. Seul le président Sékou Touré y prendra la parole. Puis, rendez-vous est pris pour le lendemain.
Le chef de l’Etat reprend son exposé là où il l’avait interrompu la veille. Orateur intarissable, il garde encore le parole pendant plus de deux heures. Les ministres, qui suivent d’une oreille distraite ce long monologue sur les méfaits de l’impérialisme en Afrique et dans le monde, sont brusquement tirés de leur torpeur : « L’impérialisme a tenté une nouvelle fois de frapper la révolution guinéenne, déclare Sékou Touré. Le 13 mai, j’ai échappé à une tentative d’assassinat. » Il devait ce jour-là visiter l’Institut Polytechnique de Conakry, lorsqu’un garçon de quatorze, membre de la milice a essayé de le tuer. L’impérialisme, conclut Sékou Touré, n’a pas abandonné la partie. Il entretient des agents dans le pays.
Un silence géné accueille ces derniers mots du chef de l’Etat. Mais, pour la première fois depuis des années, les ministres se gardent de suggérer que l’on pourchasse cette « cinquième colonne » qui, tel Phénix, renaît sans cesse de ses cendres. Keita N’Yamar N’Famara ministre du domaine des échanges, va rompre le silence. Ce vieux compagnon de route de Sékou Touré, qui a fait partie de tous les gouvernements depuis 1956, membre influent du Bureau politique, est considéré comme le fidèle des fidèles. S’adressant au chef de l’Etat, il lui demande de réfléchir avant de l’adjurer de ne pas déclencher une nouvelle vague d’arrestations qui, dit-il, sera exploitée par les ennemis de la Guinée.
Keita N’Yamar N’Famara se souvient de la répression qui a suivi les évènements du 22 novembre 1970, quand une colonne d’exilés tenta de s’emparer du pouvoir par la force. Les autres membres du gouvernement approuvent leur collègue. Sékou Touré, impassible, écoute sans mot dire. Dans la soirée, Conakry se remplit de rumeurs. On dit que le Premier ministre Béavogui et son ministre du domaine des échanges ont été arrêtés. Il n’en est rien. Mais dès le lendemain, Sékou Touré, au cours d’un meeting populaire rend publiques les révélations qu’il a faites devant ses ministres. Le milicien qui voulait l’assassiner, déclare-t-il, n’était qu’un instrument d’une vaste conspiration contre la Guinée montée en Côte d’Ivoire et au Sénégal. Les présidents Houphouët-Boigny et Léopold Sédar Senghor sont personnellement mis en cause.
Depuis, Radio-Conakry a déclenché une violente guerre des ondes contre Dakar et Abidjan, apportant chaque jour des nouvelles sensationnelles sur cette invasion préparée par une véritable armée de mercenaires rassemblés dans le parc national sénégalais de Niokolo Koba, et dans la ville ivoirienne de Daloa. Elle annonce qu’un aérodrome militaire pouvant recevoir des bombardiers a été construit au coeur du parc et que les mercenaires comptent dans leurs rangs des officiers israéliens et allemands. Pour prouver leur bonne foi, le Sénégal et la Côte d’Ivoire, indignés, invitent les diplomates accrédités à Dakar et à Abidjan et des représentants de l’OUA et de l’ONU à venir juger sur place. Rien n’y fait. La Voix de la révolution poursuit sa campagne. Elle diffuse les « aveux » enregistrés de « traîtres démasqués ». De nombreux hauts fonctionnaires, des officiers, des dirigeants de la milice et même le ministre de la Justice, M. Diallo Telli, ancien secrétaire général de l’OUA, sont arrêtés. Du fait de l’évolution de la politique extérieure guinéenne (JA No. 809), cette répression étonne. La réconciliation avec l’ennemi implacable d’hier — la France — et la disparition des troupes coloniales portugaises aux frontières n’ont donc pas dissipé à Conakry la peur d’une invastion étrangère.
Faut-il voir dans ces « révélations » un simple moyen de détourner le mécontentement populaire ? Il convient de constater en tout cas que les arrestatiions interviennent en un moment où le gouvernement connaît de graves difficultés économiques. La suppression du commerce privé et, surtout, la récente collectivisation du bétail ont fini par compromettre une situation économique déjà précaire. Et la Guinée doit faire appel à l’assistance des Etats-Unis pour son approvisionnement en produits de première nécessité.
Les aveux vus par un rescapé du Camp Boiro
Ils sont nombreux, à travers tout le continent africain, ceux qui ont passé plusieurs années en prison, sans jugement, pour des raisons politiques. Que l’un d’entre eux, de temps en temps, publie ses souvenirs, ce n’est, hélas ! pas un évènement. Dans ces conditions, que le gouvernement français saisisse illégalement un livre intitulé Prison d’Afrique qui ne met nullement en péril la paix civile, c’est surprenant. Certes, il était gênant pour Paris de voir publier des faits mettant gravement en cause des hommes politiques d’un pays avec lequel la France cherche à renouer de fructueuses relations, certes, c’était d’autant plus embarassant qu’une des personnes impliquées represente son pays à Paris. Mais rien de tout cela n’est sans précédent ni ne suffit à expliquer la décision française. Pour la comprendre, il faut avoir lui le livre : ce n’est pas un simple recueil de souvenirs, ce n’est pas non plus une oeuvre de haine, ce n’est pas a vengeance d’un opposant ; c’est, à travers le récit pudique de scènes atroces, la froide analyse d’un système monstrueux d’élimination méthodique et par vagues successives des adversaires potentiels, d’un système stalinien perfectionné par une sorte de planification des « purges ». C’est un livre important. Mais le titre, Prison d’Afrique, est mauvais. Disons tendancieux. Car cela ne se passe pas n’importe où en Afrique, cela se passe en Guinée. Jean Lacouture, dans sa préface, cite un grand nombre de pays africains où l’on emprisonne sans jugement, où l’on torture, où ont eu lieu des exécutions sommaires, parfois massives. Et il conclut, en présentant le récit : « Aussi bien qu’à Conakry, il pourrait avoir été vécu à N’Djaména ou à Kampala, ou ailleurs. » Ce n’est pas vrai. La plupart des faits relatés ont peut-être pris, un à un, leur pendant ailleurs sur le continent. L’ensemble, non. Et c’est cet ensemble qui est le sujet du livre ; c’est l’enchaînement des faits, la méthode implacable qui lui confèrent sa gravité. Et cela est spécifique. Nulle part en Afrique ailleurs qu’en Guinée il n’existe un système aussi élaboré, un système contre lequel toute révolte individuelle est vaine, impossible, un système qui contraint les victimes non seulement à s’accuser elles-mêmes, mais à devenir les collaborateurs objectifs de leurs bourreaux. Et l’on verra, dans ce livre, Jean-Paul Alata, torturé, avili, recevoir de Sékou Touré un coup de téléphone et une lettre faisant appel à ses sentiments révolutionnaires et à son amitié pour l’inciter à cette collaboration avec ses tortionnaires !
La personnalité de l’auteur n’est pas indifférente. Ce n’était pas un personnage aimé à Conakry, ce Jean-Paul Alata. Français, né à Brazzaville, en 1924, en révolte contre son milieu d’origine, il était fonctionnaire de l’administration coloniale, mais militant syndicaliste. En 1957, il adhéra au Rassemblement démocratique africain, (RDA) section de Guinée, et devint un disciple de Sékou Touré après avoir été son adversaire politique au sein de la Démocratie socialiste de Guinée (DSG) de Barry Ibrahima dit Barry III. Tout naturellement, après l’indépendance en 1958, il se mit au service de la Guinée. Directeur général des Affaires économiques et financières auprès du président de la Reepublique, il devint un homme puissant et redouté, détesté même dans certains milieux. Considéré comme un renégat par les Blancs, comme un arriviste malintentionné par les Noirs, comme un concurrent déloyal par certains membres de l’entourage de Sékou Touré, il devint, selon son expression, un métis culturel. Il prit la nationalité guinénne, se fit musulman, épousa une Guinéenne, renonça avec ostentation au costume européen et ne porta plus que le boubou. Il donna à certains l’impression qu’il jouait de la confiance que lui portait le chef de l’Etat pour se faire craindre, faute de se faire aimer. Et quand il fut jeté, en janvier 1971, dans une cellule du Camp Boiro, il n’y eut pas grand monde, à Conakry, pour le plaindre.
C’est cet homme qui, en cinquante-quatre mois de détention et de tortures morales et physiques, va réfléchir sur lui-même, et sur le système dont il est devenu une victime après avoir été un serviteur. Au début, comme tous ceux qui sont passées par là, il ne comprend rien. Il s’était bien étonné, quelques fois lors de l’arrestation de tel ou tel sans que celui-là ait trahi le régime, mais il ne s’était pas arrêté longtemps à l’idée qu’il pût être innocent. Mais lui, Alata, il sait qu’il l’est ; alors pourquoi ? Pourquoi l’a-t-on arrêté ? Pourquoi le torture-t-on ? Pourquoi lui fait-on signer des aveux aussi invraisemblables qu’humiliants ?
Ce n’est que lorsque au terme d’une séance de tortures particulièrement insoutenable on lui fait mettre en cause des pesonnalités politiques… accuser des amis qu’il comprend soudains. Tout ce qui avait précédé, pendant plusieurs mois, était destiné à le mettre en condition, à le préparer pour cela. Et ceux qu’on l’oblige à désigner comme ses complices étaient ceux qui, dans un mois ou dans un an, seraient les victimes de la prochaine purge. Implacable, la machine tourne.
Et les victimes de la machine, du moins celles qui étaient assez importantes pour être utiles, en devenaient les auxiliaires. Alata était utilisé par « la commission » présidée par le ministre Ismael Touré, demi-frère du président, assisté de l’ambassadeur à Paris Seydou Keita, pour accélérer les aveux des « nouveaux » en leur expliquant ce qui les attendait et comment personne ne pouvait résister efficacement. Et le bourreau se confiait à la victime, démontant le mécanisme comme on le voit dans l’exemple que voici.
On avait arrêté un pur entre les purs, Diallo Alpha Taran. Dans un souci de logique, Jean-Paul Alata essayait de convaincre Ismael Touré que personne ne croirait que celui-là aussi était un agent secret de l’impérialisme. Et il suggérait, pour la vraisemblance, qu’il avait pu comploter par idéal gauchiste. « Je crois que vous avez très mal compris certains aspects de nos problèmes, expliqua le ministre. Il n’y a aucune impossibilité liée à des aspects matériels ou moraux de votre vie… Il ne peut y avoir de déviationnisme de gauche. C’est le parti qui mène la politique la plus progressiste, adaptée aux réalités du pays. Le comité révolutionnaire ne laissera pas s’accréditer la légende que certaines éliminations ont eu lieu parce que les coupables reprochaient aux dirigeants de trahir la Révolution. Tous les détenus ont trahi. Tous, vous avez trahi pour de l’argent, pas par idéal. »
Reconnu coupable de blanchiment d’argent et de corruption en mai dernier par le jury, Mahmoud Thiam, ancien ministre des mines et de la géologie de Guinée, a été condamné, le 25 août 2017, à sept ans de prison ferme à New York, par l’Honorable Denise Cote, Juge fédérale pour le Southern District de New York. Avant la proclamation de la sentence, l’avocat de Mahmoud Thiam a cherché à adoucir la frappe du glaive de la Justice contre son client. Dans un plaidoyer désespéré, il a fait ainsi une invocation indirecte, implicite, inappropriée, illégitime et imméritée du Camp Boiro. Je traduis et commente ici certains passages de la dépêche de l’Associated Press, qui a été largement reprise par les journaux et les sites web.
D’entrée de jeu la juge Denise Cote déclare que le citoyen américain, Mahmoud Thiam, a trahi la République de Guinée en acceptant des pots-de-vin d’un montant 8.5 million dollars US. Il s’agit d’un constat matériel et d’une opinion irréfutable. A n’importe quel niveau de la hiérarchie administrative et gouvernementale, le fonctionnaire et le ministre sont censés servir les populations, et non pas s’en servir. Ils en sont les serviteurs et non pas les maîtres. En compromettant —peut-être irrémédiablement — le potentiel humain, social, culturel et économique (rural et industriel) de la Guinée, les régimes successifs du pays ont créé le cadre toxique dont Mahmoud Thiam est devenu un symbole mondial.
La juge continue : Mahmoud Thiam arriva à Conakry en 2009 pour “aider” la Guinée “et non pas pour la dépouiller.” “Il vit la corruption tout autour de lui. Il décida finalement d’y succumber.” La juge prête ici des intentions généreuses et un motif louable à Mahmoud Thiam. Mais la réalité est différente. Car ce n’est pas à son arrivée que M. Thiam se rendit compte de la vénalité rampante en Guinée. Il connaissait les réalités du pays. Et il devait bien au courant de l’effondrement de la moralité publique dans son pays natal et du manque de confiance des dirigeants par les populations. Le fossé se creuse depuis le début des années 1960. En 2009, l’écart était devenu béant et visible de tous, à domicile comme à l’étranger.
Lansana Conté meurt le 22 décembre 2008.Quelques heures plus tard, son remplaçant choisi et préparé, un certain capitaine Moussa Dadis Camara, chef du service carburant des Forces armées, s’empare du pouvoir. Il s’y installe, appuyé par le Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement. Pressenti pour le poste de Premier ministre, Komara Kabinet invite Mahmoud Thiam à participer à son gouvernement. Consentant, il négocie son départ de UBS et part dare-dare pour Conaky. Son plan — et peut-être l’offre — est arrêté : obtenir un poste lucratif, offrant plein d’occasions pour des tractations plus ou moins légitimes, des commissions rondelettes, ainsi que des pourboires juteux.
Mahmoud donne à Global Mining Observer en 2014 une version arrondie et édulcorée des circonstances de sa nomination gouvernementale. Il y expose aussi une conception superficielle, naïve, démagogique et prédatrice du développement, qui serait induit et impulsé par l’industrie extractive. Les préalables culturels lui échappent, bien sûr. Et, paradoxalement, les critères d’ordre financier ne font même pas l’objet d’une esquisse d’explicitation…
Le 14 janvier 2009, il entre au gouvernement dirigé par Komara Kabinet, où il occupe le poste de ministre des Mines et de l’Energie, sous la présidence du petit capitaine. Le 3 décembre 2009, Dadis et Toumba Diakité ont une altercation orageuse au sujet du massacre de centaines de manifestants pacifiques le 28 septembre précédent au stade sportif de Conakry. La dispute vire au drame et des coups de feu sont échangés. Dadis reste sur le carreau, grièvement blessé; Touba, lui, s’enfuit et se réfugie hors de Guinée. En janvier 2010 un régime de Transition est créé à la place du CNDD. Il a pour mission d’organiser l’élection présidentielle avant la fin de l’année. Général Sékouba Konaté le dirige. (A noter que cet officier est interdit de séjour aux USA depuis 2016 pour flagrant délit de trafic de devises). Et Jean-Marie Doré remplace Komara Kabinet à la Primature. Le 15 février 2010 Mahmoud Thiam conserve son portefeuille, désormais appelé Mines et la Géologie, moins l’Energie donc. Le 4 janvier 2011 Mahmoud Thiam est débarqué du gouvernement par Alpha Condé, le nouveau président “élu”. Peu après M. Thiam quittait la Guinée pour retourner dans sa patrie d’adoption, les USA. Pour son malheur, il avait déjà enfreint la loi anti-corruption étrangère connue sous le nom de Foreign Corrupt Practice Act. Dès lors, patient et méticuleux, le FBI l’attendait de pied ferme. Ainsi, dans son interview avec Global Mining Observer, Mahmoud avoue se sentir sous surveillance policière depuis 2004.
“… une terre où la force de la loi n’existe pas.” Lapidaire et exacte, la formule précédente par Juge Cote dépeint bien la Guinée. Elle s’applique à ce pays, hier comme aujourd’hui, depuis 1959. Et tant que la situation durera, il ne faudrait pas s’attendre à la réalisation de gros investissements : Konkouré, Simandou, chemin de fer trans-guinéen, nouveaux ports et aéroports, universités dignes de ce nom, etc.
Mahmoud Thiam “ne montra pas de remords pour sa culpabilité” affirmée par le jury. “J’ai même perçu quelqu’un qui croit exercer un droit”… de profiter des recettes de la corruption, ajoute la juge. Cet état d’esprit est un cancer qui s’est presque généralisé dans la fonction publique guinéenne. Lorsqu’un fonctionnaire est nommé à un poste “lucratif”, on lui dit : “C’est ta chance, saisis-la.” “Si tu n’en profites pas pour détourner le bien public à tes fins personnelles, alors tu es maudit ! »
Le code pénal fédéral américain recommande 12 ans ou plus pour le genre de crime dont Mahmoud Thiam a été reconnu coupable. En imposant une peine de 7 ans, la juge a tenu compte d’un argument de l’avocat défenseur Aaron Goldsmith. Pour attirer la compassion et la grâce des jurés et de la juge, celui-ci a invoqué “la torture et le meurtre” du prisonnier politique que fut le père de Mahmoud Thiam. Zélé, l’avocat parla du “violent régime communiste à la tête de la Guinée en 1971”. La dictature de Sékou Touré fut d’une violence inouïe, certes. Mais le tyran n’était pas d’obédience communiste. Il était sékoutouréiste ! C’est-à-dire pire que le communisme.
A s’en tenir au communiqué de l’agence de presse, l’avocat n’a pas fourni au tribunal les circonstances de la disparition de M. Thiam père. Les indications suivantes suffisent pour combler la lacune. De qui parle-t-on ? Il s’agit ici de Baba Hady Thiam, licencié en droit et directeur de la Banque guinéenne du Commerce Extérieur (BGCE). Intègre et rompu dans la gestion, l’inspection et l’audit bancaires, il faisait partie de l’élite de ce secteur dans les années 1960. Par malheur, le chef de l’Etat guinéen ne connaissait en matière de finance et de banque que les manigances et les magouilles. Entre la probité des professionnels et la fourberie du politicien, la collision et le choc devinrent inévitables. Le groupe de Baba Hady Thiam n’était pas dupe. Au contraire, il mesurait l’ampleur des dégâts causés par la gabegie de Sékou Touré. Se sachant démasqué, et pour éteindre la contradiction à son avantage, le président prit les devants de façon draconienne et tragique. Il accusa, sans la moindre preuve, ses cadres de banque de complicité avec le commando militaire guinéo-portugais qui attaqua Conakry le 22 novembre 1970. Ils furent arrêtés sans mandat, jugés en leur absence, et fusillés ou pendus par des pelotons d’exécution qui incluaient capitaine Diarra Traoré et lieutenant Lansana Conté. Outre Baba Hady Thiam, les victimes de la purge du secteur de la banque incluaient :
Ousmane Baldé, Barry III, Moriba Magassouba et Kara Soufiana Keita, pendus publiquement le 25 janvier 1971.
Félix Matos Gnan Ces pères de famille expièrent pour un crime qu’ils n’avaient pas commis. Ils ne laissèrent pas de fortune à leur famille, mais ils lèguent à la postérité une vie exemplaire et, en l’occurrence, un casier judiciaire vierge.
En plongeant délibérément dans les réseaux de corruption qui minent la Guinée, Mahmoud Thiam a pris le chemin opposé des idéaux, de la droiture et de la rectitude, incarnés par Baba Hady Thiam et sa génération.
It turns out he was, himself, a big-time offender in the plundering of the country’s meager finances. Mahmoud belongs in the category of high level of corrupt officials: presidents, government ministers, administrations’ civil servants, who have ruined Guinea: from Sékou Touré to Alpha Condé, and everyone in between, i.e., Lansana Conté, Moussa Dadis Camara, Sékouba Konaté. Therefore, Mr. Thiam’s assessment couldn’t be more accurate. He knew where the bodies were buried! In 2009 he left a job position at a New York City bank to answer the siren calls of the military junta of Dadis Camara. In Conakry he was appointed Minister of Mines… A year later, the newly “elected” president Alpha Condé decided not to keep Mr. Thiam in the government. Soon after Mahmoud came back here to the USA… However, during his short tenure he had collected millions of dollars in bribery. He thought he had fooled everybody and that he had succeeded in stealing so much money from the Guinean people. Little did he know, perhaps, that the US Federal Government had an eye on the unscrupulous and rampant venality in Guinea. A salient case in point was President Obama’s State of the Union Address of 2010, in which he declared pointedly:
« That’s why we stand with the girl who yearns to go to school in Afghanistan; why we support the human rights of the women marching through the streets of Iran; why we advocate for the young man denied a job by corruption in Guinea. For America must always stand on the side of freedom and human dignity. (Applause.) Always. (Applause.) »
Seven years after his heydays as a high-flying minister, and after Barack Obama’s public and generous stance, justice was served today with the sentencing of Mahmoud Thiam to seven years in a federal prison in America. Bien mal acquis ne profite pas… toujours ! I reproduce below the press release by the US Department of Justice. Tierno S. Bah
A former Minister of Mines and Geology of the Republic of Guinea was sentenced today to seven years in prison, and three years of supervised release, for laundering bribes paid to him by executives of China Sonangol International Ltd. (China Sonangol) and China International Fund, SA (CIF).
Acting Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Blanco of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim of the Southern District of New York, Assistant Director Stephen E. Richardson of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division and Assistant Director in Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. of the FBI’s New York Field Office made the announcement.
Mahmoud Thiam, 50, of New York, New York, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Denise L. Cote of the Southern District of New York. Thiam was convicted on May 3, after a seven-day trial of one count of transacting in criminally derived property and one count of money laundering.
“Mahmoud Thiam engaged in a corrupt scheme to benefit himself at the expense of the people of Guinea,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Blanco. “Corruption is a cancer on society that destabilizes institutions, inhibits fair and free competition, and imposes significant burdens on ordinary law-abiding people just trying to live their everyday lives. Today’s sentence sends a strong message to corrupt individuals like Thiam that if they attempt to use the U.S. financial system to hide their bribe money they will be investigated, held accountable, and punished.”
“As a unanimous jury found at trial, Thiam abused his position as Guinea’s Minister of Mines to take millions in bribes from a Chinese conglomerate, and then launder that money through the American financial system,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Kim. “Enriching himself at the expense of one Africa’s poorest countries, Thiam used some of the Chinese bribe money to pay his children’s Manhattan private school tuition and to buy a $3.75 million estate in Dutchess County. Today’s sentence shows that if you send your crime proceeds to New York, whether from drug dealing, tax evasion or international bribery, you may very well find yourself at the front end of long federal prison term.”
“Thiam abused his official position, but the outcome shows that no one is above the law,” said Assistant Director Stephen E. Richardson. “The FBI will not stand by while individuals attempt to live by their own rules and use the United States as a safe haven for their ill-gotten gains. I would like to applaud the dedicated investigators and prosecutors who have worked to hold those who have committed these crimes accountable for their illegal actions.”
“Today’s sentencing should remind the public that no matter who you are, or how much money you have, you’re not immune from prosecution. The FBI will continue to use all resources at our disposal to uncover crimes of this nature and expose them for what they really are,” said Assistant Director in Charge Sweeney
According to evidence presented at trial, China Sonangol, CIF and their subsidiaries signed a series of agreements with Guinea that gave them lucrative mining rights in Guinea. In exchange for bribes paid by executives of China Sonangol and CIF, Thiam used his position as Minister of Mines to influence the Guinean government’s decision to enter into those agreements while serving as Guinea’s Minister of Mines and Geology from 2009 to 2010. The evidence further showed that Thiam participated in a scheme to launder the bribe payments from 2009 to 2011, during which time China Sonangol and CIF paid him $8.5 million through a bank account in Hong Kong. Thiam then transferred approximately $3.9 million to bank accounts in the U.S. and used the money to pay for luxury goods and other expenses. To conceal the bribe payments, Thiam falsely claimed to banks in Hong Kong and the U.S. that he was employed as a consultant and that the money was income from the sale of land that he earned before he was a minister.
The trial evidence showed that the purpose of the bribes was to obtain substantial rights and interests in natural resources in Guinea, including the right to be the first and strategic shareholder with Guinea of a national mining company into which Guinea had to, among other things, transfer all of its stakes in various mining projects and future mining permits or concessions that the government decided to develop on its own. China Sonangol and CIF, through their subsidiaries, also obtained exclusive and valuable rights to conduct business operations in a broad range of sectors of the Guinean economy, including mining.
The FBI’s International Corruption Squads in New York City and Los Angeles investigated the case. Trial Attorney Lorinda Laryea of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Elisha Kobre and Christopher DiMase of the Southern District of New York prosecuted the case. Fraud Section Assistant Chief Tarek Helou and Trial Attorney Sarah Edwards, and Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section Senior Trial Attorney Stephen Parker previously investigated the case. The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs also provided substantial assistance in this matter.
In his will Kwame Nkrumah designated June Milne as his literary executrix. But it took the Guinean authorities fourteen years (from 1972 to 1986) to relinquish Osagyefo’s papers to her. I present here excerpts from Kwame Nkrumah The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters, the book edited by Ms. Milne. She used primary sources generated by the late president. This publication includes only the Foreword and the Introduction. Yet, the challenges and dilemmas of life in exile in Conakry are clearly exposed. Likewise for the ways in which Ghana’s first president tried to overcome the predicaments of his downfall, or his stoic stance in the face of adversity. The book’s limitations reflect the incompleteness of the material. The editor points to regrettable gaps and losses in collecting and preserving documents and artifacts. Nonetheless, June Milne’s work is informative and revealing. In addition, it gives context and weight to Victor Du Bois’ paper “The Death of Kwame Nkrumah.” That said, for readability sake, I have partitioned the 17-page Introduction into eight subtitled segments. Last, the book confuses two separate diplomatic incidents. They opposed Guinea, on the one hand, and Ghana and Ivory Coast, on the other. The first one involved PAN Am Airlines in 1966 in Accra. See André Lewin, Chapter 61. La chute et la fin de l’ami Nkrumah. On October 30th 1966 President Sekou Toure ordered the house arrest of Robinson McIlvaine, the US ambassador in Conakry. The restriction lasted less than 24 hours.… The second incident concerned KLM Airlines, in 1967 in Abidjan. It stemmed from the love-hate relationship and the cyclical feuds between Houphouët-Boigny (the master) and Sekou Toure (the disciple). Curiously, in both instances Lansana Beavogui, minister and futur prime minister, led the confined delegation.
June Milne, ed. Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters. Panaf. 1990. 416 pages
President Kwame Nkrumah, who was the first person to lead a colony in Sub-Saharan Africa to independence, was forced into exile in Guinea Conakry following the coup in Ghana on 24 February 1966. He arrived in Guinea in March and was destined to remain there until August 1971 when ill health compelled him to seek medical treatment in Romania. He died in Bucharest on 27 April 1972. During his stay in Conakry he wrote many books, and as his research assistant and publisher I was in close touch, making sixteen visits to Guinea and three to Bucharest. In his will he appointed me his literary executrix, and for years after his death I made attempts to recover his library, papers and files of correspondence which I knew were still in Villa Syli, his residence in Conakry. However, it was not until August 1986 that I was finally able to visit Conakry and obtain these papers, the bulk of which I have now deposited in the Moorland-Spingarn Research Centre at Howard University, Washington DC. As so little is known of Nkrumah’s life and work during the years he spent in Conakry, I have compiled this record from primary source material comprising the 43 Conakry files of correspondence, more than 350 letters and innumerable cables addressed to me, and from notebooks I kept during my visits to Conakry and Bucharest. The excerpts from my notebooks are included since they were written at the time of my visits to see Nkrumah, and not with hindsight. However good one’s memory, remembered conversations and remarks are suspect, and have no place in this book. It has only been possible to include a selection of the interesting letters and papers in the Conakry files. Nkrumah published in his book Dark Days in Ghana some of the letters and cables he received during the early years of his stay in Conakry. These are not reprinted here. Neither are there excerpts of his broadcasts to the Ghanaian people, nor other matter which has been published elsewhere. There were many whose loyalty and friendship were expressed verbally and remain unrecorded, but who played an important role in helping to sustain Nkrumah during the Conakry years. Never to be forgotten was the unfailing devotion of members of his Ghanaian entourage, particularly the tender care of Quarm and Nyamikeh in Bucharest during the last months of his life; the steadfastness throughout of Camara Sana, the Guinean protocol officer at Villa Syli; the innumerable thoughtful little acts of the many Africans and others who visited Nkrumah in Conakry, and who talked with him, from young students such as Lamin who travelled from Gambia to be with him and whom Nkrumah tutored for several months, to freedom fighters of the stature of Amilcar Cabral, who was a frequent visitor and with whom Nkrumah had long discussions. Sadly, there are no records of these. Similarly, there exist no written records of the visits of the many foreign envoys in Conakry, notably those from African countries, from Cuba, China, the USSR, North Vietnam and North Korea. President Fidel Castro supplied molasses and black beans through his embassy in Conakry. The Chinese ambassador brought books and silk shirts, personal gifts from the then prime minister Chou en-Lai. North Korean and Vietnamese diplomatic personnel regularly gave film shows for Nkrumah and his entourage at Villa Syli. During most of his stay in Guinea, a Vietnamese doctor attended to any medical problems at the Villa, while a Soviet dentist gave his services, bringing with him a portable dental chair for treatment to be carried out on the open seafront terrace adjoining Nkrumah’s office. The scope of these and other examples of the continuing support received by Nkrumah after the 1966 coup may to some extent be realized from references in the letters and other written evidence here published. There are, for example, references to the work of Douglas Rogers, editor of the magazine Africa and the World, and of Ghanaians who kept alive the Overseas Branch of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), an organization still in existence today and which issues The Dawn, a journal founded by Nkrumah and the CPP Overseas Branch. In a special category, but also largely unrecorded in the Conakry files, are Nkrumah’s friendship and shared Pan African objectives with President Sekou Toure, Madame Sekou Toure and the people of Guinea. Madame Sekou Toure on many occasions personally cooked meals for Nkrumah, delivering them by hand to him at Villa Syli. The visits of Guineans to the Villa, ·and the spontaneous cheering and waving of the ordinary people of Guinea whenever they saw Nkrumah, touched him deeply. As also, the special ovation from the huge crowds for himself and his entourage whenever they appeared at state functions in Conakry. The letters written by Nkrumah to me, and much of the other correspondence and documents here reproduced, are edited, mainly for reasons of space, but also because to print them in full would not contribute significantly to the picture they give of Nkrumah’s life during the Conakry and Bucharest periods. The editing has simply involved the omitting of certain passages. Nothing has been added. I have not indicated where omissions have been made, in order that the text should not appear unnecessarily disjointed. There have been many coups in Africa both before and after that of 1966 when Nkrumah ‘s government was overthrown—but none which has had greater impact on the course of Africa’s history. After a coup, little is usually heard of the deposed head of state. After the initial glare of media publicity the norm is for him to be of no further interest. With Nkrumah this was not the case. Far from sinking into obscurity, Nkrumah’s political stature grew, and continues to inspire Africans and people of African descent worldwide. The words inscribed in Guinea on his coffin provide a verdict on his life and work: “The Greatest African”.
President Kwame Nkrumah was on his way to Hanoi with peace proposals for ending the war in Vietnam when the 24 February 1966 coup in Ghana overthrew his government. The constitution was suspended and a National Liberation Council (NLC) established. It consisted of six members of the army and six policemen, with General J.A. Ankrah as chairman, and Police Commissioner J.W.K. Harlley as deputy chairman. Nkrumah had almost reached Peking, the furthest point of his journey, when the coup took place. He was informed of the news by the Chinese ambassador in Accra who had gone ahead to Peking to greet Nkrumah and to escort him during his stay in China. Nkrumah’s first reaction was to return immediately to Accra. If the VCIO of Ghana Airways had not been left behind in Rangoon, he would have embarked at once. “I knew that to avoid unnecessary bloodshed I would have to be back in Ghana within 24 hours, and this was clearly impossible. I decided, therefore, to make an immediate statement to the Ghanaian people, and to fight back on African soil just as soon as my hosts could make the necessary travel arrangements.” 1 At this time, many cables were sent by Nkrumah to heads of state, to Ghanaian diplomatic missions and to friends. Among the first was a cable to the Ghanaian embassy in Cairo:
Confirm Immediately That Ghana Airways Vcio En Route From Rangoon Has Been Instructed To Stand By In Cairo With Its Security Passengers Stop Send Your Message In Care Of Ghana Embassy Peking 2.
On the same day, 25 February, messages were sent to President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, President Modibo Keita of Mali and to President Nasser. The following message to President Sekou Toure is typical. It was in response to a message dated the day before from the Guinean president.
My dear Brother and President I have been deeply touched by your message of solidarity and support I have received today. It is true, as you say, that this incident in Ghana is a plot by the imperialists, neo-colonialists and their agents in Africa 3. As these imperialist forces grow more militant and insidious, using traitors to the African cause against the freedom and independence of our people, we must strengthen our resolution and fight for the dignity of our people to the last man and for the unity of Africa. It is heartening to know that in this struggle we can count on the support and understanding of Africa’s well-tried leaders like yourself. I know that our cause will triumph and that we can look forward to the day when Africa shall be really united and free from foreign interference and intrigues and saboteurs and puppets. I am safe and well here in Peking and I have sent my special emissary who will deliver this message to you to let you know the plans I am making for my early return to Africa. I trust that you will give him every possible assistance for the fulfilment of his mission. I shall visit you in Guinea soon 4. With sincere and brotherly affection. Kwame Nkrumah
With messages for Nkrumah pouring into Peking from Africa and many other parts of the world, and with all the work of acknowledging them, Nkrumah did not forget to cable those whom he knew would be anxious about him. Among cables and messages sent on 26 February were those to personal friends . The cable I received read: Take Heart I Am Well And Determined. In Peking, the Chinese government went ahead with plans which had been made for Nkrumah’s visit, treating him as an honoured head of state. On the evening of the 24th a banquet was held in his honour, at which a leading government official, Liu Shao-chi, spoke of the operations of neo-colonialist forces in Africa, mentioning specifically the USA, and quoting from Nkrumah’s book Neo-colonia!ism. In his speech, Nkrumah attacked imperialism and neocolonialism and American aggression in Vietnam. “On 24 February 1966, Ghana was forced one step backward. We shall take two forward,” he said. Listening to him on that occasion were members of his government and other officials who had accompanied him on the peace mission. According to Nkrumah, “most of them were frightened… Their obvious dismay was in striking contrast to the calmness and courage of the 66 other personnel — the security officers and members of my personal secretariat.” 5 Nkrumah left Peking on 28 February in an aircraft provided by the Soviet Union. Flying by way of Irkutsk, he and his entourage arrived in Moscow on 1st March. He telephoned me shortly after his arrival. He told me that he was on his way to a destination which I would doubtless hear about on the radio in due course. He said that he had instructed his foreign minister, Alex Quaison-Sackey, to go to Addis Ababa to represent the constitutional government of Ghana at the OAU Council of Ministers meeting. I had heard, however, on the BBC World Service that very morning that Quaison-Sackey had not gone to Addis Ababa, but had travelled to Accra. I told Nkrumah. He seemed shocked. For a moment he said nothing. Then he abruptly changed the subject and asked if I had heard about the defection of J.E. Bossman, the Ghana High Commissioner in London, news of which had been conveyed to Nkrumah on his arrival in Moscow. A few minutes later the call ended with Nkrumah’s assurance that I would hear from him soon after he reached his “destination”. A few of Nkrumah’s government colleagues had left Peking before him. Others travelled with him to Moscow. Kwesi Armah and other officials left Moscow to deal, as they said, with “urgent private matters”. The plan was for them to carry out their tasks and then to return to Moscow to join Nkrumah and travel with him to Guinea. But when Nkrumah learned of the defections of Bossman and Quaison-Sackey he delayed no longer, and decided to go to Conakry at once with members of his personal staff, security personnel and a number of Ghanaians who had been studying in the Soviet Union and who wished to join him.
Co-president of Guinea
It was no surprise that Nkrumah chose to accept the invitation from Guinea. He would also have been welcome in Cairo because of his friendship with President Nasser. It was there that Nkrumah’s Egyptian wife, Madame Fathia (Rizk) and the three children, Gamal, Samia and Sekou, had taken refuge 6. But Guinea under the government of President Sekou Toure and the Guinean Democratic Party (PDG) had become a stronghold of the African Revolution. Sekou Toure and Nkrumah shared the same ideas on liberation, social justice and the unification of Africa. In 1958, when Guinea made history by becoming the only state among France’s African colonies to give a decisive Non to General de Gaulle’s referendum about joining the French Community, Nkrumah’s government made £10 million available to the newly independent Guinean government to help it surmount some of its most pressing economic problems. Sekou Toure and the people of Guinea never forgot this generosity, and Nkrumah always received a tumultuous welcome whenever he visited the country. Then in 1961, Ghana and Guinea formed a Union, later extended to include Mali, which was intended to form a nucleus around which the African unification process could develop. A further factor which influenced Nkrumah’s decision to accept Sekou Toure’s invitation was the geographical consideration. Guinea was only some three hundred miles from Ghana. For Nkrumah was determined to return to Ghana to carry on the African revolutionary struggle, a resolve which never faltered during the whole of the time—more than five years—that he was destined to spend in Guinea. The first I knew of Nkrumah’s arrival in Conakry was when I saw an Evening Standard placard on a news-stand in Piccadilly, London: “Nkrumah arrives in Guinea to a 21-gun salute”. It was a relief to know that he was safely on African soil again and among friends who shared his political ideals. The aircraft carrying Nkrumah and his entourage had touched down briefly in Yugoslavia and Algeria, finally reaching Conakry during the afternoon of 2nd March. The following day, at a mass rally, Sekou Toure proclaimed Nkrumah head of state of Guinea. “The Ghanaian traitors have been mistaken in thinking that Nkrumah is simply a Ghanaian,” he declared, “he is a universal man.” It was an unprecedented expression of Pan Africanism. At the time, Nkrumah did not realize what Sekou Toure, speaking in French, had said. He thought the cheering of the crowd was in response to the Guinean president’s welcome to his distinguished guest. When later he learned the truth he was very moved but agreed only to become co-president of Guinea.
Settling down in Conakry
For the first few weeks, Nkrumah and his entourage were housed in Belle-Vue, a government guest compound situated on the coast a short distance from the centre of Conakry. During this time, at Nkrumah’s request, more modest accommodation was prepared for him at Villa Syli, an old colonial-style residence built on the seashore in the direction of the airport. It was a long, low white concrete building constructed on two levels, the lower part of which jutted out on to the beach. At high tide, the sea lapped against three sides of it. The upper part of the villa became the office area, while the lower level contained private and domestic quarters. To the rear was a secluded area shaded by mango and flamboyant trees. During the hottest months, Nkrumah would have a table and chairs carried out to “under the trees”, as he called it. But for the most part he spent his time in the office, a recessed room open at the front to the long verandah and the sea. The speedy organizing and equipping of his office was made possible by Sekou Toure’s closure of the Ghanaian Embassy in Conakry immediately after the coup. An inventory was made of all property at the embassy and at the vacated Ghanaian envoy’s official residence. Everything was put at Nkrumah’s disposal. Tables, chairs, beds, cupboards, shelving, typewriters, stationery and so on, and also the envoy’s Mercedes Benz, were transferred to Villa Syli. Within days of moving in, Nkrumah was at his desk establishing an office routine, and dealing with the flood of letters, cables and messages which poured into the Conakry post office for him from all parts of the world. Sekou Toure appointed Camara Sana, an experienced career diplomat who had served in Ghana and had a good knowledge of English, to act as Nkrumah’s protocol officer and interpreter. He was of great assistance to Nkrumah during the whole of the time he spent in Guinea. He supervised the administration of the villa, acted as liaison officer between Ghanaian and Guinean security personnel and undertook many other duties. Some of these were of a very confidential nature, concerned with attempts to restore Nkrumah to Accra. Sekou Toure and his ministers kept in close personal touch with Nkrumah, but it was Camara’s responsibility always to see that decisions were acted upon. I never knew him to have a holiday or even to take a day off. He would arrive early from his home some miles away and seldom return home before 10 or 11 p.m., after Nkrumah had retired to his room for the night.
During the early months of 1966 it was Camara who arranged for an electric generator to be installed in the compound so that the life of the villa could proceed despite the almost daily electricity cuts which the people of Conakry suffered.
Another priority which Nkrumah required was the setting up of an efficient radio station at the villa, and again it was Camara who arranged for the work to be done.
Down but not out
Throughout the years which Nkrumah spent in Guinea he was able to be kept informed of broadcasts from Ghana, and of confidential army and police messages. Each day, reports of these broadcasts and messages were placed on his desk by members of his entourage whose job it was to monitor them. In this way, Nkrumah was able to obtain insight into what was happening in Ghana, and did not have to rely solely on reports of Ghanaians and others who either travelled to Conakry to see him, or who wrote or sent messages. Right from the start of his stay in Guinea, Ghanaians loyal to his government got in touch with him. For a time, one of them openly cabled news from the Foreign Affairs Department in Accra. Others, among them members of the staff of the Ghanaian Embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone, sent him copies of reports and instructions received from the NLC in Accra. They signed themselves “Your secret agents”. While much of the information they sent was not of great significance, it was nevertheless a useful supplement to information from other sources. Within six weeks of his arrival in Conakry, Nkrumah tried to organize a conference of the militant states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to meet in Bamako, Mali on 29 May. The idea for such a conference had first been mooted by Sekou Toure in a message to Nkrumah shortly after the coup, when Nkrumah was still in Peking. The Guinean president said that his government had decided “after a thorough analysis of the African situation following the seizure of power by the instruments of imperialism… to call on all progressive African countries to hold a special conference and take all adequate measures. We think that the time factor is vital here, since it is important to make a riposte without further delay, by every means.” 7 In Conakry, Nkrumah drafted a letter of invitation to be sent to the twelve heads of state considered at the time to be militant. They were Egypt, Guinea, Ghana (CPP government) 8, Mali, Somalia, Algeria, Uganda, Mauritania, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Sierra Leone. The letters were to be signed by the three presidents of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union of 1961, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita. The invitations, dated 25 April 1966, were to be sent first to Modibo Keita requesting him to sign them and to return them to Conakry for the signatures of Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. There is no evidence among the files and papers which Nkrumah kept in Villa Syli that the conference ever took place. Such a conference so soon after the Ghana coup would surely have attracted media attention. There were no reports of it. However, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita kept in close touch and met frequently. There was a time when Nkrumah considered moving to Bamako because of its proximity to Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and the latter’s common frontier with northern Ghana. An opposition politician from Burkina Faso, whom Nkrumah knew from pre-coup days, visited him in Conakry and led him to believe that there might soon be a political change in his country which would provide favourable conditions for cross-border contact between Nkrumah’s supporters outside Ghana and those within. A move to Bamako would make such a possibility easier to accomplish, Mali and Burkina Faso sharing a common frontier. The coup of 19 November 1968 which overthrew the government of Modibo Keita ended any chance of such a move.
For the first six months or so, Nkrumah was content to monitor events in Ghana without too much concern about the effect the coup in Ghana would have on the African revolutionary struggle. But as the months passed he became anxious about the time factor, fearing that irreparable damage might be done to Ghana’s infrastructure. It was not that he wanted a restoration of his pre-1966 political position, but that he found he could not pursue his Pan African objectives adequately from Guinea. He had to return to Ghana because the infrastructure was there. On his return, others could direct the domestic administration of the country, leaving him free to devote his whole attention to organizing the Pan African struggle for the total liberation and unification of the Continent. This was not a new idea he had dreamed up in Conakry. Some time before the coup Nkrumah was thinking along these lines, as Erica Powell, his private secretary from 1955 to 1964 has confirmed in her book. Nkrumah told her before she finally left Ghana in 1965 that “he wished he could resign the presidency and devote his time to African unity.” 9
After the coup, as he was no longer president of Ghana, the idea seemed possible to realize once he had returned and could make a fresh start. He intended to establish a freedom fighter headquarters, similar to something he had seen in China when visiting Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. It would be situated not far from Accra, hidden from aerial attack in the hilly forested area of Aburi. From there he would develop the military and political structures outlined in his book Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution10. During one of my visits to Guinea, Nkrumah sketched in pencil a rough plan of the small building he would require. It consisted of two bedrooms with bathrooms, and a central room for meetings. He marked the position of doors, and the driveways leading to the entrance of the cave-like building, remembering to make a circular part where vehicles could turn.
Nkrumah’s firm belief that he would return to Ghana was strengthened by the flow of mail and messages of support he received. An indication of the extent and variety of these communications can be gathered from the files of correspondence and cables which he left behind in Villa Syli. Furthermore, throughout the Conakry years, there were numerous visits from Ghanaians and others who claimed to be organizing a counter-coup to restore him to Accra. Nkrumah suspected that some of those who claimed to be working for his return were dishonest opportunists. But lacking the intelligence facilities he had had in Ghana, he could never be sure of a person’s integrity. If it had not been for his determination to get back to the country in order to carry out his Pan African objectives, he would, I believe, have shown no interest in any scheme to accomplish his return by force. But as time passed, and the infrastructure in Ghana deteriorated, he became more vulnerable to those who approached him with so-called plans for his return. Several times he was told of an actual day when he could expect to hear good news. At other times he would be informed to expect action between certain dates. There was one occasion when the Guinean government itself was so sure of a particular plan that Nkrumah was persuaded to spend the night at Sekou Toure’s residence so that he could be ready to broadcast and to make a quick return to Accra. Always, when the expected dates passed and nothing happened, excuses would be made that something or other had unexpectedly happened to necessitate a postponement.
Camara became increasingly cynical. By the time Nkrumah had eventually to leave Conakry for medical treatment in 1971, Camara was prepared to believe that no Ghanaian could be trusted, except for those of the entourage whom he had come to know well. I sometimes wonder what Camara would think if he knew of the subsequent boasting of some of those who visited Nkrumah at the villa, claiming to have been constantly at the great man’s side, rendering him help in time of need, when in fact they let him down. Most of these braggarts were only briefly there. Others not at all.
One of the worst aspects of the dreary process of deception and disappointment was financial. For, so often, those who visited Nkrumah claiming to be working for his reinstatement in Ghana asked for cash, ostensibly to buy arms and support. The limited funds supplied initially by friendly Eastern bloc and African governments were soon exhausted. Much against his inclination, Nkrumah had to seek further financial help. He loathed the very notion of asking for support, and found it extremely distasteful to hand out cash to dubious characters whom he would not have tolerated for a moment in his presence had he not been in such a critical position, with, as he thought, the future of the African Revolution at stake. He was not prepared to let slip any opportunity which might have resulted in a return to Accra. Each time he was approached he faced the dilemma of wondering whether, if he failed to give help, he might be jeopardizing the one real chance of success. He said that all would be thoroughly investigated when he got back to Ghana. Those who had deliberately deceived him would have to explain themselves to the people, because it was the people, and not him personally, they had betrayed.
Doubtless, some of those who sought to take advantage of him in this situation had been taken in by Western media reports at the time of the coup that Nkrumah had vast sums of money deposited in Swiss banks. Even those who were skeptical about this knew that Sekou Toure strongly supported Nkrumah and was anxious to see him return to Ghana. The Guinea government could be expected to provide funds if need be. There was even speculation that Sekou Toure had repaid Nkrumah the £10 million which the Ghana government had lent to Guinea in 1958. The air around those who intended to exploit Nkrumah’s predicament was filled with rumour and innuendo. The fact is that, apart from the small royalty account in London and the funds supplied occasionally by friendly governments, Nkrumah had no money on which he could draw 11. He used to keep a certain amount of cash, mainly dollars and pounds, in a suitcase in his bedroom, some of this having been brought into Guinea in diplomatic bags. It was probably reports of the availability of cash from this supply which encouraged unscrupulous individuals to dream up ways to obtain some of it. This is not to suggest that all those who got in touch with Nkrumah in Conakry with plans to organise his return to Ghana were self-seekers, though many undoubtedly were. Within weeks of his arrival in Guinea, Nkrumah was hearing from men and women, some of whom had worked in Ghana before the coup, who had either chosen to leave or been forced to go. Among them were people he knew. Others he had never met or heard of. There was also mail from acquaintances and from organizations whose connections with Nkrumah dated back to his student days in America. Often pseudonyms were agreed between Nkrumah and those with whom he kept in touch. All mail and cables had to be sent through the main Conakry post office which, in spite of precautions, was not proof against security risks. Several times during the early days of the Conakry period, the envelopes of letters exchanged between him and myself bore unmistakable signs of having been opened and clumsily resealed. Time and again, Camara was sent to try to find out whether the mail was being interfered with in Conakry. It was impossible to discover. It was agreed that I should address envelopes to “Camara Sana” and use the PO Box number 834. On each of my visits to Guinea we used to decide new code names and phrases, in what must have seemed to any professional intelligence organization a very amateurish attempt to establish some degree of confidentiality in our letters and cables. Though there was nothing secret about what we said, we usually sealed our letters with red or green wax. I possessed two silver rings, decoratively engraved. We used one each to stamp the wax. In this way we thought we would know if the seal had been broken. In cables to me, Nkrumah would sign himself “Sana” if no reply was needed, and “Sophie”, the name of Camara’s wife, if he wanted me to reply. Sometimes in cables he would use printing or publishing terms. For example, “Galleys corrected” meant that he had received encouraging news about a counter-coup. In confidential cables with Ghanaians and others, he frequently used pseudonyms such as “Saidou” or “Amadou”. In cables to me during the last months of his life he used the name “Diallo”. However, in most of Nkrumah’s correspondence and cables no use was made of coded phrases or pseudonyms. He was addressed usually as Osagyefo 12 or Dr Nkrumah, and on rare occasions, Francis 13. Nkrumah usually in his replies signed himself Osagyefo or Kwame Nkrumah. A prolific writer was Julie Medlock. She had been director of an organization called “The Accra Assembly: the World Without the Bomb”. She was one of those who had been compelled to leave Ghana after the coup. She asked for Nkrumah’s advice and help in establishing a new headquarters for the Accra Assembly. As late as 22 April 1971 she was writing “My dearest Osagyefo… the Accra Assembly is still alive.” 14 There were many long letters from Shirley Du Bois, widow of the celebrated Afro-American campaigner W.E.B. Du Bois15. For a time after the coup, Shirley lived in Cairo, where her son David worked as a journalist and radio commentator. Later, Nkrumah arranged for Shirley to work in Peking with the Afro-Asian Writers Bureau. She visited Conakry on more than one occasion. Another who wrote at length to Nkrumah during the first few years of exile was Pat Sloan. He had been in Ghana at the time of the coup and had had to leave soon after. He wrote a detailed account of what happened at the Winneba Ideological Institute, where he had worked as senior lecturer in the Political Science faculty. The students, he said, seemed utterly confused. During the course of a protracted correspondence, Pat Sloan suggested changes in the curriculum at Winneba which should be made when Nkrumah returned to Ghana. In England, he kept Nkrumah informed of the activities and opinions of Ghanaians in London, making particular reference to the activities of the CPP Overseas and the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution 16 headed by Ekow Eshun, who before the coup had worked in the Ghana High Commission in London.
Writing and publishing
The centre of CPP Overseas activity in London at this time was the 89 Fleet Street office of the magazine Africa and the World, edited by Douglas Rogers 17. Before the coup the magazine, first published in 1964, had been financed primarily by the Ghana Government through the Bureau of African Affairs in Accra, and later by the Publicity Secretariat. The magazine’s printer was John Marshment, and the accountant and auditor was Roland (‘Roley’) Davenish Randall 18, who was instrumental in forming Panaf Publications Ltd. to publish the magazine. It was Nkrumah’s idea to have a magazine published and distributed from London, the main purpose being to publicize African affairs (and in particular the policies of the Ghanaian Government) to the world and to the large African community in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. By the time of the 1966 coup, the magazine had become well known and respected for its progressive reporting and its support for the CPP government’s radical and Pan African policies. Not surprisingly therefore, after the coup the NLC ended the funding of the magazine, and the company’s account with the Ghana Commercial Bank in London was frozen. As a result of quick action by Roley Randall, the company’s funds were rapidly switched to another bank, and the magazine carried on for a time, without missing an issue, assisted by funds from Nkrumah 19. Randall played a significant part in the success of Panaf Publications Ltd., the company which was formed for Africa and the World, and in the company Panaf Books Ltd. 20, founded in 1968 to publish the books written by Nkrumah in Conakry. On several occasions when a crisis of one kind or another occurred, his expert advice and experience resolved the difficulty. Initially when Panaf Books was formed, I worked at 89 Fleet Street in the room occupied by John Marshment, who allowed me to use part of his desk. Later, Douglas Rogers arranged for space to be made available for me in the large room at the top of the building where his secretary sat and from where Africa and the World was packaged and despatched. Rogers and Marshment were among the first to visit Nkrumah in Villa Syli. They went there in April 1966 to discuss the future of the magazine and to arrange other ways in which they could assist him to get his voice heard in Ghana. It was not long before the team of Africa and the World were publishing posters and “minimag” editions of the magazine which could be secretly infiltrated into Ghana. It was during this visit also, that on 12 April Nkrumah gave the one and only press interview of his entire stay in Conakry. Rogers’ questions and Nkrumah’s answers were published in the May 1966 issue of the magazine. There had at this time been rumours that Guinea might intervene militarily to restore Nkrumah to power in Ghana. Rogers put the question: — “Are you planning an invasion of Ghana?” The reply was: — “No. I appreciate the feelings of my brother and Comrade Sekou Toure, and I know the people of Guinea are in a militant mood about the events in Ghana. They feel, quite rightly, that this is part of a general assault upon the peace, unity and independence of Africa, and that a halt must be called to it. We have had a series of military usurpations of power, and constant international intrigue against governments which are trying to give some real economic meaning to their political independence.” He went on to say that while he understood the reaction of Guineans to the coup, he nevertheless believed it was a problem that must be resolved by Ghanaians. Nevertheless the NLC took the possibility of military intervention from Guinea seriously, raising the matter at the United Nations. During the first few years, Nkrumah was constantly being asked to receive newspaper reporters and radio and TV representatives. He refused all requests from Western media sources. He was not prepared, he said, to waste time answering questions from those who had gloated over his government’s overthrow. His political record was known. If they wanted to question him about his thinking in Guinea, they could read his books. Apart from the visits of those who had positive, constructive reasons for seeing him, and a few personal friends, no one from outside Guinea had access to Nkrumah. Both Guinean and Ghanaian security screening was very thorough. I recall what happened when a group of Afro-Americans connected with the Black Power movement arrived uninvited from Algiers and without the required entry documents. The Guinean authorities, who were suspicious of their intentions, refused permission for them to see Nkrumah. They were promptly obliged to leave in the private jet which had brought them. But in April 1966 when Flight Captain Hanna Reitsch, the well-known flying ace who had established a flying school in Ghana at Afienya, arrived unexpectedly at Conakry airport she was permitted a short visit. The Guinean authorities were uneasy about admitting a German who had achieved great distinction as a test pilot in the Second World War, and whom they regarded as a Nazi. But they gave permission when her true identity and the purpose of her visit were checked with Ghanaian security men of Nkrumah’s entourage. The hesitation of the Guinean officials was understandable, since Hanna had flown to Conakry in disguise, wearing a wig and using a false name. Hanna had been at Afienya when the coup took place, and she wanted to tell Nkrumah what had happened there, and to offer him any help she could provide. Hanna told me when I first met her in Frankfurt in 1968, that when the coup occurred she feared that Nkrumah might try to return to Ghana immediately. In which case she was convinced he would direct the pilot of his aircraft to land on the airstrip at Afienya, counting on her still being in control there, whereas the coup-makers had in fact compelled her to leave. In Conakry, Hanna warned Nkrumah against contemplating an early return to Accra, giving him lurid descriptions of the “jubilation” of Ghanaians at his overthrow. She had been horrified at what she regarded as spontaneous demonstrations against Nkrumah and the CPP government. Accounts of what she had seen at Afienya and in Accra before she left Ghana exasperated Nkrumah and members of his entourage, since they seemed to imply that she believed the people of Ghana as a whole supported the coup, whereas in fact the ordinary people took no part in it. Hanna was no diplomat. Nor did she have a great deal of political knowledge. She did not appear to allow for the external and domestic underlying causes of the coup, and the organizing of it. If she was convinced of anything, however, Hanna would vehemently and repeatedly express her views, which could be tiring as well as irritating. But when she committed herself to any person or to any project, her loyalty and courage were limitless. If Nkrumah had asked her to fly him to Accra when she visited him in Conakry, she would gladly have faced the extreme danger. As her friend Erica Powell once said to me: “If I was stranded at the North Pole, Hanna would come and get me out.” Hanna only visited Conakry once. She wanted to return, but was told that the Guinean authorities would not readmit her, because of her former association with Nazi Germany. This explanation failed to convince Hanna or her close friends, one of whom, Father Volkmar, later wrote to Nkrumah expressing Hanna’s dismay at not being allowed to visit Guinea again, and her disappointment that Nkrumah made no mention of her 1966 visit in his book Dark Days in Ghana . While the Guinean authorities strictly controlled the entry of all visitors to their country and were particularly protective of Nkrumah, it was unlikely they would have refused entry permission to anyone he invited. Throughout the Conakry years, Hanna and Nkrumah wrote to each other. In addition, Hanna sent many food parcels. It was she who sent the rose bushes which bloomed in the large concrete pots lining the verandah at Villa Syli. It was typical of Hanna to think of sending rose bushes knowing the pleasure Nkrumah had derived from his rose garden at Flagstaff House in Accra. Although to some, Hanna might have seemed a severe woman, obsessed with duty and discipline, she was I believe at heart a romantic. Unfortunately, the Conakry correspondence files contain only one letter and a postcard written by Hanna to Nkrumah during the Conakry period, and no copies of the letters which Nkrumah wrote to her. After Hanna’s death in 1979, her brother, Commander Kurt Reitsch, informed me that not one was found among Hanna’s papers in her Frankfurt apartment. Yet less than a year before she died, Hanna had shown me a pile of them, handwritten on the familiar blue airmail paper Nkrumah used in Conakry. I can only surmise that she destroyed the letters herself, or arranged for them to be destroyed after her death, probably by her faithful housekeeper and secretary Fraulein Walter. I was not surprised to find in the Conakry files so little evidence of Hanna’s lengthy correspondence with Nkrumah. For Nkrumah kept personal letters himself, and from time to time burned them. He destroyed all but a few of the hundreds of letters which I wrote to him in Conakry. The few he retained he kept along with other papers in the small steel deed box which he stored, locked, in his bedroom. All my letters to him were handwritten and I did not keep copies. But I retained every one of the hundreds of handwritten ones he wrote to me. He asked me once if I was keeping them, and when I replied “Yes”, he smiled. He was amused on many occasions at my reluctance to part with anything which might one day be of interest to students of African history. Sometimes when Nkrumah had been working on a typescript, and his secretary, Sarfo, had typed an amended version, Nkrumah would tear up the original and throw the scraps of paper into the waste paper basket. When I protested and said that the hand-altered original should be preserved because one day students would be interested to see the changes he had made, he explained that he had learned from hard experience not to keep unnecessary papers. On the occasions when he had been arrested in the years before political success, police had seized all his personal papers. At the time of the coup, his office in Flagstaff House had also been ransacked and some very confidential papers taken. Like a freedom fighter in the forest he had learned to travel light.
Life at Villa Syli
The organization and the general atmosphere prevailing at Villa Syli, especially during the first few years, seemed to me to resemble that of a freedom fighter base. It was a spartan, disciplined, all-male environment. Uniformed and armed Guinean soldiers and militiamen guarded the gates of the villa and patrolled the grounds and seashore. For a time, sentries were stationed on the verandah leading to Nkrumah’s office, as well as at other strategic points inside the villa. The impression given was of great activity and purpose, as though there was an imminent battle to be won. Each member of Nkrumah’s entourage had specific duties to perform according to their training and skills. They formed committees to organize and oversee the various activities within the villa. During 1966 the 13-member Political Committee examined the 24 February coup in Ghana and the external and internal factors relating to it. A report was drawn up, typed and bound, and presented to Nkrumah. This project was only one among many which kept Nkrumah’s Ghanaian entourage busy while in Conakry.
Soon all, including Nkrumah, had undergone military training with members of the Guinean militia.
Throughout his stay in Conakry, Nkrumah kept to an ascetic, strict routine. A typical day in his life is described in the biography Kwame Nkrumah 21. He would rise early and spend an hour or so doing yoga-type exercises in his room. Breakfast consisted of a grapefruit and perhaps a little cereal and honey, or an egg. He would usually be at his office desk by 9 o’clock and would often work through until about 2 p.m., with only a fruit drink to sustain him, or a cup of herbal tea. There would sometimes follow a game of chess with a member of his entourage… Then would come the main meal of the day, a simple two course meal of meat, chicken or fish followed always by fruit salad. His favourite food was the traditional stew and foufou of Ghana, and in Conakry this was cooked for him on certain days of the week by members of his entourage. After lunch, if there were no more visitors to see, or any more office work to attend to, he would retire to his bedroom for a short rest. He would read, and sometimes sleep for a little while, but often his rest was interrupted by the arrival of one or other of his staff with a cable, letters or a message. The evening meal was little more than a snack, and afterwards Nkrumah would talk with Sekou Toure or his ministers, or with some other visitor to the villa. Members of the various political organisations of Guinea were frequent visitors, as were the ambassadors of socialist embassies in Conakry. Then there were the visits from members of the liberation movements … Before retiring for the night Nkrumah would take his final exercise. This was usually a walk round and round the compound, sometimes ten or more times at a blistering speed which often left anyone accompanying him breathless trying to keep up.
Amilcar Cabral, president of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), was a frequent visitor. Whenever the sentries at the gates of Villa Syli recognized Cabral’s jeep approaching, they quickly flung the gates open so that the driver would scarcely need to slow down before sweeping up the drive to the doorway of the villa. Cabral made a point of calling to see Nkrumah whenever he was about to leave Conakry for the war zone 22 or for travel to seek support for the PAIGC liberation struggle. On his return to his Conakry headquarters he would promptly visit Nkrumah again. They used to talk in the privacy of Nkrumah’s office sometimes for an hour or more. Nkrumah was particularly interested in what Cabral told him of PAIGC administration of the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau, since this would form the pattern for the government of the whole country when it had been liberated from Portuguese rule. It would, Nkrumah believed, be the kind of society based on socialist principles and committed to African unification, which he had been working to build in Ghana. Most probably, Nkrumah discussed with Cabral the Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare on which he was working. Nkrumah, when writing a book, discussed it whenever possible with anyone whose opinion he valued, or whom he thought might be able to provide additional material. He would give them sections of his manuscript to read and comment upon. Knowing his high regard for Cabral as a freedom fighter engaged in precisely the kind of armed liberation struggle about which he was writing, it would have been entirely out of character for Nkrumah not to have discussed the book with him.
Notable among many others who visited Nkrumah in Villa Syli in 1966 were Julia Wright and Henri Herve. They had been working in Ghana when the CPP government was overthrown. At that time, Henri, a Frenchman, was editor of Etincelle, the French edition of The Spark 23; while Julia, the daughter of the eminent Afro-American writer Richard Wright, was assisting me in establishing Nkrumah’s research office in Accra. This was located in the bungalow which had been the home of Dorothy Padmore, widow of George Padmore. Julia and Henri, after considerable harassment, managed to leave Ghana after the coup and travelled to Conakry where they hoped to be of help to Nkrumah. Henri joined Nkrumah’s entourage at the villa for a short time. Julia helped with office work. One of her tasks was to go through Guinean periodicals and newspapers, selecting items which she thought would interest Nkrumah. She translated them from French into English, abridging where necessary, and afterwards presented Nkrumah with a well-ordered set of clippings. In addition, Julia was sometimes called upon to translate letters and messages sent to Nkrumah in French. However, not long after his arrival in Guinea, Nkrumah arranged to have French lessons from a Conakry teacher. Her instruction, supplemented by a Lingua phone French course, soon resulted in Nkrumah becoming quite proficient in the language, though I never heard him speak French fluently. Henri for a time had, I believe, connections with those trying to organize a counter-coup in Ghana. During one of my visits to Conakry in 1966 he left on what I understood to be a secret mission inside Ghana. Knowing the danger he faced, Julia was proud of him at that time. Nevertheless, some months later, it was clear that Nkrumah had lost confidence in him. Henri had never been very popular with Ghanaians of Nkrumah’s entourage. He now incurred the mistrust of Camara. It was decided that Henri should not return to Conakry. Nkrumah therefore advised Julia that her duty lay in returning to Paris to look after her young daughter Ama, who had been put in the care of Henri’s mother. Nkrumah was sorry to lose Julia, but as long as Julia remained in Guinea it would have been difficult to deny Henri permission to return to be with his wife. Julia, and occasionally Henri, continued from time to time to communicate with Nkrumah while he was in Conakry. But they never saw him again, though both attended his funeral in Conakry in May 1972.
On 10 June 1966 I set out on my first visit to Conakry. There were three main reasons for going. The first was to finalize corrections to the galleys of Challenge of the Congo; the second to discuss arrangements for a Freedom Fighters’ Edition of Axioms; and the third to achieve a final text of the new preface which Nkrumah had been preparing for Challenge of the Congo. He considered a new preface necessary in view of the coup in Ghana. As far as Axioms was concerned, Nkrumah was disappointed at the size and expensive format of the Nelson edition. He had envisaged a cheaply produced, pocket-sized book. Furthermore, he wished to make changes in a Freedom Fighters‘ edition. For example, he decided to omit the section on Non-Alignment, and to add six new sections on Black Power, People’s Militia, Revolutionary War, Propaganda, The Role of Women and “Third World”. He added axioms to the sections on Imperialism, Independence, Nationalism, Neo-colonialism, People and Racialism. The Freedom Fighters’ Edition of Axioms, first published by PanafBooks in 1968, was a small plastic-covered book which could easily be fitted into a pocket. As subsequent editions of the Panaf edition were published, quotations were added from the books Nkrumah wrote in Conakry. The Nelson edition of Axioms, apart from its format, had the disadvantage of only containing quotations from writings and speeches up to 1966. It did not sell well, specially after the Panaf Freedom Fighters’ Edition was published. Nelson remaindered the book and sold their stock to Panaf Books. Travelling by way of Amsterdam and Las Palmas, Peter 24 and I arrived at Conakry airport during the evening of the 10th of June. We were met by Ghanaians of Nkrumah’s entourage and taken to the nearby Gbessia airport hotel. The following morning a car was sent to convey us to Villa Syli. It was almost six months since I had seen Nkrumah, shortly before he left Accra on the peace mission to Hanoi. I noticed no change in him. Wearing a short-sleeved white 25 collarless drill suit, he looked extremely fit and was in his usual high spirits. He told us that arrangements had been made for us to stay in a government guest bungalow in the diplomatic quarter of Conakry, where we would be private and more comfortable. There followed a busy twelve days spent working with Nkrumah on the galleys of Challenge of the Congo and arranging the Freedom Fighters’ Edition of Axioms. We worked usually until about 2 p.m., when a table on the verandah would be prepared for lunch, Camara always joining us for the meal.
It was during this visit that I first met President Sekou Toure. It was in the grounds of Belle Vue, where Nkrumah had invited Peter and myself to meet him late one afternoon, the time when Nkrumah sometimes took exercise. On this particular day, he was having a driving lesson in the grounds of Belle Vue. When he drove up to greet us, Nkrumah had only had a few lessons, and did not seem very confident. He quickly alighted from the car and suggested we walk round the extensive grounds of Belle Vue. We had not gone far when Sekou Toure drove up at the wheel of his black Citroen. He stopped for a few minutes while Peter and I were introduced to him. On this my first visit to Conakry, I made only short entries in the notebook I took with me. These were mainly remarks made by Nkrumah which I wished to remember. I would jot them down as soon as I could, while I remembered the actual words. I also wrote brief impressions of life at the Villa, and noted down items which Nkrumah wished me to send him on my return to London. Later, as time passed and it became clear that Nkrumah might be in Conakry for some years, I felt a responsibility to record in more detail in my notebooks.
The final two years
The presence of Nkrumah in Guinea was thought by Camara, and other Guineans with whom I spoke, to strengthen Sekou Toure’s position, since they considered it unlikely any coup could succeed against him while Nkrumah lived in Conakry. Their optimism proved to be well founded. The few attempts at destabilization which took place during Nkrumah’s stay in Guinea failed. It was not until the Portuguese-led invasion of the country in November 1970 that Sekou Toure’s government was for a few days seriously threatened. However, by the time Nkrumah arrived in Conakry in March 1966, the socialist policies of Sekou Toure’s government, and the support given to the PAIGC, had already aroused the hostility of internal and external forces which Nkrumah’s presence further exacerbated. Nkrumah, far from lying low, right from the start of the Conakry period made it clear that he intended to continue the African revolutionary struggle as best he could from Guinea. Within a few days of his arrival he was broadcasting to the Ghanaian people on Radio Guinea’s “Voice of the Revolution”. This first broadcast was made on 6 March, the ninth anniversary of Ghana’s independence. Between March and December 1966, Nkrumah made fifteen broadcasts to Ghana, his purpose being to expose the true nature of the coup and to encourage resistance. In addition, he quickly set to work on writing books and pamphlets, all of which were designed to project his African liberation and unification policies. Far from being silenced, he was showing every sign of continuing to be a thorn in the flesh of the same forces, domestic and international, which had combined to overthrow his government. For them, Nkrumah and Sekou Toure were a formidable combination.
In Ghana, the NLC did not underestimate the challenge. The Ghanaian security men at Villa Syli, and Guinean military and security forces, were constantly alert for any attempt to harm Nkrumah, or to kidnap him. Naval patrols guarded the foreshore, stopping and searching any vessel which aroused their suspicion. On more than one occasion, a fishing boat with Ghanaian crew members was escorted into Conakry harbour for thorough investigation.
On 29 November 1966, the Daily Graphic, a Ghana newspaper, printed on its front page the headline “Nkrumah And Three Others Wanted For Murder” 26. A reward of £10,000 was advertised for their return to Ghana “dead or alive”. In a letter to me dated 4 December 1966, Nkrumah wrote: “What fools they are… they are at their wits’ end and in such a panic.”
In November 1966 the NLC had detained in Accra a Guinean delegation en route to an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa, during what was intended to have been a brief stop-over. The Dutch KLM aircraft had been scheduled to land in Abidjan, but had been diverted to Accra “because of bad weather”.
The NLC in detaining the Guinean delegation declared that they were being held because Ghanaians of Nkrumah’s entourage were being kept in Guinea against their will. After much diplomatic wrangling, the OAU was asked to send a mission to Conakry to discover whether in fact the Ghanaians were being forced to stay in Guinea. The OAU mission was greeted at Conakry’s Gbessia airport by demonstrating Ghanaians carrying placards expressing their loyalty to Nkrumah. During the visit, each member of the entourage was interviewed separately and the OAU delegation left Guinea to report that there was no truth in the NLC allegation. The NLC then released the Guineans held in Accra. They returned to Conakry to a heroes’ welcome. Meanwhile, Sekou Toure had refused to attend the OAU meeting, and had openly accused the USA of masterminding the kidnapping of his delegation.
The US ambassador in Guinea was put under house arrest, as were other Americans living in Guinea. They were only released after the NLC freed the Guinean delegation. All members of the Peace Corps were ordered to leave Guinea. As a result of Sekou Toure’s anti-American actions, Pan Am removed Conakry from their flight schedules.
It was shortly after these events that I travelled to Conakry for the third time in 1966. I took with me advance copies of Challenge of the Congo. But the main purpose of my visit was the two books which Nkrumah was working on at that time,Dark Days in Ghana and the Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. Notes for the Handbook which had been prepared before the coup, had been left behind in Ghana when Nkrumah departed for Hanoi. They were among documents which he said were handed over by the NLC to Western intelligence organizations. In Conakry, Nkrumah set to work on a new manual for African freedom fighters, and it was this new Handbook which was published by Panaf Books in 1968.
Notes 1. Dark Days in Ghana, Panaf Books, London, 1968, p. 10. 2. Conakry File 26. 3. Involvement of the CIA in the 24 February 1966 coup in Ghana is now generally accepted. See In Search of Enemies by John Stockwell (New York 1978) in which this former CIA officer discloses (p .201, note) that the CIA station in Accra “was given a generous budget, and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station’s involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place.” Stockwell continues: “inside CIA headquarters the Accra station was given full, if unofficial, credit for the eventual coup.” After the coup the CIA station chief in Accra, Howard T. Bane, was promoted to a senior position in the Agency, (New York Times, 9 May 1978). See also pp. 223-225 The CIA: A Forgotten History by William Blum (Zed Books, 1986), Chapter 32, Ghana 1966: Kwame Nkrumah Steps out of Line. 4. This sentence was handwritten after the message had been typed, indicating the strict security measures adopted in Peking, and the need to protect himself from further betrayal by keeping his plans secret. ( Conakry File 43) 5. Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit., p. I I. 6. Nkrumah’s son Gamal Gorkeh Nkrumah, then aged seven, remembers every detail of that traumatic day. Before the fighting at Flagstaff House began, he had been woken early by the roaring of unfed lions in the zoo a short distance from the house. Soon, the whole family was awake. Gunfire from the direction of the airport was heard, and then the broadcast of the coup leader, Colonel E.T. Kotoka announcing the coup. Fathia at once phoned the Egyptian Embassy telling them to contact Nasser to ask him to send an aircraft at once to Accra to rescue them. Her call was just in time. Minutes later, the telephone was cut off. The family took refuge in the Egyptian Embassy until the afternoon when the aircraft sent by Nasser arrived. On the drive to Accra airport their car was stopped by tanks and troops at an army road block. Fathia and her three young children were ordered out of the car at gunpoint. Fathia showed no fear, declaring her anger at the treatment of her husband who had done so much for them and for Ghana. Clearly taken by surprise at being confronted with Nkrumah’s family, the officer in charge was at a loss to know what action to take. With loaded guns still pointed at them, Fathia and the children waited at the roadside while the officer radioed for instructions. Eventually, the family was allowed to continue to the airport, and finally make their escape to Cairo. The family remained in Cairo and were never to see Nkrumah again though they kept in touch using diplomatic channels. 7. Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit., p. 15. 8. Convention People’s Party, led by Kwame Nkrumah. 9. Private Secretary (Female) Gold Coast, Christopher Hurst, London. 1984, p. 219. 10. Dedicated “To the African Guerrilla,” this book was published by Panaf Books m 1968. 11. His account in an Accra bank, into which his salary as president had been paid, had been frozen by the NLC. 12. An Akan name meaning “victorious leader”. The title was conferred on him by the CPP in recognition of his winning of independence for Ghana. 13. The name by which Nkrumah was known during his student days in the USA. and which some of his Afro-American friends continued to use. 14. Conakry File 6. 15. One of the most outstanding of the Afro-American civil rights leaders at the beginning of the 20th century. Went to live in Ghana at Kwame’s invitation in 1961. Elected a Fellow of the Ghana Academy of Arts in 1961, and awarded a doctorate in Literature by the same university in 1963. Died in Accra on 29 August 1963 where he had become a Ghanaian citizen. 16. A CPP support organization set up in London after the coup. 17. A journalist and editor who had worked in Ghana at the Guinea Press. From 1964 to 1971 he was Editor of the magazine Africa and the World. 18. Marshment and R. D. Randall had both worked in Ghana at the Guinea Press, the former as general manager, the latter as accountant and auditor. Nkrumah often referred to Marshment by the pseudonym “Max”. 19. Nkrumah had no private means to draw upon, apart from modest funds in his royalty account at the Bank of Scotland in London, which his publishers, Thomas Nelson and Sons, opened for him after the coup. 20. It had become necessary to form a company to publish the books Nkrumah wrote in Conakry, and to keep the ones he had written before the coup in print, because neither of his previous publishers, Thomas Nelson and Sons and Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., were prepared to publish them after the fall of his government. The only exceptions were two books published by Nelson in 1967 which were contracted before the coup. These were Challenge of the Congo and Axioms. PanafBooks Ltd. was active until 1987. In that year the Nkrumah copyright was leased to Zed Press Ltd., who took over the responsibility of keeping all the books written by Nkrumah in print. 21. Panaf Great Lives Series. Panaf Books. London. 1974. pp. 221-2. 22. In Guinea Bissau, where the PAIGC was engaged in a liberation war to end Portuguese colonial rule. 23. A radical newspaper published in Ghana during the period of the CPP government. 24. My son, then aged 21. 25. Throughout the years Nkrumah spent in Conakry he always wore white. 26. The others were Ambrose Yankey Sr., M. A. Mensah and Boye Moses.