Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years

June Milne, ed. Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters
June Milne, ed. Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters

In his will Kwame Nkrumah designated June Milne as his literary executrix. But it took the Guinean authorities fourteen years (from 1972 to 1986) to relinquish Osagyefo’s papers to her.  I present here excerpts from Kwame Nkrumah  The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters, the book edited by Ms. Milne. She used primary sources generated by the late president. This publication includes only the Foreword and the Introduction. Yet, the challenges and dilemmas of life in exile in Conakry are clearly exposed. Likewise for the ways in which Ghana’s first president tried to overcome the predicaments of his downfall, or his stoic stance in the face of adversity.
The book’s limitations reflect the incompleteness of the material. The editor points to regrettable gaps and losses in collecting and preserving documents and artifacts. Nonetheless, June Milne’s work is informative and revealing. In addition, it gives context and weight to Victor Du Bois’ paper “The Death of Kwame Nkrumah.”
That said, for readability sake, I have partitioned the 17-page Introduction into eight subtitled segments.
Last, the book confuses two separate diplomatic incidents. They opposed Guinea, on the one hand, and Ghana and Ivory Coast, on the other. The first one involved PAN Am Airlines in 1966 in Accra. See André Lewin, Chapter 61. La chute et la fin de l’ami Nkrumah. On October 30th 1966 President Sekou Toure ordered the house arrest of Robinson McIlvaine, the US ambassador in Conakry. The restriction lasted less than 24 hours.… The second incident concerned KLM Airlines, in 1967 in Abidjan. It stemmed from the love-hate relationship and the cyclical feuds between Houphouët-Boigny (the master) and Sekou Toure (the disciple). Curiously, in both instances Lansana Beavogui, minister and futur prime minister, led the confined delegation.

See (a) Le résistible leadership d’Houphouët-Boigny, (b) Le “vide guinéen” selon Houphouët-Boigny, (c) My Errata about Guinée, les cailloux de la mémoire

Tierno S. Bah

June Milne, ed.
Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters.
Panaf. 1990. 416 pages


June Milne, ed. Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years. His Life and Letters
June Milne, ed. Kwame Nkrumah. The Conakry Years.
His Life and Letters

President Kwame Nkrumah, who was the first person to lead a colony in Sub-Saharan Africa to independence, was forced into exile in Guinea Conakry following the coup in Ghana on 24 February 1966. He arrived in Guinea in March and was destined to remain there until August 1971 when ill health compelled him to seek medical treatment in Romania. He died in Bucharest on 27 April 1972.
During his stay in Conakry he wrote many books, and as his research assistant and publisher I was in close touch, making sixteen visits to Guinea and three to Bucharest. In his will he appointed me his literary executrix, and for years after his death I made attempts to recover his library, papers and files of correspondence which I knew were still in Villa Syli, his residence in Conakry.
However, it was not until August 1986 that I was finally able to visit Conakry and obtain these papers, the bulk of which I have now deposited in the Moorland-Spingarn Research Centre at Howard University, Washington DC.
As so little is known of Nkrumah’s life and work during the years he spent in Conakry, I have compiled this record from primary source material comprising the 43 Conakry files of correspondence, more than 350 letters and innumerable cables addressed to me, and from notebooks I kept during my visits to Conakry and Bucharest.
The excerpts from my notebooks are included since they were written at the time of my visits to see Nkrumah, and not with hindsight. However good one’s memory, remembered conversations and remarks are suspect, and have no place in this book.
It has only been possible to include a selection of the interesting letters and papers in the Conakry files. Nkrumah published in his book Dark Days in Ghana some of the letters and cables he received during the early years of his stay in Conakry. These are not reprinted here. Neither are there excerpts of his broadcasts to the Ghanaian people, nor other matter which has been published elsewhere.
There were many whose loyalty and friendship were expressed verbally and remain unrecorded, but who played an important role in helping to sustain Nkrumah during the Conakry years. Never to be forgotten was the unfailing devotion of members of his Ghanaian entourage, particularly the tender care of Quarm and Nyamikeh in Bucharest during the last months of his life; the steadfastness throughout of Camara Sana, the Guinean protocol officer at Villa Syli; the innumerable thoughtful little acts of the many Africans and others who visited Nkrumah in Conakry, and who talked with him, from young students such as Lamin who travelled from Gambia to be with him and whom Nkrumah tutored for several months, to freedom fighters of the stature of Amilcar Cabral, who was a frequent visitor and with whom Nkrumah had long discussions. Sadly, there are no records of these.
Similarly, there exist no written records of the visits of the many foreign envoys in Conakry, notably those from African countries, from Cuba, China, the USSR, North Vietnam and North Korea. President Fidel Castro supplied molasses and black beans through his embassy in Conakry. The Chinese ambassador brought books and silk shirts, personal gifts from the then prime minister Chou en-Lai. North Korean and Vietnamese diplomatic personnel regularly gave film shows for Nkrumah and his entourage at Villa Syli. During most of his stay in Guinea, a Vietnamese doctor attended to any medical problems at the Villa, while a Soviet dentist gave his services, bringing with him a portable dental chair for treatment to be carried out on the open seafront terrace adjoining Nkrumah’s office.
The scope of these and other examples of the continuing support received by Nkrumah after the 1966 coup may to some extent be realized from references in the letters and other written evidence here published. There are, for example, references to the work of Douglas Rogers, editor of the magazine Africa and the World, and of Ghanaians who kept alive the Overseas Branch of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), an organization still in existence today and which issues The Dawn, a journal founded by Nkrumah and the CPP Overseas Branch.
In a special category, but also largely unrecorded in the Conakry files, are Nkrumah’s friendship and shared Pan African objectives with President Sekou Toure, Madame Sekou Toure and the people of Guinea. Madame Sekou Toure on many occasions personally cooked meals for Nkrumah, delivering them by hand to him at Villa Syli. The visits of Guineans to the Villa, ·and the spontaneous cheering and waving of the ordinary people of Guinea whenever they saw Nkrumah, touched him deeply. As also, the special ovation from the huge crowds for himself and his entourage whenever they appeared at state functions in Conakry.
The letters written by Nkrumah to me, and much of the other correspondence and documents here reproduced, are edited, mainly for reasons of space, but also because to print them in full would not contribute significantly to the picture they give of Nkrumah’s life during the Conakry and Bucharest periods. The editing has simply involved the omitting of certain passages. Nothing has been added. I have not indicated where omissions have been made, in order that the text should not appear unnecessarily disjointed.
There have been many coups in Africa both before and after that of 1966 when Nkrumah ‘s government was overthrown—but none which has had greater impact on the course of Africa’s history. After a coup, little is usually heard of the deposed head of state. After the initial glare of media publicity the norm is for him to be of no further interest. With Nkrumah this was not the case. Far from sinking into obscurity, Nkrumah’s political stature grew, and continues to inspire Africans and people of African descent worldwide. The words inscribed in Guinea on his coffin provide a verdict on his life and work: “The Greatest African”.


The  Coup

President Kwame Nkrumah was on his way to Hanoi with peace proposals for ending the war in Vietnam when the 24 February 1966 coup in Ghana overthrew his government. The constitution was suspended and a National Liberation Council (NLC) established. It consisted of six members of the army and six policemen, with General J.A. Ankrah as chairman, and Police Commissioner J.W.K. Harlley as deputy chairman.
Nkrumah had almost reached Peking, the furthest point of his journey, when the coup took place. He was informed of the news by the Chinese ambassador in Accra who had gone ahead to Peking to greet Nkrumah and to escort him during his stay in China. Nkrumah’s first reaction was to return immediately to Accra. If the VCIO of Ghana Airways had not been left behind in Rangoon, he would have embarked at once. “I knew that to avoid unnecessary bloodshed I would have to be back in Ghana within 24 hours, and this was clearly impossible. I decided, therefore, to make an immediate statement to the Ghanaian people, and to fight back on African soil just as soon as my hosts could make the necessary travel arrangements.” 1
At this time, many cables were sent by Nkrumah to heads of state, to Ghanaian diplomatic missions and to friends. Among the first was a cable to the Ghanaian embassy in Cairo:

Confirm Immediately That Ghana Airways Vcio En Route From Rangoon Has Been Instructed To Stand By In Cairo With Its Security Passengers Stop Send Your Message In Care Of Ghana Embassy Peking 2.

On the same day, 25 February, messages were sent to President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, President Modibo Keita of Mali and to President Nasser. The following message to President Sekou Toure is typical. It was in response to a message dated the day before from the Guinean president.

My dear Brother and President
I have been deeply touched by your message of solidarity and support I have received today. It is true, as you say, that this incident in Ghana is a plot by the imperialists, neo-colonialists and their agents in Africa 3. As these imperialist forces grow more militant and insidious, using traitors to the African cause against the freedom and independence of our people, we must strengthen our resolution and fight for the dignity of our people to the last man and for the unity of Africa. It is heartening to know that in this struggle we can count on the support and understanding of Africa’s well-tried leaders like yourself.
I know that our cause will triumph and that we can look forward to the day when Africa shall be really united and free from foreign interference and intrigues and saboteurs and puppets.
I am safe and well here in Peking and I have sent my special emissary who will deliver this message to you to let you know the plans I am making for my early return to Africa. I trust that you will give him every possible assistance for the fulfilment of his mission.
I shall visit you in Guinea soon 4.
With sincere and brotherly affection.
Kwame Nkrumah

With messages for Nkrumah pouring into Peking from Africa and many other parts of the world, and with all the work of acknowledging them, Nkrumah did not forget to cable those whom he knew would be anxious about him. Among cables and messages sent on 26 February were those to personal friends . The cable I received read: Take Heart I Am Well And Determined.
In Peking, the Chinese government went ahead with plans which had been made for Nkrumah’s visit, treating him as an honoured head of state. On the evening of the 24th a banquet was held in his honour, at which a leading government official, Liu Shao-chi, spoke of the operations of neo-colonialist forces in Africa, mentioning specifically the USA, and quoting from Nkrumah’s book Neo-colonia!ism. In his speech, Nkrumah attacked imperialism and neocolonialism and American aggression in Vietnam. “On 24 February 1966, Ghana was forced one step backward. We shall take two forward,” he said. Listening to him on that occasion were members of his government and other officials who had accompanied him on the peace mission. According to Nkrumah, “most of them were frightened… Their obvious dismay was in striking contrast to the calmness and courage of the 66 other personnel — the security officers and members of my personal secretariat.” 5
Nkrumah left Peking on 28 February in an aircraft provided by the Soviet Union. Flying by way of Irkutsk, he and his entourage arrived in Moscow on 1st March. He telephoned me shortly after his arrival. He told me that he was on his way to a destination which I would doubtless hear about on the radio in due course. He said that he had instructed his foreign minister, Alex Quaison-Sackey, to go to Addis Ababa to represent the constitutional government of Ghana at the OAU Council of Ministers meeting. I had heard, however, on the BBC World Service that very morning that Quaison-Sackey had not gone to Addis Ababa, but had travelled to Accra. I told Nkrumah. He seemed shocked. For a moment he said nothing. Then he abruptly changed the subject and asked if I had heard about the defection of J.E. Bossman, the Ghana High Commissioner in London, news of which had been conveyed to Nkrumah on his arrival in Moscow. A few minutes later the call ended with Nkrumah’s assurance that I would hear from him soon after he reached his “destination”.
A few of Nkrumah’s government colleagues had left Peking before him. Others travelled with him to Moscow. Kwesi Armah and other officials left Moscow to deal, as they said, with “urgent private matters”. The plan was for them to carry out their tasks and then to return to Moscow to join Nkrumah and travel with him to Guinea. But when Nkrumah learned of the defections of Bossman and Quaison-Sackey he delayed no longer, and decided to go to Conakry at once with members of his personal staff, security personnel and a number of Ghanaians who had been studying in the Soviet Union and who wished to join him.

Co-president of Guinea

It was no surprise that Nkrumah chose to accept the invitation from Guinea. He would also have been welcome in Cairo because of his friendship with President Nasser. It was there that Nkrumah’s Egyptian wife, Madame Fathia (Rizk) and the three children, Gamal, Samia and Sekou, had taken refuge 6. But Guinea under the government of President Sekou Toure and the Guinean Democratic Party (PDG) had become a stronghold of the African Revolution. Sekou Toure and Nkrumah shared the same ideas on liberation, social justice and the unification of Africa.
In 1958, when Guinea made history by becoming the only state among France’s African colonies to give a decisive Non to General de Gaulle’s referendum about joining the French Community, Nkrumah’s government made £10 million available to the newly independent Guinean government to help it surmount some of its most pressing economic problems. Sekou Toure and the people of Guinea never forgot this generosity, and Nkrumah always received a tumultuous welcome whenever he visited the country. Then in 1961, Ghana and Guinea formed a Union, later extended to include Mali, which was intended to form a nucleus around which the African unification process could develop. A further factor which influenced Nkrumah’s decision to accept Sekou Toure’s invitation was the geographical consideration. Guinea was only some three hundred miles from Ghana. For Nkrumah was determined to return to Ghana to carry on the African revolutionary struggle, a resolve which never faltered during the whole of the time—more than five years—that he was destined to spend in Guinea.
The first I knew of Nkrumah’s arrival in Conakry was when I saw an Evening Standard placard on a news-stand in Piccadilly, London: “Nkrumah arrives in Guinea to a 21-gun salute”. It was a relief to know that he was safely on African soil again and among friends who shared his political ideals.
The aircraft carrying Nkrumah and his entourage had touched down briefly in Yugoslavia and Algeria, finally reaching Conakry during the afternoon of 2nd March. The following day, at a mass rally, Sekou Toure proclaimed Nkrumah head of state of Guinea. “The Ghanaian traitors have been mistaken in thinking that Nkrumah is simply a Ghanaian,” he declared, “he is a universal man.” It was an unprecedented expression of Pan Africanism. At the time, Nkrumah did not realize what Sekou Toure, speaking in French, had said. He thought the cheering of the crowd was in response to the Guinean president’s welcome to his distinguished guest. When later he learned the truth he was very moved but agreed only to become co-president of Guinea.

Settling down in Conakry

For the first few weeks, Nkrumah and his entourage were housed in Belle-Vue, a government guest compound situated on the coast a short distance from the centre of Conakry. During this time, at Nkrumah’s request, more modest accommodation was prepared for him at Villa Syli, an old colonial-style residence built on the seashore in the direction of the airport. It was a long, low white concrete building constructed on two levels, the lower part of which jutted out on to the beach. At high tide, the sea lapped against three sides of it. The upper part of the villa became the office area, while the lower level contained private and domestic quarters. To the rear was a secluded area shaded by mango and flamboyant trees. During the hottest months, Nkrumah would have a table and chairs carried out to “under the trees”, as he called it. But for the most part he spent his time in the office, a recessed room open at the front to the long verandah and the sea.
The speedy organizing and equipping of his office was made possible by Sekou Toure’s closure of the Ghanaian Embassy in Conakry immediately after the coup. An inventory was made of all property at the embassy and at the vacated Ghanaian envoy’s official residence. Everything was put at Nkrumah’s disposal. Tables, chairs, beds, cupboards, shelving, typewriters, stationery and so on, and also the envoy’s Mercedes Benz, were transferred to Villa Syli. Within days of moving in, Nkrumah was at his desk establishing an office routine, and dealing with the flood of letters, cables and messages which poured into the Conakry post office for him from all parts of the world.
Sekou Toure appointed Camara Sana, an experienced career diplomat who had served in Ghana and had a good knowledge of English, to act as Nkrumah’s protocol officer and interpreter. He was of great assistance to Nkrumah during the whole of the time he spent in Guinea. He supervised the administration of the villa, acted as liaison officer between Ghanaian and Guinean security personnel and undertook many other duties. Some of these were of a very confidential nature, concerned with attempts to restore Nkrumah to Accra. Sekou Toure and his ministers kept in close personal touch with Nkrumah, but it was Camara’s responsibility always to see that decisions were acted upon. I never knew him to have a holiday or even to take a day off. He would arrive early from his home some miles away and seldom return home before 10 or 11 p.m., after Nkrumah had retired to his room for the night.

During the early months of 1966 it was Camara who arranged for an electric generator to be installed in the compound so that the life of the villa could proceed despite the almost daily electricity cuts which the people of Conakry suffered.

Another priority which Nkrumah required was the setting up of an efficient radio station at the villa, and again it was Camara who arranged for the work to be done.

Down but not out

Throughout the years which Nkrumah spent in Guinea he was able to be kept informed of broadcasts from Ghana, and of confidential army and police messages. Each day, reports of these broadcasts and messages were placed on his desk by members of his entourage whose job it was to monitor them. In this way, Nkrumah was able to obtain insight into what was happening in Ghana, and did not have to rely solely on reports of Ghanaians and others who either travelled to Conakry to see him, or who wrote or sent messages.
Right from the start of his stay in Guinea, Ghanaians loyal to his government got in touch with him. For a time, one of them openly cabled news from the Foreign Affairs Department in Accra. Others, among them members of the staff of the Ghanaian Embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone, sent him copies of reports and instructions received from the NLC in Accra. They signed themselves “Your secret agents”. While much of the information they sent was not of great significance, it was nevertheless a useful supplement to information from other sources.
Within six weeks of his arrival in Conakry, Nkrumah tried to organize a conference of the militant states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to meet in Bamako, Mali on 29 May. The idea for such a conference had first been mooted by Sekou Toure in a message to Nkrumah shortly after the coup, when Nkrumah was still in Peking. The Guinean president said that his government had decided “after a thorough analysis of the African situation following the seizure of power by the instruments of imperialism… to call on all progressive African countries to hold a special conference and take all adequate measures. We think that the time factor is vital here, since it is important to make a riposte without further delay, by every means.” 7
In Conakry, Nkrumah drafted a letter of invitation to be sent to the twelve heads of state considered at the time to be militant. They were Egypt, Guinea, Ghana (CPP government) 8, Mali, Somalia, Algeria, Uganda, Mauritania, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Sierra Leone. The letters were to be signed by the three presidents of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union of 1961, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita. The invitations, dated 25 April 1966, were to be sent first to Modibo Keita requesting him to sign them and to return them to Conakry for the signatures of Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. There is no evidence among the files and papers which Nkrumah kept in Villa Syli that the conference ever took place. Such a conference so soon after the Ghana coup would surely have attracted media attention. There were no reports of it. However, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita kept in close touch and met frequently.
There was a time when Nkrumah considered moving to Bamako because of its proximity to Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and the latter’s common frontier with northern Ghana. An opposition politician from Burkina Faso, whom Nkrumah knew from pre-coup days, visited him in Conakry and led him to believe that there might soon be a political change in his country which would provide favourable conditions for cross-border contact between Nkrumah’s supporters outside Ghana and those within. A move to Bamako would make such a possibility easier to accomplish, Mali and Burkina Faso sharing a common frontier. The coup of 19 November 1968 which overthrew the government of Modibo Keita ended any chance of such a move.

For the first six months or so, Nkrumah was content to monitor events in Ghana without too much concern about the effect the coup in Ghana would have on the African revolutionary struggle. But as the months passed he became anxious about the time factor, fearing that irreparable damage might be done to Ghana’s infrastructure. It was not that he wanted a restoration of his pre-1966 political position, but that he found he could not pursue his Pan African objectives adequately from Guinea. He had to return to Ghana because the infrastructure was there. On his return, others could direct the domestic administration of the country, leaving him free to devote his whole attention to organizing the Pan African struggle for the total liberation and unification of the Continent. This was not a new idea he had dreamed up in Conakry. Some time before the coup Nkrumah was thinking along these lines, as Erica Powell, his private secretary from 1955 to 1964 has confirmed in her book. Nkrumah told her before she finally left Ghana in 1965 that “he wished he could resign the presidency and devote his time to African unity.” 9

After the coup, as he was no longer president of Ghana, the idea seemed possible to realize once he had returned and could make a fresh start. He intended to establish a freedom fighter headquarters, similar to something he had seen in China when visiting Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. It would be situated not far from Accra, hidden from aerial attack in the hilly forested area of Aburi. From there he would develop the military and political structures outlined in his book Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution 10. During one of my visits to Guinea, Nkrumah sketched in pencil a rough plan of the small building he would require. It consisted of two bedrooms with bathrooms, and a central room for meetings. He marked the position of doors, and the driveways leading to the entrance of the cave-like building, remembering to make a circular part where vehicles could turn.

Nkrumah’s firm belief that he would return to Ghana was strengthened by the flow of mail and messages of support he received. An indication of the extent and variety of these communications can be gathered from the files of correspondence and cables which he left behind in Villa Syli. Furthermore, throughout the Conakry years, there were numerous visits from Ghanaians and others who claimed to be organizing a counter-coup to restore him to Accra. Nkrumah suspected that some of those who claimed to be working for his return were dishonest opportunists. But lacking the intelligence facilities he had had in Ghana, he could never be sure of a person’s integrity. If it had not been for his determination to get back to the country in order to carry out his Pan African objectives, he would, I believe, have shown no interest in any scheme to accomplish his return by force. But as time passed, and the infrastructure in Ghana deteriorated, he became more vulnerable to those who approached him with so-called plans for his return. Several times he was told of an actual day when he could expect to hear good news. At other times he would be informed to expect action between certain dates. There was one occasion when the Guinean government itself was so sure of a particular plan that Nkrumah was persuaded to spend the night at Sekou Toure’s residence so that he could be ready to broadcast and to make a quick return to Accra.
Always, when the expected dates passed and nothing happened, excuses would be made that something or other had unexpectedly happened to necessitate a postponement.


Camara became increasingly cynical. By the time Nkrumah had eventually to leave Conakry for medical treatment in 1971, Camara was prepared to believe that no Ghanaian could be trusted, except for those of the entourage whom he had come to know well. I sometimes wonder what Camara would think if he knew of the subsequent boasting of some of those who visited Nkrumah at the villa, claiming to have been constantly at the great man’s side, rendering him help in time of need, when in fact they let him down. Most of these braggarts were only briefly there. Others not at all.

One of the worst aspects of the dreary process of deception and disappointment was financial. For, so often, those who visited Nkrumah claiming to be working for his reinstatement in Ghana asked for cash, ostensibly to buy arms and support. The limited funds supplied initially by friendly Eastern bloc and African governments were soon exhausted. Much against his inclination, Nkrumah had to seek further financial help. He loathed the very notion of asking for support, and found it extremely distasteful to hand out cash to dubious characters whom he would not have tolerated for a moment in his presence had he not been in such a critical position, with, as he thought, the future of the African Revolution at stake.
He was not prepared to let slip any opportunity which might have resulted in a return to Accra. Each time he was approached he faced the dilemma of wondering whether, if he failed to give help, he might be jeopardizing the one real chance of success. He said that all would be thoroughly investigated when he got back to Ghana. Those who had deliberately deceived him would have to explain themselves to the people, because it was the people, and not him personally, they had betrayed.

Doubtless, some of those who sought to take advantage of him in this situation had been taken in by Western media reports at the time of the coup that Nkrumah had vast sums of money deposited in Swiss banks. Even those who were skeptical about this knew that Sekou Toure strongly supported Nkrumah and was anxious to see him return to Ghana. The Guinea government could be expected to provide funds if need be. There was even speculation that Sekou Toure had repaid Nkrumah the £10 million which the Ghana government had lent to Guinea in 1958. The air around those who intended to exploit Nkrumah’s predicament was filled with rumour and innuendo. The fact is that, apart from the small royalty account in London and the funds supplied occasionally by friendly governments, Nkrumah had no money on which he could draw 11. He used to keep a certain amount of cash, mainly dollars and pounds, in a suitcase in his bedroom, some of this having been brought into Guinea in diplomatic bags. It was probably reports of the availability of cash from this supply which encouraged unscrupulous individuals to dream up ways to obtain some of it. This is not to suggest that all those who got in touch with Nkrumah in Conakry with plans to organise his return to Ghana were self-seekers, though many undoubtedly were.
Within weeks of his arrival in Guinea, Nkrumah was hearing from men and women, some of whom had worked in Ghana before the coup, who had either chosen to leave or been forced to go. Among them were people he knew. Others he had never met or heard of. There was also mail from acquaintances and from organizations whose connections with Nkrumah dated back to his student days in America.
Often pseudonyms were agreed between Nkrumah and those with whom he kept in touch. All mail and cables had to be sent through the main Conakry post office which, in spite of precautions, was not proof against security risks. Several times during the early days of the Conakry period, the envelopes of letters exchanged between him and myself bore unmistakable signs of having been opened and clumsily resealed.
Time and again, Camara was sent to try to find out whether the mail was being interfered with in Conakry. It was impossible to discover. It was agreed that I should address envelopes to “Camara Sana” and use the PO Box number 834. On each of my visits to Guinea we used to decide new code names and phrases, in what must have seemed to any professional intelligence organization a very amateurish attempt to establish some degree of confidentiality in our letters and cables. Though there was nothing secret about what we said, we usually sealed our letters with red or green wax. I possessed two silver rings, decoratively engraved. We used one each to stamp the wax. In this way we thought we would know if the seal had been broken. In cables to me, Nkrumah would sign himself “Sana” if no reply was needed, and “Sophie”, the name of Camara’s wife, if he wanted me to reply. Sometimes in cables he would use printing or publishing terms. For example, “Galleys corrected” meant that he had received encouraging news about a counter-coup. In confidential cables with Ghanaians and others, he frequently used pseudonyms such as “Saidou” or “Amadou”. In cables to me during the last months of his life he used the name “Diallo”.
However, in most of Nkrumah’s correspondence and cables no use was made of coded phrases or pseudonyms. He was addressed usually as Osagyefo 12 or Dr Nkrumah, and on rare occasions, Francis 13. Nkrumah usually in his replies signed himself Osagyefo or Kwame Nkrumah.
A prolific writer was Julie Medlock. She had been director of an organization called “The Accra Assembly: the World Without the Bomb”. She was one of those who had been compelled to leave Ghana after the coup. She asked for Nkrumah’s advice and help in establishing a new headquarters for the Accra Assembly. As late as 22 April 1971 she was writing “My dearest Osagyefo… the Accra Assembly is still alive.” 14
There were many long letters from Shirley Du Bois, widow of the celebrated Afro-American campaigner W.E.B. Du Bois 15. For a time after the coup, Shirley lived in Cairo, where her son David worked as a journalist and radio commentator. Later, Nkrumah arranged for Shirley to work in Peking with the Afro-Asian Writers Bureau. She visited Conakry on more than one occasion.
Another who wrote at length to Nkrumah during the first few years of exile was Pat Sloan. He had been in Ghana at the time of the coup and had had to leave soon after. He wrote a detailed account of what happened at the Winneba Ideological Institute, where he had worked as senior lecturer in the Political Science faculty. The students, he said, seemed utterly confused. During the course of a protracted correspondence, Pat Sloan suggested changes in the curriculum at Winneba which should be made when Nkrumah returned to Ghana. In England, he kept Nkrumah informed of the activities and opinions of Ghanaians in London, making particular reference to the activities of the CPP Overseas and the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution 16 headed by Ekow Eshun, who before the coup had worked in the Ghana High Commission in London.

Writing and publishing

The centre of CPP Overseas activity in London at this time was the 89 Fleet Street office of the magazine Africa and the World, edited by Douglas Rogers 17. Before the coup the magazine, first published in 1964, had been financed primarily by the Ghana Government through the Bureau of African Affairs in Accra, and later by the Publicity Secretariat. The magazine’s printer was John Marshment, and the accountant and auditor was Roland (‘Roley’) Davenish Randall 18, who was instrumental in forming Panaf Publications Ltd. to publish the magazine. It was Nkrumah’s idea to have a magazine published and distributed from London, the main purpose being to publicize African affairs (and in particular the policies of the Ghanaian Government) to the world and to the large African community in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. By the time of the 1966 coup, the magazine had become well known and respected for its progressive reporting and its support for the CPP government’s radical and Pan African policies. Not surprisingly therefore, after the coup the NLC ended the funding of the magazine, and the company’s account with the Ghana Commercial Bank in London was frozen. As a result of quick action by Roley Randall, the company’s funds were rapidly switched to another bank, and the magazine carried on for a time, without missing an issue, assisted by funds from Nkrumah 19.
Randall played a significant part in the success of Panaf Publications Ltd., the company which was formed for Africa and the World, and in the company Panaf Books Ltd. 20, founded in 1968 to publish the books written by Nkrumah in Conakry. On several occasions when a crisis of one kind or another occurred, his expert advice and experience resolved the difficulty.
Initially when Panaf Books was formed, I worked at 89 Fleet Street in the room occupied by John Marshment, who allowed me to use part of his desk. Later, Douglas Rogers arranged for space to be made available for me in the large room at the top of the building where his secretary sat and from where Africa and the World was packaged and despatched.
Rogers and Marshment were among the first to visit Nkrumah in Villa Syli. They went there in April 1966 to discuss the future of the magazine and to arrange other ways in which they could assist him to get his voice heard in Ghana. It was not long before the team of Africa and the World were publishing posters and “minimag” editions of the magazine which could be secretly infiltrated into Ghana. It was during this visit also, that on 12 April Nkrumah gave the one and only press interview of his entire stay in Conakry. Rogers’ questions and Nkrumah’s answers were published in the May 1966 issue of the magazine. There had at this time been rumours that Guinea might intervene militarily to restore Nkrumah to power in Ghana. Rogers put the question:
— “Are you planning an invasion of Ghana?” The reply was:
— “No. I appreciate the feelings of my brother and Comrade Sekou Toure, and I know the people of Guinea are in a militant mood about the events in Ghana. They feel, quite rightly, that this is part of a general assault upon the peace, unity and independence of Africa, and that a halt must be called to it. We have had a series of military usurpations of power, and constant international intrigue against governments which are trying to give some real economic meaning to their political independence.”
He went on to say that while he understood the reaction of Guineans to the coup, he nevertheless believed it was a problem that must be resolved by Ghanaians. Nevertheless the NLC took the possibility of military intervention from Guinea seriously, raising the matter at the United Nations.
During the first few years, Nkrumah was constantly being asked to receive newspaper reporters and radio and TV representatives. He refused all requests from Western media sources. He was not prepared, he said, to waste time answering questions from those who had gloated over his government’s overthrow. His political record was known. If they wanted to question him about his thinking in Guinea, they could read his books. Apart from the visits of those who had positive, constructive reasons for seeing him, and a few personal friends, no one from outside Guinea had access to Nkrumah. Both Guinean and Ghanaian security screening was very thorough. I recall what happened when a group of Afro-Americans connected with the Black Power movement arrived uninvited from Algiers and without the required entry documents. The Guinean authorities, who were suspicious of their intentions, refused permission for them to see Nkrumah. They were promptly obliged to leave in the private jet which had brought them.
But in April 1966 when Flight Captain Hanna Reitsch, the well-known flying ace who had established a flying school in Ghana at Afienya, arrived unexpectedly at Conakry airport she was permitted a short visit. The Guinean authorities were uneasy about admitting a German who had achieved great distinction as a test pilot in the Second World War, and whom they regarded as a Nazi. But they gave permission when her true identity and the purpose of her visit were checked with Ghanaian security men of Nkrumah’s entourage. The hesitation of the Guinean officials was understandable, since Hanna had flown to Conakry in disguise, wearing a wig and using a false name. Hanna had been at Afienya when the coup took place, and she wanted to tell Nkrumah what had happened there, and to offer him any help she could provide.
Hanna told me when I first met her in Frankfurt in 1968, that when the coup occurred she feared that Nkrumah might try to return to Ghana immediately. In which case she was convinced he would direct the pilot of his aircraft to land on the airstrip at Afienya, counting on her still being in control there, whereas the coup-makers had in fact compelled her to leave.
In Conakry, Hanna warned Nkrumah against contemplating an early return to Accra, giving him lurid descriptions of the “jubilation” of Ghanaians at his overthrow. She had been horrified at what she regarded as spontaneous demonstrations against Nkrumah and the CPP government. Accounts of what she had seen at Afienya and in Accra before she left Ghana exasperated Nkrumah and members of his entourage, since they seemed to imply that she believed the people of Ghana as a whole supported the coup, whereas in fact the ordinary people took no part in it. Hanna was no diplomat. Nor did she have a great deal of political knowledge. She did not appear to allow for the external and domestic underlying causes of the coup, and the organizing of it. If she was convinced of anything, however, Hanna would vehemently and repeatedly express her views, which could be tiring as well as irritating. But when she committed herself to any person or to any project, her loyalty and courage were limitless. If Nkrumah had asked her to fly him to Accra when she visited him in Conakry, she would gladly have faced the extreme danger. As her friend Erica Powell once said to me: “If I was stranded at the North Pole, Hanna would come and get me out.”
Hanna only visited Conakry once. She wanted to return, but was told that the Guinean authorities would not readmit her, because of her former association with Nazi Germany. This explanation failed to convince Hanna or her close friends, one of whom, Father Volkmar, later wrote to Nkrumah expressing Hanna’s dismay at not being allowed to visit Guinea again, and her disappointment that Nkrumah made no mention of her 1966 visit in his book Dark Days in Ghana . While the Guinean authorities strictly controlled the entry of all visitors to their country and were particularly protective of Nkrumah, it was unlikely they would have refused entry permission to anyone he invited.
Throughout the Conakry years, Hanna and Nkrumah wrote to each other. In addition, Hanna sent many food parcels. It was she who sent the rose bushes which bloomed in the large concrete pots lining the verandah at Villa Syli. It was typical of Hanna to think of sending rose bushes knowing the pleasure Nkrumah had derived from his rose garden at Flagstaff House in Accra. Although to some, Hanna might have seemed a severe woman, obsessed with duty and discipline, she was I believe at heart a romantic.
Unfortunately, the Conakry correspondence files contain only one letter and a postcard written by Hanna to Nkrumah during the Conakry period, and no copies of the letters which Nkrumah wrote to her. After Hanna’s death in 1979, her brother, Commander Kurt Reitsch, informed me that not one was found among Hanna’s papers in her Frankfurt apartment. Yet less than a year before she died, Hanna had shown me a pile of them, handwritten on the familiar blue airmail paper Nkrumah used in Conakry. I can only surmise that she destroyed the letters herself, or arranged for them to be destroyed after her death, probably by her faithful housekeeper and secretary Fraulein Walter.
I was not surprised to find in the Conakry files so little evidence of Hanna’s lengthy correspondence with Nkrumah. For Nkrumah kept personal letters himself, and from time to time burned them. He destroyed all but a few of the hundreds of letters which I wrote to him in Conakry. The few he retained he kept along with other papers in the small steel deed box which he stored, locked, in his bedroom. All my letters to him were handwritten and I did not keep copies. But I retained every one of the hundreds of handwritten ones he wrote to me. He asked me once if I was keeping them, and when I replied “Yes”, he smiled.
He was amused on many occasions at my reluctance to part with anything which might one day be of interest to students of African history. Sometimes when Nkrumah had been working on a typescript, and his secretary, Sarfo, had typed an amended version, Nkrumah would tear up the original and throw the scraps of paper into the waste paper basket. When I protested and said that the hand-altered original should be preserved because one day students would be interested to see the changes he had made, he explained that he had learned from hard experience not to keep unnecessary papers. On the occasions when he had been arrested in the years before political success, police had seized all his personal papers. At the time of the coup, his office in Flagstaff House had also been ransacked and some very confidential papers taken. Like a freedom fighter in the forest he had learned to travel light.

Life at Villa Syli

The organization and the general atmosphere prevailing at Villa Syli, especially during the first few years, seemed to me to resemble that of a freedom fighter base. It was a spartan, disciplined, all-male environment. Uniformed and armed Guinean soldiers and militiamen guarded the gates of the villa and patrolled the grounds and seashore. For a time, sentries were stationed on the verandah leading to Nkrumah’s office, as well as at other strategic points inside the villa. The impression given was of great activity and purpose, as though there was an imminent battle to be won. Each member of Nkrumah’s entourage had specific duties to perform according to their training and skills. They formed committees to organize and oversee the various activities within the villa. During 1966 the 13-member Political Committee examined the 24 February coup in Ghana and the external and internal factors relating to it. A report was drawn up, typed and bound, and presented to Nkrumah. This project was only one among many which kept Nkrumah’s Ghanaian entourage busy while in Conakry.

Soon all, including Nkrumah, had undergone military training with members of the Guinean militia.

Throughout his stay in Conakry, Nkrumah kept to an ascetic, strict routine. A typical day in his life is described in the biography Kwame Nkrumah 21.
He would rise early and spend an hour or so doing yoga-type exercises in his room. Breakfast consisted of a grapefruit and perhaps a little cereal and honey, or an egg. He would usually be at his office desk by 9 o’clock and would often work through until about 2 p.m., with only a fruit drink to sustain him, or a cup of herbal tea. There would sometimes follow a game of chess with a member of his entourage… Then would come the main meal of the day, a simple two course meal of meat, chicken or fish followed always by fruit salad. His favourite food was the traditional stew and foufou of Ghana, and in Conakry this was cooked for him on certain days of the week by members of his entourage. After lunch, if there were no more visitors to see, or any more office work to attend to, he would retire to his bedroom for a short rest. He would read, and sometimes sleep for a little while, but often his rest was interrupted by the arrival of one or other of his staff with a cable, letters or a message. The evening meal was little more than a snack, and afterwards Nkrumah would talk with Sekou Toure or his ministers, or with some other visitor to the villa. Members of the various political organisations of Guinea were frequent visitors, as were the ambassadors of socialist embassies in Conakry. Then there were the visits from members of the liberation movements … Before retiring for the night Nkrumah would take his final exercise. This was usually a walk round and round the compound, sometimes ten or more times at a blistering speed which often left anyone accompanying him breathless trying to keep up.

Amilcar Cabral

Amilcar Cabral, president of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), was a frequent visitor. Whenever the sentries at the gates of Villa Syli recognized Cabral’s jeep approaching, they quickly flung the gates open so that the driver would scarcely need to slow down before sweeping up the drive to the doorway of the villa. Cabral made a point of calling to see Nkrumah whenever he was about to leave Conakry for the war zone 22 or for travel to seek support for the PAIGC liberation struggle. On his return to his Conakry headquarters he would promptly visit Nkrumah again. They used to talk in the privacy of Nkrumah’s office sometimes for an hour or more.
Nkrumah was particularly interested in what Cabral told him of PAIGC administration of the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau, since this would form the pattern for the government of the whole country when it had been liberated from Portuguese rule. It would, Nkrumah believed, be the kind of society based on socialist principles and committed to African unification, which he had been working to build in Ghana. Most probably, Nkrumah discussed with Cabral the Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare on which he was working. Nkrumah, when writing a book, discussed it whenever possible with anyone whose opinion he valued, or whom he thought might be able to provide additional material. He would give them sections of his manuscript to read and comment upon. Knowing his high regard for Cabral as a freedom fighter engaged in precisely the kind of armed liberation struggle about which he was writing, it would have been entirely out of character for Nkrumah not to have discussed the book with him.

See also Piero Gleijeses. First Ambassadors: Cuba’s Role in Guinea-Bissau’s War of Independence

Notable among many others who visited Nkrumah in Villa Syli in 1966 were Julia Wright and Henri Herve. They had been working in Ghana when the CPP government was overthrown. At that time, Henri, a Frenchman, was editor of Etincelle, the French edition of The Spark 23; while Julia, the daughter of the eminent Afro-American writer Richard Wright, was assisting me in establishing Nkrumah’s research office in Accra. This was located in the bungalow which had been the home of Dorothy Padmore, widow of George Padmore. Julia and Henri, after considerable harassment, managed to leave Ghana after the coup and travelled to Conakry where they hoped to be of help to Nkrumah. Henri joined Nkrumah’s entourage at the villa for a short time. Julia helped with office work. One of her tasks was to go through Guinean periodicals and newspapers, selecting items which she thought would interest Nkrumah. She translated them from French into English, abridging where necessary, and afterwards presented Nkrumah with a well-ordered set of clippings. In addition, Julia was sometimes called upon to translate letters and messages sent to Nkrumah in French. However, not long after his arrival in Guinea, Nkrumah arranged to have French lessons from a Conakry teacher. Her instruction, supplemented by a Lingua phone French course, soon resulted in Nkrumah becoming quite proficient in the language, though I never heard him speak French fluently.
Henri for a time had, I believe, connections with those trying to organize a counter-coup in Ghana. During one of my visits to Conakry in 1966 he left on what I understood to be a secret mission inside Ghana. Knowing the danger he faced, Julia was proud of him at that time. Nevertheless, some months later, it was clear that Nkrumah had lost confidence in him. Henri had never been very popular with Ghanaians of Nkrumah’s entourage. He now incurred the mistrust of Camara. It was decided that Henri should not return to Conakry. Nkrumah therefore advised Julia that her duty lay in returning to Paris to look after her young daughter Ama, who had been put in the care of Henri’s mother. Nkrumah was sorry to lose Julia, but as long as Julia remained in Guinea it would have been difficult to deny Henri permission to return to be with his wife. Julia, and occasionally Henri, continued from time to time to communicate with Nkrumah while he was in Conakry. But they never saw him again, though both attended his funeral in Conakry in May 1972.

First visit

On 10 June 1966 I set out on my first visit to Conakry. There were three main reasons for going.
The first was to finalize corrections to the galleys of Challenge of the Congo; the second to discuss arrangements for a Freedom Fighters’ Edition of Axioms; and the third to achieve a final text of the new preface which Nkrumah had been preparing for Challenge of the Congo.
He considered a new preface necessary in view of the coup in Ghana. As far as Axioms was concerned, Nkrumah was disappointed at the size and expensive format of the Nelson edition. He had envisaged a cheaply produced, pocket-sized book. Furthermore, he wished to make changes in a Freedom Fighters‘ edition. For example, he decided to omit the section on Non-Alignment, and to add six new sections on Black Power, People’s Militia, Revolutionary War, Propaganda, The Role of Women and “Third World”. He added axioms to the sections on Imperialism, Independence, Nationalism, Neo-colonialism, People and Racialism. The Freedom Fighters’ Edition of Axioms, first published by PanafBooks in 1968, was a small plastic-covered book which could easily be fitted into a pocket. As subsequent editions of the Panaf edition were published, quotations were added from the books Nkrumah wrote in Conakry. The Nelson edition of Axioms, apart from its format, had the disadvantage of only containing quotations from writings and speeches up to 1966. It did not sell well, specially after the Panaf Freedom Fighters’ Edition was published. Nelson remaindered the book and sold their stock to Panaf Books.
Travelling by way of Amsterdam and Las Palmas, Peter 24 and I arrived at Conakry airport during the evening of the 10th of June. We were met by Ghanaians of Nkrumah’s entourage and taken to the nearby Gbessia airport hotel. The following morning a car was sent to convey us to Villa Syli. It was almost six months since I had seen Nkrumah, shortly before he left Accra on the peace mission to Hanoi. I noticed no change in him. Wearing a short-sleeved white 25 collarless drill suit, he looked extremely fit and was in his usual high spirits. He told us that arrangements had been made for us to stay in a government guest bungalow in the diplomatic quarter of Conakry, where we would be private and more comfortable.
There followed a busy twelve days spent working with Nkrumah on the galleys of Challenge of the Congo and arranging the Freedom Fighters’ Edition of Axioms. We worked usually until about 2 p.m., when a table on the verandah would be prepared for lunch, Camara always joining us for the meal.

It was during this visit that I first met President Sekou Toure. It was in the grounds of Belle Vue, where Nkrumah had invited Peter and myself to meet him late one afternoon, the time when Nkrumah sometimes took exercise. On this particular day, he was having a driving lesson in the grounds of Belle Vue. When he drove up to greet us, Nkrumah had only had a few lessons, and did not seem very confident. He quickly alighted from the car and suggested we walk round the extensive grounds of Belle Vue. We had not gone far when Sekou Toure drove up at the wheel of his black Citroen. He stopped for a few minutes while Peter and I were introduced to him.
On this my first visit to Conakry, I made only short entries in the notebook I took with me. These were mainly remarks made by Nkrumah which I wished to remember. I would jot them down as soon as I could, while I remembered the actual words. I also wrote brief impressions of life at the Villa, and noted down items which Nkrumah wished me to send him on my return to London. Later, as time passed and it became clear that Nkrumah might be in Conakry for some years, I felt a responsibility to record in more detail in my notebooks.

The final two years

The presence of Nkrumah in Guinea was thought by Camara, and other Guineans with whom I spoke, to strengthen Sekou Toure’s position, since they considered it unlikely any coup could succeed against him while Nkrumah lived in Conakry. Their optimism proved to be well founded. The few attempts at destabilization which took place during Nkrumah’s stay in Guinea failed.
It was not until the Portuguese-led invasion of the country in November 1970 that Sekou Toure’s government was for a few days seriously threatened.
However, by the time Nkrumah arrived in Conakry in March 1966, the socialist policies of Sekou Toure’s government, and the support given to the PAIGC, had already aroused the hostility of internal and external forces which Nkrumah’s presence further exacerbated. Nkrumah, far from lying low, right from the start of the Conakry period made it clear that he intended to continue the African revolutionary struggle as best he could from Guinea.
Within a few days of his arrival he was broadcasting to the Ghanaian people on Radio Guinea’s “Voice of the Revolution”. This first broadcast was made on 6 March, the ninth anniversary of Ghana’s independence.
Between March and December 1966, Nkrumah made fifteen broadcasts to Ghana, his purpose being to expose the true nature of the coup and to encourage resistance.
In addition, he quickly set to work on writing books and pamphlets, all of which were designed to project his African liberation and unification policies. Far from being silenced, he was showing every sign of continuing to be a thorn in the flesh of the same forces, domestic and international, which had combined to overthrow his government. For them, Nkrumah and Sekou Toure were a formidable combination.

In Ghana, the NLC did not underestimate the challenge. The Ghanaian security men at Villa Syli, and Guinean military and security forces, were constantly alert for any attempt to harm Nkrumah, or to kidnap him. Naval patrols guarded the foreshore, stopping and searching any vessel which aroused their suspicion. On more than one occasion, a fishing boat with Ghanaian crew members was escorted into Conakry harbour for thorough investigation.

On 29 November 1966, the Daily Graphic, a Ghana newspaper, printed on its front page the headline “Nkrumah And Three Others Wanted For Murder” 26. A reward of £10,000 was advertised for their return to Ghana “dead or alive”. In a letter to me dated 4 December 1966, Nkrumah wrote: “What fools they are… they are at their wits’ end and in such a panic.”

In November 1966 the NLC had detained in Accra a Guinean delegation en route to an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa, during what was intended to have been a brief stop-over. The Dutch KLM aircraft had been scheduled to land in Abidjan, but had been diverted to Accra “because of bad weather”.

The NLC in detaining the Guinean delegation declared that they were being held because Ghanaians of Nkrumah’s entourage were being kept in Guinea against their will. After much diplomatic wrangling, the OAU was asked to send a mission to Conakry to discover whether in fact the Ghanaians were being forced to stay in Guinea. The OAU mission was greeted at Conakry’s Gbessia airport by demonstrating Ghanaians carrying placards expressing their loyalty to Nkrumah. During the visit, each member of the entourage was interviewed separately and the OAU delegation left Guinea to report that there was no truth in the NLC allegation. The NLC then released the Guineans held in Accra. They returned to Conakry to a heroes’ welcome. Meanwhile, Sekou Toure had refused to attend the OAU meeting, and had openly accused the USA of masterminding the kidnapping of his delegation.

The US ambassador in Guinea was put under house arrest, as were other Americans living in Guinea. They were only released after the NLC freed the Guinean delegation. All members of the Peace Corps were ordered to leave Guinea. As a result of Sekou Toure’s anti-American actions, Pan Am removed Conakry from their flight schedules.

It was shortly after these events that I travelled to Conakry for the third time in 1966. I took with me advance copies of Challenge of the Congo. But the main purpose of my visit was the two books which Nkrumah was working on at that time,Dark Days in Ghana and the Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. Notes for the Handbook which had been prepared before the coup, had been left behind in Ghana when Nkrumah departed for Hanoi. They were among documents which he said were handed over by the NLC to Western intelligence organizations. In Conakry, Nkrumah set to work on a new manual for African freedom fighters, and it was this new Handbook which was published by Panaf Books in 1968.

1. Dark Days in Ghana, Panaf Books, London, 1968, p. 10.
2. Conakry File 26.
3. Involvement of the CIA in the 24 February 1966 coup in Ghana is now generally accepted. See In Search of Enemies by John Stockwell (New York 1978) in which this former CIA officer discloses (p .201, note) that the CIA station in Accra “was given a generous budget, and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station’s involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place.” Stockwell continues: “inside CIA headquarters the Accra station was given full, if unofficial, credit for the eventual coup.”
After the coup the CIA station chief in Accra, Howard T. Bane, was promoted to a senior position in the Agency, (New York Times, 9 May 1978). See also pp. 223-225 The CIA: A Forgotten History by William Blum (Zed Books, 1986), Chapter 32, Ghana 1966: Kwame Nkrumah Steps out of Line.
4. This sentence was handwritten after the message had been typed, indicating the strict security measures adopted in Peking, and the need to protect himself from further betrayal by keeping his plans secret. ( Conakry File 43)
5. Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit., p. I I.
6. Nkrumah’s son Gamal Gorkeh Nkrumah, then aged seven, remembers every detail of that traumatic day. Before the fighting at Flagstaff House began, he had been woken early by the roaring of unfed lions in the zoo a short distance from the house. Soon, the whole family was awake. Gunfire from the direction of the airport was heard, and then the broadcast of the coup leader, Colonel E.T. Kotoka announcing the coup. Fathia at once phoned the Egyptian Embassy telling them to contact Nasser to ask him to send an aircraft at once to Accra to rescue them. Her call was just in time. Minutes later, the telephone was cut off. The family took refuge in the Egyptian Embassy until the afternoon when the aircraft sent by Nasser arrived. On the drive to Accra airport their car was stopped by tanks and troops at an army road block. Fathia and her three young children were ordered out of the car at gunpoint. Fathia showed no fear, declaring her anger at the treatment of her husband who had done so much for them and for Ghana. Clearly taken by surprise at being confronted with Nkrumah’s family, the officer in charge was at a loss to know what action to take. With loaded guns still pointed at them, Fathia and the children waited at the roadside while the officer radioed for instructions. Eventually, the family was allowed to continue to the airport, and finally make their escape to Cairo. The family remained in Cairo and were never to see Nkrumah again though they kept in touch using diplomatic channels.
7. Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit., p. 15.
8. Convention People’s Party, led by Kwame Nkrumah.
9. Private Secretary (Female) Gold Coast, Christopher Hurst, London. 1984, p. 219.
10. Dedicated “To the African Guerrilla,” this book was published by Panaf Books m 1968.
11. His account in an Accra bank, into which his salary as president had been paid, had been frozen by the NLC.
12. An Akan name meaning “victorious leader”. The title was conferred on him by the CPP in recognition of his winning of independence for Ghana.
13. The name by which Nkrumah was known during his student days in the USA. and which some of his Afro-American friends continued to use.
14. Conakry File 6.
15. One of the most outstanding of the Afro-American civil rights leaders at the beginning of the 20th century. Went to live in Ghana at Kwame’s invitation in 1961. Elected a Fellow of the Ghana Academy of Arts in 1961, and awarded a doctorate in Literature by the same university in 1963. Died in Accra on 29 August 1963 where he had become a Ghanaian citizen.
16. A CPP support organization set up in London after the coup.
17. A journalist and editor who had worked in Ghana at the Guinea Press. From 1964 to 1971 he was Editor of the magazine Africa and the World.
18. Marshment and R. D. Randall had both worked in Ghana at the Guinea Press, the former as general manager, the latter as accountant and auditor. Nkrumah often referred to Marshment by the pseudonym “Max”.
19. Nkrumah had no private means to draw upon, apart from modest funds in his royalty account at the Bank of Scotland in London, which his publishers, Thomas Nelson and Sons, opened for him after the coup.
20. It had become necessary to form a company to publish the books Nkrumah wrote in Conakry, and to keep the ones he had written before the coup in print, because neither of his previous publishers, Thomas Nelson and Sons and Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., were prepared to publish them after the fall of his government. The only exceptions were two books published by Nelson in 1967 which were contracted before the coup. These were Challenge of the Congo and Axioms. PanafBooks Ltd. was active until 1987. In that year the Nkrumah copyright was leased to Zed Press Ltd., who took over the responsibility of keeping all the books written by Nkrumah in print.
21. Panaf Great Lives Series. Panaf Books. London. 1974. pp. 221-2.
22. In Guinea Bissau, where the PAIGC was engaged in a liberation war to end Portuguese colonial rule.
23. A radical newspaper published in Ghana during the period of the CPP government.
24. My son, then aged 21.
25. Throughout the years Nkrumah spent in Conakry he always wore white.
26. The others were Ambrose Yankey Sr., M. A. Mensah and Boye Moses.

Le résistible leadership d’Houphouët-Boigny

Cinquante-six années durant, de 1937 à 1993, Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1905-1993) excerça un leadership multiple : traditionnel, syndical, politique, parlementaire et gouvernemental. Je continue ici mon exploration de la longue et complexe carrière du “père-fondateur” de la république de Côte d’Ivoire. Dans une première partie je  réfute et clarifie quelques assertions du “Vieux” sur la Guinée. Dans la deuxième partie, je passe en revue  son  leadership, qui, en tant que philosophie et pratique, résista plus d’un demi-siècle. Et qui, bien que balloté, survit aujourd’hui en Côte d’Ivoire. Dans un état plus que jamais résistible.


Tour à tour description, commentaire et analyse, cet article s’inspire et exploite les sources suivantes :

Note. Je n’ai pas encore eu les ouvrages de Grah Mel sous la main. Je compte toutefois les présenter ici ou sur webAfriqa.

Première Partie
Réfutations et Clarifications

Sans perdre de vue, le rôle et la place d’Houphouët dans la Françafrique, je me concentre sur la dimension africaine du personnage et son influence déterminante sur l’évolution et l’implosion politiques de la Guinée. D’où la nécessité et l’utilité de réfuter et de clarifier un aspect des rapports initiaux entre  Sékou Touré et Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

Souvenir inexact

Houphouët-Boigny déclare :

« … un beau jour, on m’a appris qu’il y avait là-bas un jeune syndicaliste qui voulait rallumer le flambeau de la lutte du RDA. C’était Sékou Touré. Je me suis déplacé, je l’ai rencontré chez sa grand-tante qui me l’a recommandé…»

Date de rencontre erronée

Cette rencontre remonte vraisemblablement à 1951. Mais la remémoration est absolument inexacte. Car Houphouët-Boigny avait déjà fait la connaissance de Sékou Touré. Au Congrès constitutif du RDA en octobre 1946 à Bamako ! Sékou fit partie de la délégation guinéenne. Pierre Kipé, en témoigne dans le livre sus-mentionné.

Emergence de Sékou Touré

Ibrahima Baba Kaké écrit :

“Dès le départ Sékou Touré devient l’homme fort du RDA en Guinée.”

Erreur. L’arrivée de Sékou au devant de la scène publique fut différée de quatre ans : de 1947 à 1951. Des hommes plus âgés et de statut social plus élevé tinrent la barre du de la section guinéenne du RDA. Celle-ci fut créée en mai 1947 sous l’égide de Madeira Keita. Les principaux collaborateurs de celui-ci étaient:

Le jeune Sékou Touré venait au 5ème rang de la hiérarchie. Il était alors le secrétaire général adjoint du syndicat USCG. Au sein du comité directeur il partageait les responsabilités du poste des affaires économiques et sociales avec Nfa Mohamed Touré (commis des finances) et Fatoumata Ciré Bah (secrétaire du greffe et des parquets).
Houphouët-Boigny connaissait Sékou Touré depuis 1946 donc. D’où la fausseté du souvenir rappelé plus haut.

Houphouët-Boigny et les cousins Touré

Houphouët continue :

« Je l’ai (Sékou Touré) fait venir à Abidjan avec son cousin, Petit Touré, époux de ma propre nièce. Celui-là aussi n’est plus. »

Avant la montée au pouvoir de deux leaders du Rassemblement démocratique africain : l'Ivoirien Houphouët-Boigny (le parrain) et le Guinéen Sékou Touré (le poulain) modestement habillés et attablés, circa 1954.
Avant la montée au pouvoir de deux leaders du Rassemblement démocratique africain : l’Ivoirien Houphouët-Boigny (le parrain) et le Guinéen Sékou Touré (le poulain) modestement habillés et attablés, circa 1954.

Bailleur de fonds

Houphouët-Boigny ne se contenta pas seulement d’inviter Sékou Touré à Abidjan. Bien au contraire, il fut son bailleur de fonds. Il le soutint financièrement, lui prodiguant  conseils et lui apportant la solidarité du Rassemblement démocratique africain. Mieux, à partir de 1954, Bernard Cornut-Gentille, Gouverneur général de l’Afrique Occidentale Française,  se joignit à l’Ivoirien dans le parrainage de Sékou Touré. La bienveillante protection des deux hommes éperonna la montée en flèche de Sékou au pouvoir  Nous verrons plus loin que le poulain se retournera contre ses parrains.

Cynisme ou sénilité

Houphouët-Boigny parle laconiquement de Petit Touré et de sa mort. Mais il ne dit pas comment, où et quand ? A lire ce passage on pourrait conclure que Petit Touré fut emporté par la maladie ou un accident de circulation. Hélas, macabre et tragique, la réalité est toute autre. Car Sékou Touré fut la cause de la disparition de Petit Touré. C’est sur son ordre que ce dernier périt de faim et de soif (diète noire) au Camp Boiro en 1965. Et quel fut son “crime” ? Il avait déposé la demande d’agrément et les statuts d’un parti d’opposition au PDG : le Parti de l’Unité Nationale de Guinée. Aux yeux de Sékou Touré c’était là un forfait punissable de mort. Le Vieux aurait dû saisir l’occasion du Colloque d’Abidjan pour réhabiliter la mémoire de Petit Touré. Mais non, par cynisme et/ou sénilité, il  se borna à verser des larmes de crocodile et à propager une image retouchée et trompeuse du dictateur guinéen.

Installés au pouvoir et présidents à vie de la Côte d'Ivoire et de la Guinée, Houphouët-Boigny et Sékou Touré sont conduits en Cadillac décapotable à Conakry en 1962 (Photo: Information Côte d'Ivoire)
Installés au pouvoir et présidents à vie de la Côte d’Ivoire et de la Guinée, respectivement, Houphouët-Boigny et Sékou Touré sont conduits en Cadillac décapotable à Conakry en 1962 (Photo: Information Côte d’Ivoire)

Notice biographique

Le nom de baptême du futur leader est Oufoué Djaa. Plus tard, converti au catholicisme, diplômé de l’Ecole William Ponty et jouissant du statut d’“évolué”, il francisa son nom en Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Boigny désigne le bélier en langue baulé. Le site Archive suggère que l’âge est tronqué. Il aurait vu le jour huit ans avant 1905, qui est la date consignée sur son acte de naissance ou jugement supplétif. Il appartiendrait donc à la génération de 1897, l’année précédente de l’arrestation de l’empereur Samori Touré à Guélémou, dans le territoire de la future Côte d’Ivoire.
Houphouët-Boigny se maria deux fois. Comme indiqué dans Le “vide guinéen” selon Houphouët-Boigny, il épousa Khadija Racine Sow (1913-2006) en 1930 à Abengourou. Le couple divorça en 1952. Et Houphouët resta “célibataire” pendant 10 ans ans. En 1962 il se remaria avec Marie-Thérèse Brou, sa cadette de 25 ans. Ces secondes noces connurent des scandales. Car les époux menaient chacun une vie extra-maritale. Félix engendra une fillette hors-mariage. Pour sa part, volage et portée aux escapades, Thérèse s’absenta au moins une fois du foyer en 1957 pour une randonnée avec un Italien à Milan. Et elle compta Sékou Touré parmi ses amants. André Lewin signale que les deux amoureux eurent une intense et brève liaison.

A noter que le premier président guinéen récidiva dans les années 1970 en ajoutant Mme. William Tolbert à la liste de ses trophées féminins (Voir l’énumération —très partielle— des quelque 13 épouses et maîtresses). Sékou Touré mourut comme il avait vécu, emporté par une libido débridée et le tabagisme. Sur la table d’opération de la Clinique de Cleveland, les chirurgiens tentèrent en vain de le sauver de la syphilis cardiaque et de la sclérose des artères coronaire et pulmonaire. Lire Sékou Touré : la mort américaine.

Deuxième partie.
Un leadership résistible (1937-1993)

Ruth Morgenthau dessine autant que possible le cadre —social, économique, politique et culturel — qui engendra les partis politiques africains et leurs leaders à partir de 1946. La lecture de son livre montre que quatre forces se conjuguèrent pour produire Félix Houphouët-Boigny :

  • L’hégémonie française, coloniale et post-coloniale
  • La politique des partis et les contradictions des leaders
  • Les populations africaines
  • Le contexte mondial

Le livre Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa est la  version améliorée de la thèse de doctorat (Ph.D.) de Ruth Morgenthau. De format compact l’ouvrage compte 439 pages. Mais une fabrication moins dense pourrait aisément attendre mille pages. Le corps du texte est enrichi de centaines de notes en bas de page, que j’ai regroupées en fin de chapitre. Publié en 1964, le travail fut généralement fut bien reçu à la fois pour contenu spécialisé en politologie, et pour sa dimension parfois inter-disciplinaire (histoire, anthropologie, ethnologie, économie). L’auteure effectua trois voyages de recherche sur le terrain, en 1951, 1960 et 1961. Sa préface contient une liste impressionnante d’informateurs : Ouezzin Coulibaly, Mamby Sidibé, Hampâté Bâ, Madany Mountaga Tall, Baidy Guèye, Sékou Touré, Seydou Diallo ,  N’Famara Keita, Telli Diallo, Karim Fofana, Idrissa Diarra Mahamane Alassane Haidara, Mamadou Aw, Seydou Badian Kouyaté, Abdoulaye Sangaré, Bernard Dadié, Urbain Nicoue, Issoufou Seydou Djermakoye, Senou Adande, Emile Derlin Zinsou, Doudou Guèye, Lamine Guèye, Mamadou Dia, Doudou Thiam, Assane et Ursula Seck, Abdoulaye Guèye, Abdoulaye Ly, etc.
Le livre examine la situation de quatre pays : Sénégal, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinée. Il s’ouvre par une solide introduction et trois chapitres généraux :

Un passage de l’introduction s’interroge avec pertinence : Comment doit-on comprendre l’usage de la référence Fama (roi en langue Maninka) pour désigner Sékou Touré en Guinée ? Ecouter, par exemple, le Bembeya Jazz national dans Regard sur le passé.

Après les quatre dossiers d’enquête, le livre propose une analyse d’ensemble et formule des opinions — parfois prémonitoires — dans les chapitres suivants :

Lacunes, erreurs, points faibles du livre

  • On relève des fautes de transcription des noms français. La confusion découle surtout des nuances du genre grammatical (masculin/féminin) du nom français.
  • L’auteur fait de Sékou Touré un descendant paternel de Samori Touré. En réalité, la parenté dérive de la mère de Sékou, une Camara. Bien qu’ayant le patronyme Touré, Alpha (le père de Sékou) n’était pas lié  à Samori.
  • L’eurocentrisme occidental apparaît çà et là à travers l’ouvrage ; ainsi al-Hajj Umar Tall et Samori sont traités de simples chefs guerriers. Aucun mot sur la production littéraire, l’impact théologique et le rayonnement spirituel du premier, ou  l’énergie organisationnelle et les aspirations unitaires du second.
  • La narration s’arrête à l’année 1961 alors que le livre fut publié en 1964. Une mise à jour avant la mise sous presse eût considérablement amélioré le contenu.
  • L’étiquette French-speaking est une généralisation excessive. Elle ne s’applique qu’à la minorité parlant la langue du colonisateur, qui reste,  pour l’écrasante majorité des Africains, un idiome étranger. Qui maintient des barrières linguistiques artificielles entre dirigeants europhones et administrés non-europhones.
  • Le livre est superficiel sur le rôle et la place de la religion en Côte d’Ivoire. Dommage, car le Christianisme était très actif. L’Eglise catholique, les syncrétismes religieux et les mouvements messianiques, par exemple, étaient impliqués dans le climat social de l’époque. Lire le Harrisme, Afrique: le harrisme et le déhima en Côte d’Ivoire coloniale, etc.
  • Ruth Morgenthau mentionne le Hamallisme ((1920-1950) en passant. Mais elle ne nomme pas le fondateur de ce courant Tijaniyya. Il s’agit bien sûr de Cheikh Hamahoullah ou Hamallah. Les travaux d’Alioune Traoré dégagent le portrait de ce sufi et saint anti-colonial. Tierno Bokar Salif Tall se plaça sous son allégeance spirituelle. Et mon grand-père, Tierno Aliou Buuɓa-Ndiyan, appuya l’enseignement et la voie du Cheikh. Que grâce  soit  rendue à tous les trois. Sous la ténébreuse Troisième République, son Empire Colonial et son régime de l’Indigénat, ces trois figures furent d’éminents porte-étendards de la tradition africaine et de l’orthodoxie sunni malékite.
  • Le livre rapporte un témoignage du sénateur Ouezzin Coulibaly au sujet de l’assassinat du sénateur Biaka Boda en janvier 1950. Mais la version donnée est, à mon avis, superficielle et inadmissible. Dans son roman satirique En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages Ahmadou Kourouma campe mieux la vague de répression du RDA par les autorités coloniales entre 1949 et 1950. Elle liquida Biaka et faillit emporter Houphouët.

Les racines d’Houphouët-Boigny

Félix Houphouët-Boigny n’inventa pas la politique des partis en Afrique Française. Avant l’arrivée à maturité de la génération d’Houphouët, entre 1905 et 1918, diverses associations et personnalités (africaines et afro-américaines) avaient allumé le flambeau de la lutte. Du côté français, Maurice Delafosse — un maître à penser d’Houphouët — présageait dès 1915 l’éveil et le combat des colonisés pour leur émancipation.  Cela dit, Houphouët reste un doyen et une figure de proue de la politique et de la gouvernance en dans l’Afrique moderne.

Les quatre communes de plein exercie du Sénégal (Saint-Louis, Gorée, Dakar, Rufisque) jouèrent également un rôle précurseur. Et Houphouët fit l’expérience de cette organisation et discriminatoire, et fut fortement lié au Sénégal. C’est, en effet, le pays de son alma mater (Ecole normale William Ponty) et de son beau-père, Racine Sow. Malheureusement, Houphouët se départit de ces liens et adopta une attitude paradoxale axée sur deux points : (a) son rejet de ce qu’il percevait comme “l’élitisme” saintlouisien et dakarois, (b) son opposition irréductible aux thèses fédéralistes des dirigeants sénégalais. La concurrence trouva son expression la plus aigüe en 1957-58 dans le débat entre fédéralistes (Lamine Guèye, Senghor, Sékou Touré, etc.) et territorialistes (Houphouët). La question posée était de savoir s’il fallait accéder à l’indépendance en tant que bloc ouest-africain fédéré ou bien en tant que territoires distincts. Voulant  éviter l’éclatement, Senghor créa le néologisme balkanisation et mit ses pairs en garde contre les conséquences d’une marche en ordre dispersé vers la souveraineté…
Lire également (a) The Emergence of Black politics in Senegal. The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920
(b) Assimilés ou patriotes africains ? Naissance du nationalisme culturel en Afrique française (1853-1931) (c) Sékou Touré : Le Héros et le Tyran, chapitre 4, “Le Triomphe (1958-1959)”

De gauche à droite, Léopold Sédar Senghor (Sénégal), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d'Ivoire), et l'abbé-président Fulbert Youlou (Congo-Brazzaville), avatar comique et accident tragique de la FrancAfrique. Le trio affiche une allure détendue. Pourtant, derrière le sourire persistaient des divergences profondes, une rivalité tenace, et, au bout du compte, l'affabilissement mutuel. Photo: Table-ronde d'Abidjan. 24 octobre 1960
De gauche à droite, Léopold Sédar Senghor (Sénégal), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), et l’abbé-président Fulbert Youlou (Congo-Brazzaville), accident historique et avatar aberrant de la Françafrique. Le trio affiche une allure détendue. Pourtant, derrière le sourire persistaient des divergences profondes, une rivalité tenace, et, au bout du compte, l’affabilissement mutuel. Photo: Table-ronde d’Abidjan. 24 octobre 1960

Axe triangulaire

Morgenthau place les débuts d’Houphouët dans un axe triangulaire incluant :

  • La politique coloniale d’intéressement de planteurs Français
  • L’incorporation de la main-d’oeuvre forcée extra-territoriale
  • L’adoption  de la nouvelle économie de plantation par les Ivoriens et les immigrés

Politique d’intéressement

Ruth écrit (je traduis) : « A partir de 1930 les autorités coloniales de Côte d’Ivoire décidèrent d’intéresser des Français à venir s’installer comme planteurs des cultures d’exportation (cacao, café). Les premières actions se développèrent dans la ceinture forestière, à peu près au sud du 8° parallèle. Les plantations des Européens se situaient :

  1. A l’ouest de la rivère Bandama, près de Gagnoa, Daloa, et Man
  2. Le long de la côte méridionale, près de Grand Bassam, Abidjan, Grand Lahou, et Sassandra
  3. Le long de l’axe ferroviaire Agboville-Dimbokro-Bouaké, en forêt
  4. A Katiola et Korhogo dans la savanne septentrionnale.

une main-d’oeuvre forcée importée

Imposant le travail forcé, le régime de l’Indigénat importa une main-d’oeuvre abondante et bon marché. Ces recrutements obligatoires permirent la mise en valeur les plantations des Européens. Ainsi, le décret du 25 octobre 1925 organisa le mouvement des contingents des régions pauvres du nord vers le sud fertile. Le texte règlementa aussi la répartition du personnel importé  entre l’administration et les planteurs Européens. Devant la faible densité démographique  (9 habitants au km2) du sud, les colonisateurs contraignirent des travailleurs du nord de la Côte d’Ivoire, de la Guinée, et, surtout, de la Haute-Volta (Burkina Faso). Les statistiques officielles établissent qu’entre 1920 et 1930, plus de 190.000 Voltaïques furent incorporés dans les brigades de travail en Côte d’Ivoire.

Adoption  de la nouvelle économie de plantation par les Ivoriens

L’auteur souligne l’intérêt et la participation effective des Africains à l’économie de plantation. « Peu après l’installation des coloniaux, les Africains créèrent eux aussi des plantations. Plus petits que les domaines des Européens, leurs lots étaient éparpillés à travers la forêt. Dans l’entre-deux guerres (1918-1939), leurs plantations s’étendirent à l’est de la Bandama parmi les peuples Baulé et Agni. (Baule and Agni sont apparentés ; eux et les Ashanti du Ghana appartiennent à l’aire ethnique Akan).
La particularité de la colonie de Côte d’Ivoire découle du fait que des citadins et des “évolués” (diplômés de l’école française) s’intéressèrent et s’investirent dans l’économie de plantation. Ce faisant, ils se dégageaient de la dépendance salariale de la bureaucratie coloniale. Contrairement à la plupart des autres territoires — où les fonctionnaires dépendaient de l’administration — les colonisés pouvaient s’installer et vivre à leur compte. Mas la fièvre de plantation ne s’arrêta pas aux fonctionnaires. Elle gagna aussi les villageois illétrés, y compris les femmes. Chacun trouva dans la plantation un moyen d’améliorer son status économique et social. Les chefs traditionnels bénéficièrent de l’émergence de cette couche de planteurs de plus en plus prospères. Et la rivalité entre élites traditionelles et modernes s’atténua. L’économie de plantation et l’accès à l’argent rapprocha les chefs traditionnels — précoloniaux —et les chefs modernes. En conséquence, les chefs traditionnel acceptèrent un “évolué” et chef de statut secondaire, en l’occurrence,  Felix Houphouët-Boigny, comme leur porte-parole.
Toutefois, ces développements engendrèrent des clivages et des frictions. Ce fut notamment avec la distinction entre autochtones et “étrangers” ou “dioula”, c’est-à-dire les travailleurs immigrés — forcés et volontaires —  du Nord de la Côte d’Ivoire et de territoires voisins. Les graines de l’“ivoirité” venaient d’être semées. Avec elles, la dualité fondamentale, déconcertante et débilitante de la Côte d’Ivoire : terre d’inclusion et  d’exclusion, hospitalière et xénophobe. Cette contradiction débouchera en 2002 sur la crise politico-militaire, la guerre civile et la partition du pays entre le Nord et le Sud.

Carte ethnique de la Côte d'Ivoire. Source : Ruth S. Morgenthau. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. 1964
Carte ethnique de la Côte d’Ivoire. Source : Ruth S. Morgenthau. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. 1964
Carte politique de la Côte d'Ivoire. Source : Ruth S. Morgenthau. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. 1964
Source : Ruth S. Morgenthau. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. 1964

Dans une prochaine livraion j’examine la carrière politique d’Houphouët-Boigny en quatre phases et périodes :

  • La phase organisationnelle et fondatrice
  • Dans l’opposition (RDA) et face à la répression coloniale
  • La collaboration et la cooptation
  • “L’indépendance” et la présidence à vie

(A suivre)

Tierno S. Bah

Fuuta-Jalon. Histoire : Alfaya et Soriya

Kiridi Bangoura, ministre Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement
Kiridi Bangoura, ministre Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement.

Un des mes correspondants rapporte et réagit à des propos tenus par Kiridi Bangoura, ministre Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement. L’occasion était un atelier sur la prévention de conflits. Pas étonnant. A défaut d’un Etat viable, les fonctionnaires guinéens passent d’un atelier/séminaire à l’autre. Et plutôt que de prévenir les conflits, le régime du président Alpha Condé en fait un cheval de bataille et une stratégie. Pour s’en convaincre, il faut considérer les passions que son mutisme sur un 3ème mandat déchaînent aujourd’hui.… Qui vivra verra !

Entretemps, hier au ministère de l’unité nationale, Kiridi Bangoura aurait offert son expertise sur la résolution des conflits dans le Fuuta-Jalon théocratique :

« Sans faire du plaisir à Monsieur le Ministre Conseiller principal du Chef de l’État, M. Tibou Kamara, ici présent, face à des crises qui minaient le Fuuta, Elhadj Oumar Tall de passage dans les contrées, a jeté les bases de l’alternance entre les frères Sorya et Alfaya, ce qui aurait résolu les conflits de succession au Fuuta. »

Le secrétaire général du gouvernement passe ici du coq à l’âne. Ce faisant, il commet une bourde en appliquant à l’histoire du 19è siècles le jargon de la bureaucratie onusienne et des ONG internationales du 21è siècle. C’est lamentable ! Lorsqu’on n’a rien à dire de clair, il est préférable de se taire. Kiridi aurait dû se conformer à ce sage dicton. Ou alors il aurait dû remuer sa langue plusieurs fois dans sa bouche avant de parler. Trop tard. Mon jeune correspondant l’a déjà démenti sur Facebook. J’apporte ici mon grain de sel en dix points.


Pour M. Kiridi Bangoura le politicien, la remarque peut paraître acceptable et inspiratrice. Malheureusement, au regard de l’Histoire et de de la Culture, ses mots sont désespérément superficiels, inappropriés et erronés.
Une telle gaffe est étonnante de la part d’un sociologue qui fut, jadis, un intellectuel et un militant de la culture. Il eut par exemple l’opportunité, remarquable, de collaborer avec Pr. Djibril Tamsir Niane —le doyen de faculté révéré de ma génération et son beau-père —et le génial Williams Sassine. Le trio produisit Il était une fois – l’alphabète; une adaptation théâtrale du roman L’alphabête, du même auteur que celui du Zéhéros n’est pas n’importe qui : Sassine, dénonciateur et pourfendeur mordant de la débâcle guinéenne.
Par ailleurs, le catalogue bibliothécaire mondial WordCat contient deux autres titres signés Kiridi Bangoura :

  • Le baptême des chiots : roman, paru en 1997
  • Une cabine pour deux, rédigé avec Michelle Allen et publié en 1995

Kiridi Bangoura fut ainsi un acteur de la scène culturelle au 20è siècle. Mais au 21e siècle il a apparemment changé le fusil d’épaule. Et il a délaissé la création littéraire et artistique par la plume. Il n’est pas le seul dans ce cas. Au contraire, cette catégorie est surpeuplée en Guinée et en Afrique, où la plume ne nourrit pas. Cela pourrait expliquer que depuis bientôt deux décennies M. Bangoura se retrouve dans les plus hautes sphères du pouvoir. D’abord sous Lansana Conté et depuis 2010 avec Alpha Condé.


Et pourtant, jusqu’en 2004 en ce qui me concerne, Kiridi avait conservé la lucidité et le réflexe d’un homme de culture. J’en ai fait indirectement l’expérience lorsque, au nom de Tabital Pulaaku Guinée (TPG), je déposai le dossier de demande d’agrément au ministère de la Décentralisation dont il était le secrétaire général. On m’avait chargé de coiffer le groupe de pilotage pour la création de la branche guinéenne de Tabital Pulaaku International. En me confiant le dossier, on m’avait répété que l’obtention de l’agrément dépendrait entièrement de Kiridi Bangoura. Si, à l’image du président Lansana Conté et de certains cadres Sose, il se montrait hostile ou indifférent, alors le projet était voué à l’échec. Par contre, s’il n’y faisait pas objection, la réussite était acquise par avance. A son crédit, M. Bangoura apprécia le contenu purement culturel de la demande. Il l’approuva. Son entourage me confirma par la suite son attitude positive, pour ne pas dire bienveillante. L’arrêté fut donc signé par le ministre Moussa Solano. Et Tabital Pulaaku Guinée devint une ONG officielle.

“… les crises qui minaient du Fuuta-Jalon…”

Kiridi Bangoura a voulu peut-être ironiser et chahuter son collègue Tibou Kamara. Malheureusement le passé tragique de la Guinée, le climat politique vicié du pays, ne permettent pas à un minister de blaguer avec l’histoire de n’importe laquelle des quatres régions naturelles, à commencer par le Fuuta-Jalon. Passant donc outre la neutralité positive de Kiridi vis-à-vis de TPG en 2004, et tenant compte de la réaction de mon jeune correspondant sur Facebook,  voici mes objections à la remarque de Kiridi Bangoura.

Pour comprendre les fondements — théocentrique, politique et juridique — de la Confédération musulmane, il faut lire Thierno Diallo. Institutions politiques du Fouta-Djallon au XIXè siècle. Dakar, IFAN, 1972, sur webFuuta.

  1. Il n’y a pas de système politique parfait. Cela est évident. Et Kiridi devrait continuer à puiser auprès de l’éminent source qu’est Pr. Djibril Tamsir Niane — qui est, une fois de plus, son beau-père.  Il aurait appris ainsi la futilité d’ériger al-Hajji Umar Taal en sauveur du Fauta-Jalon et en pacificateur des turbulents ou belliqueux princes Bari Seediyaaɓe de Timbo.
    Pr. Niane l’aurait conseillé de ne pas s’ériger, dans l’exercice de ses fonctions gouvernementales, en Don Quichotte redresseur des torts et travers de l’Histoire. Qu’il s’agisse du Fuuta-Jalon ou du pays baga ancestral de Kiridi. En effet, les sources historiques sont abondantes sur le morcellement, sur l’émiettement et le factionnalisme des chefferies du Bagatay.…
  2. Malgré les tensions et les crises cycliques, la Confédération musulmane du Fuuta-Jalon fonctionna pendant deux siècles environ. Il s’agit là d’une longevité historique remarquable dans l’Ouest africain. Mieux, en dépit des turbulences —fatales — de l’aristocratie, la société fuutanienne formait un ensemble “très homogène, fortement discipliné, hiérarchisé et organisé en une féodalité théocratique”, selon l’analyse judicieuse de Telli Diallo dans l’article “Le divorce chez les Peuls du Fuuta-Jalon”.
  3. Né, élevé et instruit par son père, Sa’idu, Al-Hajj Umar Taal séjourna longtemps et fréquemment au Fuuta-Jalon, auprès de son maître Shayku Abdul Naagil de Labé. Selon mon oncle Tierno Mamadou Bah, il y prédit même la naissance de Tierno Aliyyu Buuɓa Ndiyan. Son long séjour dans cette province qui fut le diiwal majeur de la Confédération —aujourd’hui réduite à sa portion congrue — explique qu’après la proclamation de la république en octobre 1958, le camp militaire Markala de Labé fut baptisé du nom du Calife tijjaniya. Cela bien avant que l’aéroport de Ségou (Mali) —vaincue et soumise par Umar — ne reçoive le même nom.
  4. L’alternance Alfaya entre Soriya n’était pas seulement horizontale, c’est-à-dire concernant uniquement les Bari Seediyaaɓe Timbo. Elle était verticale aussi et s’appliquait aux neuf die (provinces). Les changements bisannuels du gouvernement dans la capitale confédérale s’accompagnaient de nominations de nouveaux chefs (Lamɓe) de province en fonction de l’allégeance des prétendants locaux soit à la branche alfaya, soit à celle soriya.
  5. Une légende court toujours selon laquelle Al-Hajj Umar Taal eut des visées usurpatrices du pouvoir de Timbo. D’où la confrontation qui aurait eu lieu entre lui et Tierno Muhammad Samba Mombeya, d’une part. Il y a également le dialogue entre lui et son homonyme, Almami Umaru, (père de Mamadu Paate, Bokar Biro) et que Tierno Saadu Dalen avait prédit et prévenue le souverain de Timbo au sujet de son visiteur du Fuuta-Tooro.
    Mais Al-Hajj Umar respectait le Fuuta-Jalon. On lui attribue la déclaration suivante : « Il existe 313 érudits au Fuuta-Jalon: 300 me sont inférieurs, 10 sont mes égaux, 3 sont mes maîtres.»
  6. Le prestige du système politique et des institutions du Fuuta-Jalon était tel que l’empereur Samori Touré fut très honoré de se voir conférer le titre d’Almami par les souverains alternants Umaru (Soriya) et Ibrahima Sori Daara Ier (Alfaya) en 1878.
  7. Spécialiste du monde manding et de Samori Touré, Yves Person fut commandant de cercle de Beyla jusqu’au référendum de 1958. Il devint par la suite professeur d’histoire à La Sorbonne. Le titre des trois volumes de son oeuvre principale est Samori. Une révolution dyula, avec au total près de 2500 pages. Dans la Première Partie du Tome I “Les Voies de l’Islam”, Person affirme : « Le Fuuta-Dyalõ rayonne depuis le XVIIIme siècle comme un centre majeur de civilisation et Kankan a subi fortement son influence culturelle et politique. Beaucoup de ses savants allaient se former à Timbo et c’est grâce à ce voisinage que la métropole dyula fut autre chose qu’une cité de négociants. »
  8. A propos du partenariat entre Samori et les Almami du Fuuta-Jalon, Person remarque que ce pays “ne s’offrait pourtant pas au premier conquérant, car l’orgueil peul pouvait faire l’union contre une intrusion étrangère. Samori n’avait d’ailleurs pas de telles intentions : il était très sensible au prestige religieux de Fugumba, la ville sainte, et il voulait seulement négocier avec les Almamy le libre passage de ses caravanes vers Freetown.”
  9. Curieusement, le même Yves Person se rend coupable de jugements tranchants et erronés sur son sujet de recherche. En effet, dans l’Introduction il prétend que « Depuis le XVme siècle les Malinke ne font plus l’histoire, ils la subissent. Ils perdent le sens de l’empire, sinon celui de l’Etat pour se replier dans le cadre exigu des kafu. En dépit de quelques aventures éphémères, d’ailleurs limitées dans l’espace, leur vie politique se morcelle à l’extrême. »
    Il s’agit là évidemment d’une généralisation abusive et erronée. Car le peuple manding n’a jamais cessé de faire l’histoire.
  10. Conclusion. Kiridi Bangoura commet aujourd’hui le même péché de jugement de valeur à l’emporte-pièce sur des questions complexes et délicates. Ses fonctions officielles rendent sa situation délicate. De surcroît,  il est l’un des verrous du régime décrié d’Alpha Condé. Il devrait en conséquence se garder de donner des leçons de gouvernance, passées ou présentes. Car depuis une décennie, entouré de M. Kiridi Bangoura et consorts, Président Condé peine à assumer la magistrature suprême au bénéfice des populations. Lui et son équipe n’ont pas apporté grand-chose aux populations rurales et urbaines de Guinée. Ils pataugent dans un bilan médiocre.
    En tant que membre du gouvernement, Kiridi Bangoura est astreint à la retenue dans les actes et à la mesure dans les propos.  Au cas contraire, il risque d’emprunter le langage vénimeux, inflammatoire et incendiaire de son patron.
    Ou de MM. Ousmane Kaba, Mansour Kaba, Lansiné Kaba, fils authentiques de Kankan, et, —c’est dommage— dénigreurs, falsificateurs et accusateurs du passé du Fauta-Jalon, pourtant révéré par leurs ancêtres.Désobligeants et irritants,  la légèreté et le cynisme avivent les tensions et creusent l’impasse. Ils sont inacceptables dans la conduite des affaires d’Etat. Seuls le respect, l’équité, la justice peuvent faciliter le dialogue et contribuer à tirer la Guinée du trou.

Tierno S. Bah

Président brouillon et pion

Président de la Guinée et président en exercice de l’Union Africaine (2017-2018), Alpha Condé suggère, d’une réunion à l’autre, de couper le cordon ombilical entre l’Afrique et l’Europe. Il ne faut surtout pas le prendre à ses mots. Car il dit le contraire de ce qu’il pense, et pense le contraire de ce qu’il dit. M. Condé ne formule pas là un souhait sincère, ni même un voeu pieux. Il se lance plutôt dans une rengaine  cynique, une manoeuvre fourbe et une tactique trompeuse.

Président bavard et brouillon

Alpha Condé voudrait faire accroire l’Afrique est désormais majeure. Malheureusement il ne fournit pas de données pour étayer son bavardage et sa démagogie. Pis, il feint d’ignorer la dépendance systématique de son régime vis-à-vis de pilleurs tels que le Groupe Bolloré. Par dessus-tout le “professeur” refuse de tenir compte de la faiblesse systémique du continent par rapport aux économies étrangères. En effet tous les voyants clignotent au rouge vif en Afrique :

  • Analphabétisme
  • Déclin des systèmes d’éducation et de recherche
  • Marginalisation du paysannat
  • Affaiblissement du réseau de santé
  • Non-industrialisation, avec pour causes et conséquences : la faiblesse de la production énergétique (domestique et industrielle), le manque d’eau potable, etc.
  • Exclusive et excessive présence des industries extractives (mines, pétrole, bois)
  • Importation déséquilibrée des produits (principaux et secondaires) de consommation
  • Mise à l’écart de l’ordre financier mondial et des marchés de capitaux

M. Condé a donc beau jeu de se démener et voyager. Il parle et se déplace dans le vide. Déboussolé et déphasé, il brandit le spectre maudit de Sékou Touré, qu’il voudrait imiter —comme le tueur Moussa Dadis Camara —, de manière sélective, oppressive et versatile.

Président pion

Le discours pseudo-nationaliste de M. Conté expose son manque de stratégie. Brouillon à souhait, il enfonce la Guinée dans la paupérisation, et ce, au nom de ses médiocres intérêts personnels et familiaux.
Mais sa rhétorique est contredite et annulée par l’appauvrissement croissant de l’Afrique et de la Guinée. Mais son idéologie tronquée jure avec le quotidien des Guinéens. Les citoyens ploient sous les calamités : mauvaise gouvernement, violations des droits de l’homme, corruption, impunité, etc.
En dernière analyse, Président Alpha Condé n’est qu’un pion. Consentant dans ce rôle, il accepte allégrément la manipulation par ses tuteurs et bailleurs globaux et/ou régionaux.

Il suffit de lire l’article ci-dessous, publié hier par Jeune Afrique, pour mesurer l’ampleur des machinations du chef de l’Etat et de son entourage, ainsi que l’étendue de la débâcle et de la désespérance de ses populations guinéennes.

Le journaliste Mathieu Olivier est le signataire du document. Il n’a pas honte d’employer la désignation “palais Sékoutouréya” : illégitime et imméritée, illicite et illégale. Il devrait plutôt écrire Palais de la présidence de la république. Comme l’Elysée à Paris, l’immeuble est le siège d’une institution : la branche exécutive de l’Etat. Propriété publique et impersonnelle, aucun nom individuel ne doit lui être attaché. Surtout pas celui de Sékou Touré !

Tierno S. Bah

Bras de fer de titans entre Soros et Steinmetz autour d’une mine géante en Guinée

En plaçant ses apôtres de la transparence au plus près du cabinet présidentiel de la Guinée, George Soros a écarté un de ses ennemis jurés. Une stratégie bien rodée dont Jeune Afrique dévoile les coulisses.

« J’essaie de t’appeler mais tu ne réponds à aucun de tes numéros, y compris ton portable. » Ce 27 avril 2013, Alpha Mohamed Condé est inquiet. Le fils du chef de l’État guinéen tente de joindre Scott Horton, avocat américain de DLA Piper, pour l’entretenir d’une histoire que l’agence Bloomberg s’apprête à écrire, et qui semble embarrasser la présidence. La ligne ne passe pas. « Alpha Mohamed » se rabat sur sa messagerie électronique, en espérant être plus chanceux. Un reporter de Bloomberg à Conakry travaille en effet sur un article concernant un accord passé entre la Guinée et le Liberia pour l’évacuation, via Monrovia, d’une partie du minerai issu du mont Nimba.

Or, Conakry veut éviter que cette information ne revienne aux oreilles des grandes sociétés minières présentes en Guinée, qui sont elles aussi tentées d’utiliser la voie libérienne plutôt que de financer un « corridor central » menant à Conakry – ce que souhaiteraient les autorités guinéennes. « Il est extrêmement important que cette histoire ne sorte pas », explique Scott Horton dans un e-mail au fils du président et au ministre des Mines, Mohamed Lamine Fofana, ce même 27 avril. Son objectif : corriger le tir en ajustant les déclarations du ministre, et ne pas donner l’impression d’un « feu vert » pour la potentielle exportation du fer de la mine de Simandou par le Liberia.

Dans les secrets du cabinet DLA

DLA Piper n’est pas n’importe quel cabinet. Il a parmi ses clients George Soros, le célèbre milliardaire américain, qui en a fait son relais en Guinée. Quant à Scott Horton, il n’est pas non plus n’importe quel avocat. Collaborateur de Soros, ce natif de Greenville, en Caroline du Sud, a connu le milliardaire il y a trente ans, à l’époque où ce dernier avait le regard porté sur l’Europe de l’Est.

C’est d’ailleurs George Soros qui, en avril 2011, a fait en sorte que la route de Scott Horton croise celle d’Alpha Condé, le nouveau président guinéen, élu en décembre 2010. Ce dernier et George Soros se connaissent déjà. Ils se sont rencontrés par l’intermédiaire de Bernard Kouchner, ancien ministre français des Affaires étrangères.

Le milliardaire n’hésite donc pas à demander à son ami Horton, 55 ans à l’époque, d’aller rencontrer « Alpha », fraîchement installé au palais de Sékoutoureya. Le président, explique Soros, veut lancer des réformes, notamment dans les mines, secteur qu’il soupçonne d’avoir alimenté les caisses noires de son prédécesseur Lansana Conté, et il faut l’y aider. Le rôle de DLA Piper en Guinée est officiellement, et avec l’appui des ONG « sorosiennes », d’accompagner le gouvernement dans ses réformes. Il lance pour cela des enquêtes, dont une partie est menée par un certain Steven Fox, ancien du département d’État américain qui a travaillé pour la CIA, dirigeant de la société d’évaluation des risques Veracity Worldwide.

Les investigations mettent au jour des faits de corruption dans le passage des contrats miniers, qui sont donc réétudiés. DLA Piper, qui a rédigé le rapport, pointe en particulier le groupe minier BSGR, du Franco-Israélien Beny Steinmetz, accusé d’avoir obtenu les droits sur le gisement de Simandou par « corruption apparente ». Or Steinmetz n’est, lui non plus, pas n’importe qui : il est l’ennemi juré de George Soros.

La rivalité entre les deux hommes remonte à près de vingt ans, en Russie, en 1998. Depuis, les épisodes se succèdent, avec d’un côté le groupe Steinmetz, qui utilise jusqu’en 2012 l’agence de communication FTI, et de l’autre les hommes de Soros. DLA Piper a-t-il été l’instrument du milliardaire américain dans une guerre personnelle ? Toujours est-il que, dès le début de la présidence d’Alpha Condé, l’affrontement gagne la Guinée, où, chez DLA Piper, on s’emploie à contrer la menace BSGR, n’hésitant pas à « inspirer » la stratégie de la présidence guinéenne.

Une cellule est mise en place. En font partie Alpha Mohamed Condé, Mohamed Lamine Fofana, ministre des Mines, et Ibrahima Kalil Kaba, le directeur de cabinet du président, proposé comme coordinateur. Leur « coach » : Scott Horton. Le 1er juin 2013, c’est lui qui fait le point, par e-mail, à cette petite équipe sur la stratégie à adopter dans le secteur minier. Ce diplômé de l’université du Texas, qui échange de façon régulière avec George Soros, va droit au but.

« La Guinée passe constamment à côté d’opportunités en étant trop lente à réagir et en étant instrumentalisée par des personnes comme M. Steinmetz », estime-t-il. Et de leur conseiller une offensive fondée sur le fait que « la Guinée est une victime de Steinmetz ». Il va plus loin : « Nous sommes très proches maintenant d’obtenir des informations selon lesquelles Steinmetz finance et radicalise l’opposition, les poussant à envisager un changement de régime sans élections. […] Je pense que ce serait un coup majeur de la part de la présidence. »

Info ou intox ? À l’époque, cela fait en tout cas plusieurs mois que DLA Piper réfléchit à une stratégie, notamment via les médias, visant à contrer « les attaques de BSGR ». Alors que le gouvernement est empêtré dans l’affaire du prêt guinéen contracté auprès de la société Palladino, c’est par exemple une nouvelle fois Scott Horton qui intervient. Le 21 mars 2013, il met en relation deux communicants engagés par la présidence guinéenne, Célia Grémy, du cabinet Momentum Consulting, et Chris McShane, de Hillingdon Cresswell, avec les conseillers presse de Palladino, Lawrence Dore et Locksley Ryan.


Objectif : déminer le possible scandale Palladino et présenter le prêt entre le gouvernement guinéen et Palladino plus transparent, notamment en le publiant sur internet. Moins d’un mois plus tard, les équipes touchent au but. Lawrence Dore propose d’écrire un communiqué dans lequel il serait clair que quelqu’un, « comme BSGR, a cherché à dénaturer le prêt Palladino pour discréditer le gouvernement ».

À la même période, BSGR est peu à peu écarté de Simandou. Sous le régime du président Lansana Conté, le groupe avait en effet réussi à obtenir la moitié des concessions de la mine. Elle les avait revendues en 2009 au groupe brésilien Vale, pour 2,5 milliards de dollars. Mais, en avril 2013, après les accusations de corruption contre BSGR, Vale rompt l’accord, moyennant l’abandon de son avance de 500 millions de dollars.

Le 16 juin 2013, une rencontre réunit à Londres Sam Walsh, président-directeur général de Rio Tinto, Jin-Yong Cai, son homologue de la Société financière internationale (IFC, filiale de la Banque mondiale), et Alpha Condé, présent au Royaume-Uni à l’occasion du G8. L’hôte de cette réunion extraordinaire n’est autre que George Soros, un habitué des rendez-vous en marge des sommets internationaux.

Cette rencontre n’est pas anodine : elle confirme les dispositions prises par l’État guinéen pour abroger les permis détenus par BSGR, alors que Rio Tinto, associé au chinois Chinalco, obtient le droit d’exploitation totale de Simandou. Depuis, la guerre par réseaux interposés n’a pas faibli. Le Franco-Israélien, assigné à résidence en Israël, est aujourd’hui accusé de corruption par la Guinée, le FBI et le canton de Genève. Un de ses anciens collaborateurs, Frédéric Cilins, a été condamné à deux ans de prison aux États-Unis. Au cœur de plusieurs enquêtes, Beny Steinmetz ne se prive toutefois pas de contre-attaquer : le 14 avril, il a déposé plainte à New York contre Soros et sa fondation Open Society Foundations, qu’il accuse d’avoir fait échouer ses projets à Simandou.

Mathieu Olivier
Jeune Afrique

Abdullahi : destin et ascendance d’un Taal

Abdoullahi Tall (1879-1899), fils d'Ahmadou Shaykh (roi de Ségou et suzerain de Dinguiraye), petit-fils d'Al-Hajj Umar, surnommé l'Aiglon impérial.
L’Aiglon impérial, Abdullahi Taal (1879-1899) ; fils d’Ahmadu Shaykh (sultan de Ségou, suzerain de Dinguiraye, Lam-Julɓe, i.e. Commandeur des Croyants), petit-fils d’Al-Hajj Umar. Inhumé au Cimetière Montparnasse, Paris.

La brièveté du destin d’Abdullahi est, pour ainsi dire, inversement proportionnelle à la profondeur de son ascendance. Autant le premier fut court, autant la seconde est étendue.


Fils d’Ahmadu Shaykh, Lam-Julɓe (Commandeur des Croyants), petit-fils d’Alhajji Umar Taal, Abdullahi ne vécut que vingt ans (1879 à 1899). Il était l’un des cadets d’Ahmadu. Ses frères aînés, Ahmadou Makki, Mady et Modi, étaient des officiers actifs de l’armée de leur père.

Les dix dernières années de la vie d’Abdullahi sont évoquées dans le livre intitulé Histoire synthétique de l’Afrique résistante. Les réactions des peuples africains face aux influences extérieures.

Nazi Boni (1909-1978)
Nazi Boni (1909-1978)

Préfacé par Jean Suret-Canale, cet ouvrage est l’oeuvre de Nazi Boni (1909-1978), brillant instituteur, politicien, parlementaire, auteur et historien Burkinaɓe. Adversaire de Félix Houphouët-Boigny, il fut exilé à Dakar à la fin des années 1950. Il mit son éloignement du pays à profit pour faire des recherches à l’Institut Français d’Afrique Noire (IFAN). Ses efforts aboutirent à la  publication d’un roman Crépuscule des temps anciens; chronique du Bwamu. Roman (Editions Présence africaine, 1962) et du livre d’histoire sus-mentionné.
Au chapitre 4, et sous le titre “L’Aiglon meurt en France et l’Aigle au Sokoto”, Nazi Boni écrit :

« Lorsque le 6 avril 1894, les forces françaises attaquèrent par surprise Ségou et obligèrent Madani à une retraite précipitée, abandonnant à l’ennemi la famille et le trésor de son père, un enfant de dix à douze ans, Abdoulaye, fils du Lam-Dioulbé, refusa de suivre les fuyards. Malgré un bombardement intense, il retourna dans la dionfoutou (forteresse) où se trouvait sa mère. Après la chute de la ville, Abdoulaye se rendit aux Français. Colonel Louis Archinard le prit sous sa protection. Le prestige de son origine et sa noblesse naturelle en firent un objet de vénération de la part des Africains de la colonne. En route pour Kayes, à chaque heure de salam, les tirailleurs musulmans allaient spontanément prier derrière lui. Un tel rayonnement spontané inquiéta Archinard. Les autorités coloniales auraient fixé Saint-Louis comme résidence à l’auguste prisonnier si la présence de celui-ci dans cette ville islamisée n’eût été susceptible d’entraîner du remous.
Le Gouvernement français ordonna donc l’envoi d’Abdoulaye à Paris où l’on confia son éducation à une famille bourgeoise, les de l’Isle de Sales.
D’une brillante intelligence, le fils du « Commandeur des Croyants » ne mit pas, au lycée Janson de Sailly, plus de 7 à 8 ans pour préparer avec succès le concours d’entrée à l’Ecole militaire de Saint-Cyr. Le 19 mars 1899, il s’éteignait à Passy, vers l’âge de 20 ans, comme le Roi de Rome, au moment où il prenait pleinement conscience du drame de sa famille. Il repose au cimetière de Montparnasse. »

Facade du lycée Janson de Sailly, dans le 16è Arrondissement à Paris. Abdullahi Taal y étudia dans les années 1890.
Facade du lycée Janson de Sailly, dans le 16è Arrondissement à Paris. Abdullahi Taal y étudia dans les années 1890.

Nazi Boni tire ses sources de la volumineuse documentation publiée, en deux volumes totalisant 1140 pages, par Jacques Méniaud.
Je publierai en temps opportun les travaux de Méniaud, dont la Bibliothèque du Congrès possède une copie, ici à Washington, DC., y compris les détails sur le séjour et la fin inopinée d’Abdulaahi Taal à Paris.

Le surnom l’Aiglon est une analogie entre le sort  de Napolén II, fils de Napoléon Ier, empereur des Français et le petit-fils d’Alhajj Umar Taal. Les deux princes moururent respectivement à 21 ans et à 20 ans.


Au chapitre 5 “Le Macina, Théâtre de guerres, Caveau des rois. Comment Aguibou succéda à son frère Ahmadou”, Nazi Boni traite de l’ascendance d’Abdullahi Taal. Il commence par les conquêtes fulgurantes et le règne d’Alhajj Umar, le Caliphe et champion de la voie tijjaniyya en Afrique de l’Ouest. Après avoir fondé Dinguiraye, dans l’actuelle Guinée, en 1849, il triompha de Ségou après deux ans de campagne (1949-1861). Il y fit son entrée le 9 mars 1861.
Nazi Boni examine ensuite le conflit —théologique, religieux, politique et militaire — entre Alhajj Umar et la dynastie Bari de la Diina du Maasina.

Amadou Hampâté Bâ et Jacques Daget nous ont laissé un récit plus complet de ce pan d’histoire dans l’Empire peul du Macina (1818-1845).

Le chapitre 4 est accessible sur Semantic Africa, où le reste du livre de Nazi Boni sera publié.

Les péripéties de la fin d’Alhajj Umar sont présentées. Le caliphe échappa au siège d’Hamdallaye par Ba-Lobbo, du Maasina, et Bekkay Ntiéni, de Tombouctou. Il trouva un refuge temporaire à Jegembere, à Bandiagara, en pays dogon. Il disparut dans une grotte de ce village après l’explosion d’un baril de poudre. A propos du siège et de ses conséquences, Nazi Boni écrit (page 207) :

« Au huitième mois du drame, les assiégés se sentirent perdus sans un secours extérieur. Ahmadou Cheikhou, sultan de Ségou qui ne pouvait ignorer la gravité de la situation avait adopté une attitude étrange, sinon inqualifiable. Il ne lui était absolument pas impossible d’accourir avec des renforts. Cependant, il ne tenta pas le moindre effort dans ce sens. Confiant aux moyens occultes de son père, attendait-il un miracle ? Ou bien faut-il croire, selon les rapports officiels, qu’il voyait dans l’éventuelle disparition de son père l’occasion de se défaire d’une tutelle dont il ne voulait peut-être plus ? Chose peu probable. En tout cas, ses frères lui rendirent la monnaie de sa pièce plus tard, à ses heures les plus tragiques.
On peut affirmer sans risque de se tromper que le conquérant blanc exploita cette faute d’Ahmadou pour introduire de graves dissensions dans la famille d’El Hadj Omar. »

Viennent ensuite les portraits, le rôle, les conflits et la lutte fratricide des princes Taal, présenté dans l’ordre suivant :

  • Tidiani Taal (1864-1888)
  • Mounirou Taal (1888-1891)
  • Tapsirou Taal
  • Mohammed Aguibou Taal (1893-1908)
  • Aguibou Taal
  • …………………

Nazi Boni s’apesantit sur la vie d’Aguibou Taal. Sous pression militaire française, il quitta son trône sur le royaume de Dinguiraye pour prendre le commanement de Bandiagara (et donc du Maasina). Sous la tutelle de Colonel Archinard, l’ennemi et le vainqueur de son frère Ahmadu Shaykh.

En résumé, l’Empire toucouleur d’Alhajj Umar rayonna pendant trente ans environ. Mais il s’effondra graduellement à partir de 1865. Tidiani, le neveu et généralissime, reprit le flambeau après la tragédie de Jegembere. Vint ensuite la succession légitime par Ahmadu Shaykh, au nom du droit d’aînesse. Mais l’acharnement d’Archinard contre Ahmadu mit fin à la souveraineté des Taal. La France coloniale imposa la soumission et la collaboration aux héritiers et successeurs d’Alhajj Umar.
Adversaire farouche d’Ahmadu Shaykh, Archinard ne se limita pas à le déloger de Ségou. Il lui ravit aussi Abdullahi, son enfant… Il confisqua également l’oeuvre, l’image et le souvenir de celui-ci en transportant toute la documentation sur le royaume toucouleur de Ségou dans ses archives, consignées depuis aux Archives nationales d’outre-mer.

Tierno S. Bah